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ABSTRACT
I have made an analysis of Santiago's Intercommunal Land-Use Plan, PRIS
(1960), in a historical perspective; its style of implementation, as
well as Chile's planning policy environment during the period 1960-1980,
a period in Chile of considerable political change. My intention was to
find common as well as diverse elements in the planning environments of
the four political regimes that took place during this time frame that
could have had an impact on PRIS' implementation. I examined the gaps
between declared intentions and their actual implementation, and the
effectiveness in reaching objectives. I tried to isolate the
difficulties encountered by PRIS that happened because of the Chilean
planning policy context of the 60s and 70s, from those that were
constant to this urban planning approach (recognizing that both factors
have strong interrelationships).
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INTRODUCT ION
"Those professions that do not look at
their past might not have a future".
(Laurence C. Gerchens, AICP, Executive Secretary of The
Society for American City and Regional Planning
History, at the 1990 APA National Planning Conference
in Denver)
Land-use metropolitan planning, seems to be returning in the
western hemisphere following more than a decade of
intellectual proscription. After being considered as the
solution to urban equity and development during the 50s and
60s, general disenchantment with its results banned it
almost completely during the 70s and 80s from the academic
field (though not from practice). It was sustained that
planners inclined to this type of approach in urban planning
were subject to three unsurmountable flaws: they were biased
toward physical planning, usually omitting social
considerations, they inevitably failed in designing adequate
implementation strategies, and they disregarded social
participation, because they usually belonged to the
tradition of top-down planning.
The reaction in the 70s in western developed countries,
mainly in the U.S., was to implement only policies at both,
the macro level (national planning), and at the base-level
(community planning). The first was to create the overall
framework for reaching national goals, and the latter would
allow a more direct participation of the people in the
decisions of affecting their habitat.
Chile, and Santiago (the capital city) were certainly not
the exception to this process. Santiago's Inter-municipal
Plan (PRIS), promulgated in 1960, was considered in its
origins as the tool for planning a modern metropolis, and
controlling its growth. And though an initial effort for
implementation was made, put in a context of increasing
social participation during the 60s and early 70s, it was
seen by coming planners as insufficient for confronting the
social conflicts that had emerged. Consequently the plan was
much left aside.
During the military government (1973-1990), and following
the trend described of pulling away from metropolitan
planning, urban planning was restructured. This task was
mainly accomplished by economists (many of whom had studied
in U.S. universities), polarizing it into the two extreme
levels pointed out: national urban planning, and municipal
land-use planning. For the first level, planners created an
indicative policy instrument, the National Policy of Urban
Development (PNDU) which introduced market oriented policies
to the field. And at the local level, most municipal land-
use plans were reformulated in a five year period (1980-
1985), making them consistent with the ideology of PNDU. As
a corollary, transgressions to metropolitan plans like that
of Santiago's 1, subject of this study, were tacitly
tolerated by the central authorities each time conflicts
between both instances arose. As I shall point out later,
this was facilitated by the fact that metropolitan plans had
no support-institution to enforce their prescriptions.
Municipalities in this new scheme were granted with greater
financial resources, though their decision making power was
greatly dimmed.
By the end of the 80s however, comprehensive planning seems
1 Besides PRIS, two other metropolitan plans were coded in
Chile: Concepcion (1965), and Valparaiso-Vina del Mar (1970).
to be coming back from its reclusion. Again international
technical assistance agencies --which were more on the line
of an anti-state approach during the 70s and early 80s-- are
encouraging comprehensive urban planning [Rivkin: 1983]. In
the United States, several cases which were not in the
mainstream of their times have shown impressive results in
comprehensive planning: Miami, Nashville, Jacksonville, and
Indianapolis [Patterson: 1988], while other cities have
recently reformulated their owns: Chicago, Boston, Denver,
as well as Toronto in Canada. Washington D.C.'s National
Capital Planning Commission - NCPC, is about to initiate
studies to project the U.S. national capital in a
comprehensive approach to the year 2050 2. Regarding
institutional aspects, discussion is taking place whether
Council of Governments (COGs) should be granted more
resources and authority to enforce sub-state regional plans.
Planners are also realizing that the crusade of protecting
the environment, where territorial jurisdictions are clearly
an obstacle, needs this more large-scale approach. We read
in a recent edition of a Connecticut-based planning
publication:
"Although (recent intense residential and
commercial growth in Connecticut has) increased
municipal tax bases, it has also caused
inconsistent land use patterns, degradation or
loss of regionally-significant natural and
agricultural resources, overburdened intrastate
roads and restricted access to affordable
housing. In other words, growth often occurred
without addressing regional economic and
environmental impacts. Because of strong 'home
rule' powers, however, municipalities in
Connecticut are not legally obligated to
address development impacts that transcend
2 National Capital Planning Commission, Project 2050.
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established political boundaries".
At this point I should make clear that by no means I am
advocating through this study a revival of the traditional
comprehensive land-use plan; that of static nature, and
produced by a professional clique, with no built-in
participatory structure, and of exclusive physical nature.
What I will be promoting is the idea that a scale and scope
like of this type of approach has not been replaced in
current urban planning instruments, and is truly missing
when dealing with problems like social equity, the
environment, or infrastructure maintenance and service
provision.
The general trend toward a more comprehensive approach in
urban planning will surely hit Chile in the coming years,
and an effort will have to be made to place it into a
context of higher social participation and pluralism, which
my country has adopted. I believe then that the time has
come to start analyzing Chile's own experience in
metropolitan planning, so to learn from the past what
difficulties are likely to be encountered, and what, on the
other hand, has proven to work well. The main purpose of
this thesis is to study the specific case of Santiago and
its 1960 Metropolitan Plan (PRIS 4) in relation to the
socio-political context in which it operated; to analyze not
only what failed or succeeded, but also to examine the
policy context in which the plan was designed and
implemented, and infer from there some of the possible
causes for these failures and achievements.
3 Callahan, Keane, "Why regional planning? An argument for
bioregionalism", in The Law and The Land, vol 4:4, Robinson & Cole;
Hartford, Connecticut, Winter 1990
4 "Plan Regulador Intercomunal de Santiago" - PRIS (1960).
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The present context looks promising for reconciling national
planning and municipal planning, and my hope is that studies
like this will see increase their value in the near future.
THESIS DESCRIPTION
I intend to make a historical analysis of Santiago's
intercommunal regulador plan PRIS 5, its style of
implementation, as well as Chile's planning policy
environment during the period 1960-1980. This was the time-
frame given by its authors as the period in which PRIS
prescriptions should have been in full operation. The
context for this study will be Chile's past four political
regimes: Alessandri, Frei, Allende, and Pinochet (up to
1980), a context of considerable political change. I will
try to find common as well as diverse elements during this
time frame that could have had an impact on PRIS'
implementation. I will examine the gaps between declared
intentions and their actual implementation, and the
effectiveness in reaching objectives. I will also attempt to
identify which of the difficulties encountered by PRIS owe
more to the chilean planning policy context of the 60s and
70s, and which instead owe just to the approach chosen,
recognizing that both factors have strong
interrelationships. Finally, based on all this, I will make
some concluding remarks.
In the first chapter I will make a brief review of
metropolitan planning literature and, and its actual
standing so to put PRIS in a historical policy context.
Chapter II will deal with a detailed analysis of PRIS'
objectives, precepts, updates, and evaluation of results.
Next, in chapter III, I will recount the policy environment
during the succeeding governments between 1960 and 1980,
5 Including the modification to the suburban land-use code
introduced in 1979 (Supreme Decree No. 420, 1979).
trying to establish connections to the PRIS' objectives,
precepts, updates, and results. Finally, in chapter IV I
will make some concluding remarks and recommendations.
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CHAPTER I: METROPOLITAN PLANNING SINCE 1950: A DISCUSSION
With this chapter I intend to make a conceptual framework
for analysis of PRIS. I will review the experience that
metropolitan land-use planning has showed in western
countries in the past thirty years, at the light of Latin
American comprehensive planning tradition. This is an
unfinished story and not a happy one. However, much has been
learned in the process.
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AND PLANNERS IN LATIN AMERICA BETWEEN
1950 AND 1980
Latin American planning in the 50s and 60s was deeply
grounded on the Comtean tradition 6 of the nineteenth
century which states that scientific rationality is to guide
of the human enterprise [Friedman: 1986]. According to this
vision, a plan is nothing but the translation of an historic
fate into pragmatic terms. To challenge a plan then, should
be as difficult as to challenge the law of gravity.
Added to the above, two other elements have profoundly
affected planning in Latin america. In the first place, the
role that the state has traditionally had as a strong and
centralized one, inheritance from the colonial period in
which all major decisions were taken by the spanish crown.
Once the new countries emerged in the early nineteenth
6 Auguste Comte (1798-1857), french mathematician and
philosopher.
century, the role of the crown was transferred to the new
states formed. The second element is the impact that the
ideas of the Enlightenment period had in the formation of
these new countries, determining a hierarchical relation
with the state, which establishes that the interests of the
state are identical to those of the people, a concept that
still endures [Friedman: 1986].
In the 50s and 60s, when long-range planning became
increasingly a state activity in Latin America, the
influence of this tradition, induced planners in the region
to understand comprehensive plans as an expression of the
public interests, that once legally coded, would provide a
course in history. Planning, could not then be abandon to
blind forces like the market or political interests, but
instead, should be carried by experts, who, absent of
personal political agendas, would obey only the national
interests [Friedman: 1986].
Three significant events greatly influenced planners in
Latin America in the 50s and 60s. The first was the success
of the Marshall Plan (1947-52), which connected investment
to planning, and thus established the identity "planning
equals development", a paradigm that would influence an
entire generation of planners in this continent [Friedman:
1986]. In the second place, the establishment of the French
Planning Commissariat (beginning of the 50s) whose
objectives were industrialization and modernization of the
infrastructure under the concept of indicative planning '.
Finally, the creation of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin
7 This is normally used to define a role for the state as
one leading the private sector toward the development of target
areas in accordance to a nation's interest. The instruments usually
employed to pursue this objective are initial public investment,
incentives and government action in general.
America), with its innovative techniques in investment
programming, knowledge taught to several young planners in
the region, and specially in Chile where ECLA had its
headquarters. For ECLA, economic growth and national
development goals were two sides of a same coin, and were to
be reached through a rapid industrialization process based
on the creation of protected markets, for which the state
was the main actor.
By the end of the 60s however, there was general
disappointment with long-term planning in Latin America. The
impetus of the beginning of the decade was gone. Its
principal objective: a more equitable distribution of
resources amongst the population seemed to be even farther
away than before. Also, planning was loosing the battle in
incorporating social and economically the enormous masses of
migrants to cities that had triggered in the developing
world in the mid 40s. Lets not forget that, in absolute
numbers, this flow of low-income persons to the urban areas
in LDCs since World War II constituted one of the greatest
migrations in human history.
"The vast stretches of make-shift dwellings
surrounding virtually every city of the
developing world, (in many cases constituting
the majority of the population), are a visual
manifestation of the general breakdown of
conventional legal and administrative
institutions when confronted with the sheer
magnitudes of current levels of urbanization"
[Doeble: 19751.
Beginning the 70s planning was under change. The informal
sector was "discovered" (ILO 1972) and later on (ILO 1977)
the satisfaction of basic needs was put into the planning
agenda in most international planning institutions. World
Bank, for example, started promoting plans aimed to the
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self-improvement in urban housing and rural development. On
the other hand, the apparent success of the Newly
Industrialized Countries (NICs) switched the import
substitution ideology to another which promoted industrial
exports. Rational planning and linear growth put in this new
context were losing their grounds. If planning was in a
crisis in the late 60s, a decade later was in a complete
disorder [Friedman: 19861. Some countries in the region,
like Chile and Uruguay, begun by then experimenting with
neo-liberal policies and their application to urban
planning.
By the late 70s in the United States and Western Europe the
tendency was toward speeding up the plan-making process, to
involve those affected, to integrate resource and
development planning, to make planning more adaptable, less
detailed; to make implementation more a matter of guiding
growth, less a structure of legal control for what shall not
be done [OECD, Ian Haywood: 1977]. Long-range comprehensive
planning became under attack --both within and without the
planning profession-- and is still today. Many specialist go
as far as to believe that it is ineffective, unrealistic,
lacking initiative, and even irrelevant [Patterson: 1983].
By the same token, the relatively short-term community
development planning has been increasing since then,
specially in the United States, and it is in this area where
most of the planning investment goes, and where the greatest
public interest is.
In most of Latin America however, this process was not
entirely captured. In the first place because of different
public policy-making traditions described. But primarily
because most of these countries were at the time under
military regimes, where top-down planning had found again
its way. In Chile for instance, despite greater financial
18
resources granted to the local governments (municipalities)
during the Pinochet regime, no greater decision-making power
was --on a participatory basis-- tied up with this policy.
From the frustrated experience of the 60s and 70s,
comprehensive planning theorists, and planners have gained
more understanding of the political consequences of this
approach. In the first place, planning is now seen as
inseparable from politics; no such thing as neutral or
scientific planning is possible; and no plans can succeed if
no consideration is given to current political limitations
[Friedman: 1986]. In the second place, the state is one
among other actors in a society. It is neither totally
autonomous nor totally an instrument of class domination.
The state is not neutral, and has its own agenda, which at
times is opposed to other legitimate actors [Friedman:
1986]. In the urban planning realm, much more consciousness
exists among urban planners to recognize that urbanization
creates new groupings of interests and centers of power and
influence, each of which attempts to manipulate the
legal/administrative system to its own ends [Doeble: 1975];
that land-use regulations are often drafted to protect these
vested interests and to serve existing owners at the expense
of new development [Courtney in Dunkerley: 1983], that local
vested interests perpetuate status-quo situations
(specifically social segregation) [Patterson: 1988].
MAIN FAILURES OF METROPOLITAN PLANS
In general, land-use metropolitan plans in LDCs have failed
to achieve their goals. A desire of greater land-use
efficiency and a more equitable distribution of urban
resources (mainly land) have not been provided by this
19
planning approach. Many reasons are usually given for this
phenomena, but the most cited among the literature reviewed
are:
Over-ambitious objectives
The objectives usually put forward in most metropolitan
plans and in most land-use policies, specially within a
context of rapid urban expansion (distinctiveness of most of
Latin America's capital cities during the 60s and 70s) are:
appropriate supply of urbanized land for housing, for
recreational activities, for productive activities, and
services; harmonious urban spatial patterns; greater equity
in wealth income, including access by low-income families to
adequate shelter; spatial distribution of population and
activities at the regional and national levels consistent
with general national priorities; etc, etc. These objectives
not only overlap and raise the typical conflict between
giving priority to efficiency or to equity, particularly in
the short term; they are also too vague to be useful
[Dunkerley: 19831. "They do not define the concepts needed
to determine operational priorities and to adjust these
priorities to rapidly changing conditions. Desirable urban
patterns are particularly difficult to define with
precision; many value judgments are involved and must be
made in ignorance of long-term effects and of changes that
will occur over the long lifetime of what now is being
built" [Dunkerley: 1983].
Another type of objective that has been a constant to most
large-scale urban plans has been the aspiration of achieving
"efficient" land-use patterns and urban growth. This
traditionally has been understood as to mean "denser" urban
development. The argument has been that the higher the
20
density of urban development, the lower the per capita cost
in infrastructure. It is also said that another advantage of
density is to avoid misuse, and protect (however
indirectly), high valued agricultural land, as means of
guaranteeing food provision for the city. Evidence provided
by experts for inefficient land use is the 'leap-frog' style
of development (bypassing vacant tracts). The strategy to
address this problem during the 60s and 70s was to define
strict urban limits around the built area of cities, i.e. a
moratorium solution. But those types of limits implied a no-
growth solution, un-implementable in the Latin American
context of the time. Sooner than latter, not only developers
and organized settlers advanced those limits, but the state
as well, regardless the existence of a plan. Experience, has
proven that metropolitan plans rarely alter urban density
against economic forces [Patterson: 19881.
The creation of a greenbelt around cities was an inspiration
taken from the London Greater Plan which was also typically
adopted by metropolitan plans elsewhere. Agriculture land in
the outskirts of the city would not only deserve protection
from the production point of view, but also as a mean of
assuring the existence of close-by open space to all
citizens (again a social equity principle). In less
developed countries this idea has rarely succeeded. However,
this remains as a valid aspiration which still needs further
study in economic terms 8.
a Recent empirical studies in the United States for example,
have shown that this objective can be accomplished within the rules
of the market if regulations are well designed and include the
existence of exurban districts. In those cases, the demand for
exurban land shifts to exurban districts and not to farmland
protected in a greenbelt; the price gradient of exurban land rises
near the greenbelt area denoting that exurban land captures scenic
and other benefits from the greenbelt; and if both types of
districts are well defined, both types of activities can coexist.
For further information see: Nelson, Arthur C., "An empirical note
Physical bias and absence of implementation and monitoring
mechanisms
The physical orientation of Latin American urban planners,
specially in the southern cone, has a strong inspiration in
the British tradition, which consists in preparing extremely
detailed plans for land-use, transportation, and density,
which give official status to the pattern to be achieved. It
is strongly influenced by architectural design concepts.
This approach has failed in implementation due to
disassociating public investment decisions with plan
prescriptions, and also because insufficient and inadequate
personnel usually operates the system. The rigidity of such
approaches have contributed to the gap between plan and
performance [Rivkin in Dunkerley: 1983].
The 'Plano Regulador' (traditional land-use instrument in
Latin America) is structured as a final product instead as a
first step in a continuing planning process. A process that
should begin with the identification of problems to their
solution through coordinated implementation measures. Rarely
there has been left room for periodic revisions, with
follow-up studies. Neither has been concern for
reconsideration of objectives based on changing priorities
among local interest groups. "When the same political
leadership is retained over many years, the same rigid plan
prevails. With a change in administration the entire plan
can be tossed out" [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
on how regional urban containment policy influences an interaction
between greenbelt and exurban land markets", in Journal of the
American Planning Association, Vol 54:2, Spring 1988. (An even more
extended article can be found in JAPA Spring 1986).
In general, metropolitan planners have lacked of strategic
thinking, they have tended to see strategy as large scale,
and tactics as small scale. They have demonstrated good
tactical ability, but poor strategic thinking, specially in
two areas: unnecessary separation between formulation and
implementation, and inability to see planning in the context
of public management system, specifically paying attention
to the process of allocation of resources (and in a broader
sense than public finance). Implementation of physical plans
based on location permit granting (according to established
zoning regulations), is rather a crude mechanism confronted
with indicative economic plans [OECD, Dekleva, et al: 1977].
In LDCs, where urban growth is rapid, and financial
resources and infrastructure are invariably insufficient,
metropolitan planning has become an isolated activity, often
lacking of effective tools for implementation [Doeble:
1975]. Urban planning is still seen as physical planning, of
static nature, lacking both investment priorities and
effective land-use control policies. Almost no attention is
paid to implementation, "to anticipating the reaction of
market forces, and to assessing the cost of various
government agencies and the economic effects on different
income groups" [Courtney in Dunkerley: 1983]. During the
past three decades of urban planning in Latin America
planners have primarily emphasized the technical and
physical aspects of planning instead of the policy-making
function, physical development instead of a continuous
participatory process. This narrow conception has left
behind completely unsolved the most vital social and
economic problems of the cities, physical improvements have
normally been detrimental for the poor, and spatial
segregation has deepen [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
Inanorooriateness of land management systems
Starting the mid 70s the tendency in metropolitan planning
in western countries was to reverse the tight control on
urban expansion and to make the market control the
incorporation of land to be urbanized. But the market has
shown poor results in producing efficient land-use patterns.
Without some standards for land subdivisions and building,
market forces have often produced patterns of development
that have increased the cost of providing public services,
increases in costs that cannot be readily related or charged
to individual actions that caused them [Dunkerley: 1983].
The leading role of public authorities in land management
and in guiding growth seems to be over. As the Vancouver
Habitat Congress of 1976 had stated in its final document:
"Land, because of its unique nature and the
crucial role it plays in human settlements,
cannot be treated as an ordinary asset,
controlled by individuals and subject to the
pressures and inefficiencies of the market.
Private land is also a principal instrument of
accumulation and concentration of wealth and
therefore contributes to social injustice; if
unchecked, it may become a major obstacle in
the planning and implementation of development
schemes. Social justice, urban renewal and
development, the provision of decent dwellings
and healthy conditions for the people can only
be achieved if land is used in the interests of
society as a whole"..."Land is a scarce
resource whose management should be subject to
public surveillance or control in the interest
of the nation".
* Vancouver Habitat Congress, "Recommendations on land
policy", Vancouver, Canada, 1976.
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The strategy in the United States and England has been a
higher degrees of government involvement in land management
with an active participation of interests groups. The state
guides private developers representing the public interest
and according to a well defined plan of priorities and
incentives, normally leaving space for negotiations.
Interest groups and individuals have a say in establishing
zoning regulations in public meetings, and through lobbying
the legislature; and if adversely affected have always the
resort of acting through the judicial system. Ordinances and
regulations are constantly revised according to changing
conditions.
Control of land speculation and price is usually the result
of a poor land management system. Powerful social and
economic forces, like accelerated processes of urbanization
and urban population growth, periods of low interest rates
and or high inflation, capital markets poorly developed
which makes land a secure investment, semi-monopolistic land
ownership, etc., have gone beyond plans' control systems or
of the responsible urban planning institutions. Ironically,
in occasions land-use plans themselves have generated these
types of phenomena; for example, by stating in advance which
land is to-be-urbanized, frequently generates land
speculation; in a market economy, insufficient stock of
serviced land for development, as a result of a new plan,
will definitely increase prices. Speculation also arises
from weak enforcement and modification of regulations, which
leads to escalation of land prices, excluding low-income
households [Courtney in Dunkerley: 19831.
The other side of the story is that the high value of
favorable decisions generates a climate of corruption in the
public policy environment. Despite strong legal sanctions
and enforcement agencies, for instance, it may not be
possible to implement density controls if the population is
expanding rapidly but the supply of urbanized land is
tightly constrained. Regulatory measures slow the rate at
which urban land is supplied and hence increase pressures to
subvert them [Dunkerley: 1983].
Rigidity of prescriptions and excessive extension of time
frames
This rigidity of comprehensive land-use plans has been their
worst enemy given their usual long-term strategy. Generally,
they look at ten or fifteen years ahead with a ten year look
at proposals for development. But the fact of the matter is
that reality keeps demonstrating the near impossibility of
any accurate forecast of the likely resource situation a
decade in advance; specially in LDCs. Also, long-term
planning has been commonly associated with inflexible
controls mechanisms, which has made adjustment to rapid
change extremely difficult. Moreover, the static nature of
these regulations puts the public sector in a position of
reaction and constraint, rather than initiation and
promotion, and they may also have serious negative effects,
causing delays and unproductive expenditures in the process
of securing exceptions, or spurious conformity to the plans
[Courtney in Dunkerley: 1983]. As a consequence
comprehensive plans have had an appearance of unreality, or
at least uncertainty [OECD, Murray Stewart: 1977].
Inappropriate way of working with instability
Metropolitan land-use plans in developing countries are even
more rarely followed than in developed countries.
"Incorrectly estimated growth patterns, political pressure
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for change, and failure to provide the indicated public
services are common causes of this poor record" [Dunkerley:
19831. Also political instability. Urban planners need to
find a way of dealing with instability. Political and
institutional instability has been the single most important
reason while metropolitan plans have not succeeded in Latin
America. Plans have lacked the political will and stability
needed to extend their usefulness over the period of one and
two decades for which they were projected. Greater political
continuity as well as institutional reforms are basic
prerequisites to long-range policy-making [Violich-
Daughters: 1987].
This brings about another related issue: working with
uncertainty. Planning systems which have left no room for
uncertain outcomes of their prescriptions, or for variables
for which they have no control, with the complexity of
uncertainty of decisions in which they are involved, have
had an uneasy performance, if not relinquished completely.
On the other hand, a sense of pragmatism has shown that
land-use plans, despite efforts to keep up with their
original design, are adapted quite regularly [OECD, Andreas
Faludi: 1977]. The case of PRIS is a good example: as I
shall describe later, after several years of implementing a
no-growth strategy, it became evident that the plan had
failed in anticipating the magnitude of population growth
for Santiago. Nevertheless, the plan had no alternative
prescriptions or a structured way of deciding alternative
solutions. Soon, PRIS planners, instead of using the
instrument for guiding and managing this diverting variable,
were only introducing the necessary changes on the plan so
it would fit with reality, i.e. drawing new urban limits.
This nearly obsessive need for accomplishing a complete
finished product, has made the periods of study plans and
design of metropolitan extremely lengthy. In LDCs this is
aggravated by the lack of information and data. The duration
of a research and design period for preparing a plan like
this normally takes between three to five years, sometimes
more 1*, which often makes them outdated before becoming
operational [OECD Murray Stewart: 1977]. Besides, typically
there has been absence of provision for regular short-term
updating to keep up with changing circumstances, which makes
them nearly impossible to coordinate with annual programming
and budget decisions [OECD, Murray Stewart: 1977].
So, while mid and long-range planning have been the paradigm
for urban planners (constantly praised in the field's
literature), the plans have usually failed under short term
crisis, and thus, improvisation and adaptation have usually
taken place in policy design, despite of these formal long-
range plans [Friedman: 1986].
Lack of public participation
If a plan is imposed without considering the problems of
implementation, feedback, and involvement of those affected
(citizens, landowners, investors, industrialists) the plan
is likely to be left aside [OECD, Ian Haywood: 1977]. One
key reason why large-scale land-use plans tend to be left
aside is that they tend to deny room for public
participation.
In some countries' efforts to overcome this problem through
the organization of public meetings, before, during and
after a metropolitan plan is coded. But experience has shown
that still there is an unfortunate information and education
10 PRIS' study took seven years.
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gap between planners and the public, which needs to be
closed before these meetings can be less than
inconsequential. The most common deficiencies are:
disorganized participation systems, unaware authorities of
the usefulness of participation, unavailability of accurate
information, no opportunities for everyone to speak up, ill-
use of groups and people willing to get involved, no
consensus on common agendas between politicians,
technicians, and public, etc. The usual public meeting to
discuss a new metropolitan plan to-be-coded goes more or
less like this:
"...suddenly, someone is telling (ordinary
people) to think about their future in relation
to that of a city, about the future living-
surroundings of their future children. And
someone is telling them that in nice booklets.
Or by way of official papers. Papers that
otherwise one only gets from tax offices or
police officers. And suddenly, while (they) are
accustomed to silently walking on the shady
side of the street, trying to be quiet, and
avoiding trouble, (they) are invited to speak
up to people who seem to be in a position to
order major changes in city-life"..." Only that
what (it is conveyed to them), in written and
spoken words, is put in most difficult and
official terms. A kind of sanskrit"..."They
have to see alternative solutions, choose from
them and see through this, to other problems
that might emerge from their choice. They are
expected to be able to talk about all this to
people who clearly know better and are trained
masters in discussion. Who is really informed?
Who could really participate?" "
Galjaard, J.M. , "Participation in planning - price and value
- some comments from the Netherlands", in: Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development - OECD, Ian Haywood (editor),
"Implementation of Urban Plans", "a summary of proceedings of a
symposium held in Athens, lOth-14th October, 1977.
In Latin American, where extreme inequalities exist among
different areas of the cities, where national politics are
above all public decisions, and where the state has
traditionally played a strong role in deciding what is best
for the public interest, a metropolitan level town meeting
can be highly unproductive and confrontational. There, plans
are generally considered to be more property of professional
personnel, who are directly influenced by political power,
than instruments for reflecting the will of a particular
community [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE 90s
Nevertheless all these difficulties that comprehensive
metropolitan planning has confronted in past decades, it
still seems to be the level of urban planning where it is
possible to extract the relevant issues of national policies
--sectoral or comprehensive-- make a framework with
interpretations that convey toward the systematic
development of the metropolitan area, and to apply the
decisions to areas of the city [Gakenheimer: 1971].
Metropolitan plans, though usually absent of legal enforcing
powers and powerful backing institutions, have had in some
cases success in promoting good ideas. Concepts which serve
to smaller scale plans to work under a larger conceptual
framework. Greenbelt, commercial corridors, water resource
management, etc, are usual topics that local plans make
reference to metropolitan plans, even if not forced to by
law.
There seems to be indications of new attitudes toward land
use planning and regulation which can make metropolitan
plans more operational than in the past. The older types of
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comprehensive land-use and master plans are giving way to a
more flexible approach relating planning and implementation
more closely at the metropolitan or regional level. Land-use
planning in general, is now almost invariably seen as
continuous process, requiring periodic review of actual
accomplishments and changing requirements and a pragmatic
approach to meeting multiple objectives with the very
limited means available --not least, those for
implementation and enforcement [Dunkerley: 1983].
For Latin America there is still a greater challenge. During
the 80s, this continent has seen a new a actor that rise:
the anonymous poor masses; a growing sector with high levels
of organization and capacity for action, which are
challenging the old scheme of a bourgeoisie control of the
state [Friedman: 1986]. Unless metropolitan planning becomes
a process where this social sector is incorporated into a
formal participatory land-use planning procedure, we are
likely to see in the future a deepening differentiation of
two types of cities: that where planning is structured and
effective, and another --where the majority lives-- where
planning goes behind de facto land-use operations.
CHAPTER II: THE INTERCOMMUNAL PLAN OF SANTIAGO -- PRIS
INTRODUCTORY SYNOPSIS
Santiago's metropolitan land-use plan --PRIS-- 12, has
already existed for thirty years. It was promulgated in
1960; and has undergone few changes since, remaining today
as a legally recognized document. In 1979 substantial
modifications were introduced to the so called "suburban
area" through the Supreme Decree 420/79 ", transforming
part of the original PRIS into a new plan.
The initial plan (1960) was prepared following a world trend
on metropolitan master planning, influenced by the London
Greater Plan (1944), and specially by the Plan d'Amunagement
et d'Organization Gxnrale de la RIgion Parisien -- PADOG--
(1958). It was elaborated within the Planning Department of
the Ministry of Public Works, where a special office was
designated for this purpose "*. (When the Ministry of
Housing was created in 1965 these activities were
transferred there, specifically to the Urban Development
Division). Under the direction of Juan Honold (architect), a
group of professionals, mainly architects and engineers, had
been working in this plan since 1953, i.e., they took seven
years to have it ready, and convince the executive power
12 Plan Regulador Intercommunal de Santiago, D.S. no 2387,
MOP, 11-10-60.
13 Supreme Decree No 420; MINVU, 10-31-79.
14 "Departamento de Planos Reguladores".
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(lobbying in terms of U.S. politics) to promulgate it. As a
strategy for territorial coordination, they had consulted
with planning officials of the seventeen municipalities that
were to compromise what the plan denominated the
"Metropolitan Area of Santiago". After its adoption PRIS'
physical statutes became incorporated in the corresponding
municipal development guidance maps as the mechanism for
implementation.
PRIS was an advanced instrument for its time, mainly due to
having features as industrial zoning and traffic network
design. Nonetheless, many of its propositions failed, either
by lack of implementation, or else by not being followed by
the private sector, community and even state institutions.
It was an imperative style of planning, where its norms were
transferred to municipal guidance maps with no consultation
with the public, and imposed by decree in the belief that
the state accurately represents the public interest (Comtean
tradition), and that passing a law was just enough for the
plan to become a reality, a classic concept of latin
american planners [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
In spite of PRIS weaknesses as a policy instrument, some of
its precepts did thrive: industrial relocation, road
network, and up to some extent, inter-municipal
coordination. But its moratorium on land annexation
completely failed in two of its main --and related-- goals:
increasing urban density, and controlling growth in fringe
areas.
Almost twenty years later, in 1979, and in a completely
different political context, the liberalization of the
exurban land, carried forward through the supreme decree No
420/79, made significant modifications to what the PRIS had
designated as "suburban areas". Moratorium was abandon and a
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growth management style was introduced. While the norms for
the internal urbanized area of Santiago were left almost
intact to the original plan, outside the perimeter was
created an "urban expansion area", eliminating in this zone
most restrictions on subdivision ordinances -. The ideology
behind this new policy was to introduce market rules to
Santiago's exurban land, and was done in order to make the
plan consistent with the general ongoing economic principles
of market deregulation policies at the national level. Only
few restrictions would apply for urbanizing this surrounding
land, as its authors believed that productive rural land
should freely compete with urbanized land, and, in general,
that market forces are the most efficient way of protecting
the public interests [Lopez: 1981].
GENESIS
In 1953, using special prerogatives ("facultades
extraordinarias") for legislative power, conferred by
Congress to President Ibasez 1, he promulgated a new
Building and Urbanization Code 1, considered by chilean
specialists as the first modern urban legislation in the
country. This code established for the first time, and
within a legal framework, the need for those cities which
were conformed by multiple municipalities of intercommunal
planning, basically understood as the need of having
*s In the inner-zone liberalization was carried forward through
local (municipal) land-use plans.
1 Carlos Ibanez del Campo, President of Chile between 1952
and 1958.
17 "Ley General de Construcciones y Urbanizaciones"; DFL 224,
July 7, 1953. Effective until 1976.
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coordinated intercommunal land-use plans. It granted these
to-be-made plans a higher rank or status than the existing
municipal land-use plans. The latter were from then on to be
subordinated to the intercommunal maps in urban areas where
these were promulgated.
Endowed by this new legislative body, the Planning
Department of the Ministry of Public Works and
Transportation -- MOPT, without delay assembled a
professional team to study an intercommunal regulador map
for Santiago [Honold: 1985]. The team was integrated by a
majority of architects and engineers, the professions that
were believed at the time to be the best prepared for urban
planning. After seven years of analysis and of policy
design, in November 1960, and being the President by then
Jorge Alessandri ", it was finally promulgated the
Intercommunal Plan Regulador of Santiago - PRIS ".
Usually, to conceive and code a metropolitan land-use plan
takes between two and three years. PRIS took seven, probably
owed to the fact that its authors lacked of the necessary
expertise, experience and data. It was one of the first
metropolitan plans Latin America, and the majority of its
professionals had recently graduated from the university.
The plan basically defined the urban, suburban, and rural
areas for the seventeen municipalities that conformed what
denominated "The Metropolitan Area of Santiago". The area
had 1,900,000 residents, and the plan envisioned 5,000,000
in the next twenty years (1960-1980) [Honold-Poblete: 1966].
It also designed a new traffic network; zoned industry,
18 1958-1964.
" Supreme Decree No. 2387, MOPT; November 10, 1960.
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green and open spaces, and areas restricted to residential
use; all of this with an intercommunal perspective. Most of
its precepts, although not explicitly stated in the plan,
were to be reached in a time span of twenty years (1960-
1980) (Honold-Poblete: 1966).
PRIS included in its jurisdiction the territories of the
seventeen municipalities that conformed then the urbanized
area of Santiago: Santiago, the central commune with a
population of 646,000, San Miguel (244,000), Nuzoa
(206,000), Conchali (159,000), La Cisterna (154,000), Quinta
Normal (150,000), Las Condes (86,000), Providencia (83,000),
Pudahuel (78,000), San Bernardo (71,000), La Granja
(68,000), Renca (53,000), Maipu (51,000), Puente Alto
(51,000), La Florida (18,000), Quilicura (6,000), and
Pirque.
Complementary to PRIS was a Regional Plan, also elaborated
by the same professional team at the Planning Department of
MOPT, which considered mainly aspects related to industrial
relocation (due to economic or environmental impacts).
PRIS is not explicit either in its agenda (time schedule and
priorities) nor in the sharing of implementation
responsibilities. This was supposedly to be in hands of the
planning departments of the ministries and municipalities,
at least until a Metropolitan Government of Santiago was
created. But unfortunately this never happened.
Strictly speaking, PRIS is a legally standing planning
instrument today, having only once been significantly
updated. This occurred in 1979 when Santiago's suburban area
was subject to land-use liberalization under President's
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Pinochet regime 20
STRUCTURE OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING IN CHILE
Metropolitan urban planning in Chile, within the period of
this analysis, used mainly the tools, instruments and
control mechanisms of land-use planning. During 1960-1980,
it was also a restrictive method where the state retained
urban planning as a monopolistic activity based on land-use
regulations. These are: zoning, subdivision regulations,
building regulations, and approval by local governments
(municipalities).
The hierarchy of urban land-use plans has been the
following: above all, if existing, a metropolitan land-use
plan ("Plan Regulador Intercomunal"); at the local or
municipal level, a municipal land-use plan ("Plan Regulador
Comunal"), and for special situations master or structure
plans ("Plan Seccional") 21. These three instruments use
basically the same types of land-use control mechanisms:
zoning, subdivision regulations, and building regulations,
providing a hierarchy of regulatory techniques covering
different sizes of land area and levels of detail, from the
whole city (metropolitan plans) to a plot scale (local
building regulations). The three instruments were usually
used in conjunction and often including elements of one
another. Metropolitan plans were over local plans, and the
latter could be more restrictive. Both types of plans were
20 Supreme Decree No. 420, MINVU; October 31, 1979.
21 Since 1979, and according to the National Policy of Urban
Development (PNDU), above all these instruments should be a
"Regional Regulador Plan". However, these have not been formulated
for any region in accordance to this policy (see Annex 1).
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determined by different groups of decision-makers: planners
from the Ministry of Housing and of the municipalities
respectively, fact which often produced lack of
coordination.
Starting in 1980, land-use regulations were subject to
reform and a system of management-improvements was imposed:
most barriers were removed to use incentives and
restrictions on land annexation through market forces. In
Santiago, PRIS was revised in relation to the exurban areas,
and local plans only had to comply with the National Policy
of Urban Development (PNDU), a document that applied the
principles of a free market to urban planning 22
This strategy however, failed in creating a system
consistent with its principles; providing well defined
mechanisms of incentives for private developers, a system
where the government could use financial resources and power
to organize land-use development. The concept of a
subsidiary state was considered mostly as a "hands-off
state" (see chapter III, Public Development Policy during
the Pinochet Regime).
OBJECTIVES OF PRIS
City growth and socio-demographic considerations
According to the 1952 Census, Santiago's population had
doubled in the previous twenty two years (1930-1952): from
22 Starting in 1980 also, local land-use plans were
subcontracted to certified private consultant firms. The directive
was: "make them as flexible as possible".
696,231 to 1,384,285 inhabitants. Contemporary forecasts
were estimating 5.000,000 for 1985, i.e., four times the
1952 population [Honold: 1985]. The population rate of
growth had been 3.1 between 1940 and 1952, and 4.7 between
1952 and 1960, while for the rest of the country had only
been 1.39 and 2.75 respectively [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
This was in total contradiction with the million inhabitants
that Karl Brunner 23 forecasted in the early thirties and to
be reached by 1960. On Brunner's forecast was based
Santiago's central commune's Regulador Plan (land-use
plan), and most of chilean city planners beliefs prior to
1950.
In addition all this, the process of urbanization and
concentration in Santiago --mainly originated by the state
in the late 30s with a state-guided industrialization
policy-- had concentrated in Santiago by 1960, 32% of the
national population, being the migratory process responsible
for almost a third of this growth between 1952 and 1960 24
What seemed more alarming, was that the levels of investment
--specially in infrastructure-- had not significantly
increased within the same period, process known as
"uncapitalized urbanization". As a result of this situation,
huge slums or shanty towns had sprung in the periphery of
23 Austrian city planner hired by the Chilean government to
design Santiago's commune first regulador plan (1929).
24 Raczynski, D., Estudios CIEPLAN No. 29.
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Santiago ("misery belts" in the rhetoric of the 50s), and
vast tracts of agricultural soil had yielded to
urbanization.
Each of the municipalities that conformed Santiago, and
which already had a Regulador Plan (7 out of 17), was making
ample provisions of land from the exurban area, and
reserving it for residential use. In this way they could
attract and increase their population, and consequently,
gain leverage in their petitions to the central government
[Honold: 19851. No legal instrument checked the occupation
of this land, which, if occurred, would have signified a
four-fold of the city's area, i.e., 60,000 hectares (150,000
acres) [Honold: 1985]. What PRIS planners were concerned
with, was that the majority of this land was rich
agriculture soil, devoted to food production for Santiago's
supply. They saw then the need for establishing a mechanism
for protection.
Zoning and traffic considerations
Industrial location in Santiago was considered as totally
anarchic by PRIS' team. Each municipality provided land to
have its own industrial park, giving little or no
consideration to impacts on the rest of the city of factors
such as contamination, security, or traffic congestion. The
central commune concentrated by 1960 around 50% of
Santiago's industry, and more or less 25% of the country's,
most of which was labor-intensive. Relocation seemed
inevitable [Honold-Poblete: 19661.
Most of Santiago's communes were poor and lacked of public
services. It seemed as a contradiction that cities with a
fourth of the population of some of the communes of the
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metropolitan area of Santiago, had instead much better
communal services [Honold- Poblete: 1966]. This situation
increased the use of the central commune's service system,
already overloaded, but by far the best equipped. Equity
considerations guided PRIS planners to propose a
decentralized service system.
Another consideration was that Santiago's traffic network
seemed obsolete. The city had had up to then an aggregative
style of physical growth, and the main avenues of Santiago
were of radial nature, overlaying the colonial period
access-roads to the city. This, in combination with the
already mentioned lack of public services and retail stores
in most communes, produced enormous daily backups in the
downtown area. A new traffic network looked like the
solution.
With respect to green areas, Santiago's municipalities had
not taken well care of this need, mainly due to the speed of
growth of the metropolitan area. Not enough land had been
zoned as green areas, and less had been implemented. Most of
the parks citizens used, belonged to the central commune,
and had been created in the nineteenth or early twentieth
century. Some of the ones located in the peripheral communes
were in private hands. Open space in the outskirts of the
city seemed to be the only means of contact with nature, but
rather inaccessible to the majority of the population.
Decision-making processes
To coordinate the decision-making process was a key target
of the intercommunal planning scheme considered in the new
Building and Urbanization code of 1953. Until 1960, when
PRIS was promulgated, each municipality was completely
sovereign in its land-use planning and zoning-code's
decisions. No coordination or legal framework for urban
planning between the Santiago's seventeen municipalities,
nor these with the central government existed.
On the other hand, and regarding infrastructure and
facility-provision, the situation was the opposite, but
ironically, with no better results. The state had
centralized this function, but had located these activities
in different national agencies, creating again a problem of
coordination. In the Ministry of Public Works (MOPT) were
located: the Urban Pavement agency, the Sanitary Works
agency, the housing agency (CORVI), the Santiago Water
Company, and the state Architecture agency in charge of
building community development facilities. In the Ministry
of Education was the agency that constructed public schools
in urban areas, "Sociedad Constructora de Establecimientos
Educacionales". In the Ministry of Public Health was the
equivalent "Sociedad Constructora de Establecimientos
Educacionales". In the Ministry of Interior was the Electric
and Gas Service agency, in charge of regulating the
provision of electricity and gas to the urban areas
[Cleaves: 1974]. Also, The Central Savings and Loan Fund,
"Caja Central de Ahorros y Prestamos", in charge of
auditing, regulating and promoting the private system of
savings and loans associations for housing loans, was under
the supervision of the Ministry of Finance [Cleaves: 1974].
By the same token, there was no integrated planning between
the urban areas of Santiago, and the surrounding rural
areas, task that corresponded to the Ministry of
Agriculture.
For the coordination of all these state agencies the authors
of PRIS were expecting the soon creation of a metropolitan
planning agency that would serve as an integrating entity
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between national and metropolitan planning [Honold-Poblete:
1966]. Though much literature was written on this topic in
the late 60s and early 70s, the idea was never fully
materialized, and to that owes in great extent the failure
of PRIS implementation 25
PRIS' PRECEPTS
Zoning and city limits
PRIS zoned three basic types of areas: urban, suburban, and
rural; separated by urban and suburban limits respectively.
These were basically defined by their land-use regime.
In the urban area PRIS prescribed residential use,
commercial use, industrial use, communal services, and green
areas. Building in these areas had to be in agreement with
PRIS zoning code as well with those determined by the
corresponding municipal land-use plans, codes and
ordinances.
For the suburban area, four possible uses were coded and
zoned: rural-residential subdivisions ("parcelas agricolas-
residenciales"), with a minimum size between 5,000 and
25 During the Pinochet regime it was created the "Intendencia
Metropolitana", a sort of sub-state regional government; but
because of its hierarchal relation to the central government
(dependent on the Ministry of Interior), it was more devoted to
housing programs than to urban planning, activity which reported
greater political rewarding (see chapter III: Metropolitan
planning).
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15,000 square meters (1.25 - 3.75 acres), and with a floor
area ratio between 8 and 3% respectively; the quantity and
quality of urbanization and infrastructure of this area was
to be determined by the Urban Pavement Division, and the
Sanitary Works Division, both belonging as well with PRIS'
office to MOPT; a second area for forest preservation, a
third for agriculture preservation, and a fourth for special
uses (airports, military camps, hospitals, tourist,
historical sites, cemeteries, etc.). The suburban area was
thought as the city's land stock for future development, not
to be urbanized for twenty years (1960-80). In the meanwhile
it would serve as a city resort area, a sort of "greenbelt"
as that of the Greater London Plan [Honold: 19851. Though
the rural-residential use was an acknowledgement of the fact
that to preserve a greenbelt there is a need for regulating
exurban districts (see chapter I), the minimum size of the
lots allowed corresponded more to U.S. standards than to
chilean, and thus its residential use became highly
restrictive. This land was also the target for land-
takeovers, as well as for massive state-built housing
projects. All three types of actions against, and despite,
PRIS regulations.
Finally the rural area --that outside the suburban limits
but within the municipalities' jurisdiction -- was reserved
only for agricultural use, and coded by specific pre-
existing laws 26. PRIS subdivision regulations stipulated
land tracts not inferior to 15,000 hectares (37,000 acres).
An agricultural development plan for this area to compete in
economic terms with the suburban and urban areas was not
provided by this plan. It was believed that just by defining
these limits would encourage the state and the private
26 Law No. 7747, and by the "Reglamento de Parcelaciones
Agricolas" (decree No. 319, May 25, 1954).
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sector to invest on irrigation infrastructure; an indicative
style of planning.
Within the urban area, PRIS zoned four uses: industrial,
residential, public facilities (commune centers), and green
areas. The industrial areas were classified into three
categories: hazardous ("peligrosas"), bothersome
("molestas"), and inoffensive ("inofensivas"). This
classification enabled PRIS to zone three distinct types of
industrial urban districts in Santiago, none of which could
include hazardous industry:
- Twelve zones restricted to industry with an
intercommunal character.
- Sixteen zones for bothersome industry mixed with
inoffensive industry, with a prohibition for new
bothersome industry to establish. Bothersome factories
could expand but no new industry would be allowed.
Eventually, in a non-stipulated time-frame, these
industries would be eradicated to the intercommunal
zones.
- Zones of inoffensive industry mixed with residential
use to be regulated by local the planning codes.
The objectives of the industrial zoning were: to create
industrial parks with location based solely on accessibility
and air pollution factors; to move out of the urban area the
hazardous industry; to decentralize the heavy industry
locating it far away from Santiago (a national policy
objective); to protect residential land value by eliminating
the uncertainty factor of future installation of bothersome
industry in these zones; and to create economies of
agglomeration by grouping industry into industrial parks
[Honold-Poblete: 1966].
PRIS gave some norms and precepts for the application of
this industry code: those industries which already existed
but were located in the wrong zone could relocate within the
same zone; creation of a special zone was according to the
dominant winds for industries classified by the sanitary
code as "smoke-propagators"; no restrictions on location for
artisans' workshops; consideration of special cases (a list
of 157 bothersome industries provided by PRIS, that had been
elaborated by the Department of Industrial Hygiene of the
Ministry of Public Health, was merely "informative" and an
industry could be subject to special consideration by that
bureau). Anticipating disputes over location of the
bothersome industry between the municipalities and the
Ministry of Public Health, the Department of Planning of
MOPT --office of PRIS-- was instituted as the arbitrator in
these matters. This was one of the few PRIS precepts that
had a recursive style of planning, as well as integrative
with another state agency in the process, and also a
mechanism for dispute resolution.
With respect to open space and green areas, PRIS normed
seven different classes: rural-forest reserves; suburban
agriculture and suburban-forests reserves; metropolitan
parks; local parks; special areas (stadiums, and private
parks); park-avenues; and tourism roads. In general, it was
only defined their limits and building restrictions, but no
indications over implementation, maintenance, or
preservation were made.
The main objectives of zoning green areas were to create a
balanced distribution of green areas in the city, and to
protect these areas from other uses by giving them a legal
status as such [Honold-Poblete: 1966] This because in Chile
it results extremely difficult to change land entailments
27, and though the authors knew that many of the parks
defined would take long to be implemented or even never be
realized, they thought they could at least preserve the
sites from other uses and preserve them as open spaces
[Honold: 1985].
With respect to residential areas four types were coded and
zoned: for low-cost housing, for self-construction housing,
for housing mixed with industry, and for plain residential.
Low cost housing was seen since the early 50s as a
responsibility of the state, and several large scale
projects were built in fringe areas of the city. PRIS
planners wanted to propose which sites could be used for
this purpose in the future. Self-construction on the other
hand, was a "hot-issue" in Chile in the 50s. Several low-
co.st housing projects had been built in this fashion 28, and
it was believed as of great potential for contending the
housing deficit of 25,000 units. This approach though, was
never fully pursued by future governments, and thus, the
classification of these areas was never seriously
considered.
In PRIS' map on the other hand, there is zoning for to two
other categories of areas: for housing settlements to-be-
improved, and for downtown renewal. The authors estimated
the housing capacity for Santiago considering a land
occupational density of 144 persons/hectare (58
persons/acre) for the urban area, and 10 persons/hectare (4
27 In spanish: "desafectacion".
28 "Poblacion Santa Anita" is an example.
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persons/acre) for the suburban area, plus higher densities
in zones to be renewed: 500 persons/hectare (200
persons/acre). Considering the 21,600 hectares (53,000
acres) of the then urban area, plus the 17,000 hectares
(42,000 acres) reserved by PRIS as suburban area, they
calculated that the city could easily accommodate 5 million
during the next twenty years (1960-1980) [Honold-Poblete:
1966]. That is where this figure comes from.
Precise sites were defined for the low-cost housing and
self-construction housing categories, in lots that already
belonged to the state, mainly to the housing agency - CORVI.
Over five hundred hectares (1,200 acres) were classified as
for self-construction, which if occupied with the density
proposed (144 persons/hectare) could settle around 75,000
people. The total acreage of the area reserved is by all
means modest given the existent rate of population growth
for Santiago in the early 60s (65,000 people/year), unless
it was believed that the state low-cost-housing-programs, to
be settled in other sites, would take care of the rest.
Another observation one might make is that the absolute
majority of the sites reserved for these purposes were
located in territories belonging to the poorest
municipalities of Santiago, sanctioning and encouraging thus
the existing physical social segregation.
Traffic network, infrastructure, and services
The major goal of the new road-network design proposed by
PRIS was to reduce traffic congestion from Santiago's
downtown area, or central commune. It was almost impossible
then to commute between two non-adjacent communes without
converging to the central one [Honold: 1985]. According to
PRIS's director, traffic congestion problems in Santiago's
principal avenue (Alameda) were worse in 1960 than in 1980
[Honold: 1985]. Each local regulador plan had its own road
system, and in some cases these classifications were
contradictory between two adjacent communes.
For this purpose the plan established five types or
hierarchies of roads: Greater Santiago's access roads (six
defined), outer-ring road (circunvalacion) in the peripheral
communes, mid-inner distribution system (four new avenues
defined), radial intercommunal roads (definite routes to
downtown area defined), and central distribution system
(left for the municipality of the central commune to define
according to its new Plan Regulador 29). All new roads and
avenues had specified widths.
With respect to the outer-ring road, probably the most
significant proposition in matter of transit network for
Santiago, it was not placed across density-homogeneous
areas. Parts of it were even located on the plans' suburban
area, with the possible intention of guiding city
development toward areas known for having a poor
agricultural soil (indicative planning).
Regarding services, PRIS outlines sixteen communal centers
(one for each commune, except for Pirque which was rural),
to serve as indicative of where the municipalities and the
central government should locate their investments on
service facilities; and also indicative to the private
sector, specially to merchandisers. All of these centers
were defined on pre-existing communal centers and commercial
concentrations, and thus represented a re-enforcement
action. Those chosen were located considering proximity to
an intercommunal road (in PRIS' classification), so to
29 To be promulgated only this year (1990).
guarantee accessibility. This strategy was complementary to
the general objective of dispersing activities from the
downtown area.
Growth control and densification
As stated, one of the main objectives of PRIS was to
increase residential density in the Greater Santiago urban
area, with a special emphasis in the central commune, which
had began by then a process of decay and deterioration. This
was pursued through two main strategies: land annexation
moratorium, with strict urban limits drawn on the border of
the existing built area (plus a "reasonable acreage to
contain demographic growth for the next twenty years"); and
a "proposition" for urban renewal in the central commune,
estimating a final density in this area of the order of
magnitude of 500 persons/hectare [Honold-Poblete: 1966] 30*.
No state initiative was designed to incentive development
and urban renewal in this area. No special zones were drawn.
No funding or loans were provided. Just a proposition.
Economic Strategy
Four basic aspects are directly faced by PRIS regarding
general economic policy. The first was to increase urban
density as a mean of reducing state expenditure in
infrastructure that resulted from the city's constant
extension ("urban sprawl"). Efficiency was believed as
denser development, and thus a no-growth strategy was
designed.
3* This commune at the time had approximately 140 inhabitants
per acre.
A second economic objective was to protect the surrounding
agriculture land from the city's growth as a proximal source
of food supply for Santiago. It was believed that once this
area had a "legal" rural status, would encourage sectoral
investment in agriculture, and thus the benefits of
development would be extended to it. No special programs
though, were drawn with the Ministry of Agriculture or with
local farmer's associations. (I personally doubt whether
this policy was even known outside the building of the
Ministry of Housing).
A third one was to improve industrial efficiency through
economies of agglomeration and enhanced accessibility. Thus,
industrial parks were designed to be next to Santiago's
access roads (also determined by PRIS). At the same time,
but with a more regional or national perspective, a
complementary regional plan to PRIS 31 prohibited new heavy
industry to locate closer to 100 kilometers (62 miles) from
Santiago, with the purpose of developing nearby regions and
deviating migrations otherwise coming to the capital city, a
national objective applied to a metropolitan plan.
Finally, a fourth economic issue included was the
recognition that the inoffensive industry and artisans'
activities should be mixed with residential activity ("mixed
areas"). This concept, rather obvious today, was not in the
50s and 60s, when the urban theory, influenced by CIAM 32
postulates, proclaimed a total physical separation between
residential and labor activities. If this postulate would
have been followed by PRIS planners, many of them recent
31 "Plan de Desarrollo Regional", MOPT.
32 International Congress of Modern Architecture.
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graduates from architect's schools, would have produced a
harmful dissociation between small industry and the owner's
or workers' residential areas. This, particularly in a third
world economy like Chile, would have implied something in
between the destruction of this sector, and the
inapplicability of the plan.
PRIS' UPDATES
1976
In March 1976, PRIS was modified by its original director
(Juan Honold). The subway system's layout (Metro) --
according to the "Plan Regulador of Santiago's Metropolitan
Transport" -- was incorporated to PRIS, as well as some
minor changes in the hierarchy of the transit-network
design. Also, it was eliminated from the zoning code the
"low-cost housing areas", and the "self-construction housing
areas", mostly due to its obsolescence. The urban limits
were also updated. In general, no new urban planning
knowledge was introduced with this revision, and only were
incorporated changes that had taken place despite this plan.
The fact that again its original director was in charge of
this revision probably owes to the government --under
Pinochet since 1973-- being in a period of defining its own
urban ideology, and Juan Honold represented for the
meanwhile a physical planning style neutral and inoffensive
for a conservative regime. It also owes to a typical
phenomenon of Latin America, where plans are considered more
33 Prepared in 1968 by the Department of Planning and Urban
Planning of MOPT, under the direction of Juan Parrochia.
property of a professional personnel than instruments of a
community [Violich-Daughters: 1987]. Juan Honold is still
consulted whenever a minor revision to PRIS is contemplated.
It is this version of PRIS that is still valid today for the
urban area, with the only exception of the mixed areas
(inoffensive industry and residential use), which were
deregulated in the 1979 update.
1979
In October 1979, following a governmental decision to apply
nation-wide economic liberalization to urban land markets,
PRIS is subject to its most radical adjustment with the
Supreme Decree 420/79 3*. After almost twenty years (1960-
79) of continuity in the preservation of PRIS' urban limits
(at least as a concept), these are abolished, and the
"suburban area" became the "area of urban expansion". This
land could be urbanized according to a set of minimum and
"flexible" norms, requiring the approval the regional branch
of MINVU for Santiago, the Secretaria Regional Ministerial
of Santiago --SEREMI-M. The state however, would not finance
extensions of urban infrastructure.
' Legal instrument which updated PRIS.
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With the objective of leaving in hands of the private sector
the initiative of Santiago's urban development, the Supreme
Decree 420/79 revokes Santiago's urban limits, at least in
the way these were understood until then. The newly defined
urban expansion area was subject to norms for urbanization
based on a previous study held by SEREMI-M on "developmental
potentiality" 35 of different subareas. A compounded
coefficient of growth potential was elaborated in SEREMI-M,
grounded on three components: environment, population, and
organization. Within the latter, and following general
governmental economic principles, land price was considered
to be a positive indicator of private sector's interest for
development, and thus the norms for areas with higher land
values, were more tolerant and flexible so to "guide the
private initiative to invest on them".
PRIS 1979 modifications were done under the general
framework of the Urban Development National Policy (PNDU) 36
of 1979, where it was hypothesize that the urban land-price
gradient was negatively altered by the existence of urban
limits, increasing erroneously the price of urban land,
specially in the proximity to these limits. This high value
was produced by "a false shortage of urban land stock",
factor which excluded many people from owning a house, due
to having to bare in the price the high cost of urban land
[Lopez: 19811. The state then, inspired by the protection of
the public interest ("bien comun"), had to remove one of the
causes of the housing deficit.
"" SEREMI-M, MINVU, "Obietivos generales del estudio de la
posible expansion del Area Metropolitana de Santiago y de la
proposicion de modificacion al PRIS"; Santiago, April, 1979.
36 For a more detailed explanation of the 1979 PNDU see Annex
1.
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EVALUATION OF PRIS FAILURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS
I believe that PRIS greatest achievements have clearly been
the industrial zoning and relocation; the creation of an
adequate traffic network; and, up to some extent, inter-
municipal planning coordination. Also, it has been partially
responsible for the development of communal centers. On the
other hand, I think it totally failed in three related
issues: retardation of the urban sprawl, at least up to 1979
when that was its intention; increasing urban density; and
effectively protecting the surrounding cultivated land from
urbanization. Scarce results in my understanding, has had in
promoting urban renewal in the central commune, as well as
in the creation of new green areas. A more detailed analysis
of some of these issues follows.
Industrial zoning and relocation
The industry classified by PRIS as either hazardous or
bothersome, had been in 1980 almost entirely relocated from
areas proscribed by PRIS. This had been especially effective
in the central commune. On the other hand, the largest
industrial park defined by PRIS (intercommunal industry area
Quilicura-Renca-Conchali) has been a recognized success,
accommodating in the past thirty years numerous new industry
which was attracted by the area's excellent accessibility;
and it is located in an area where the dominant winds do not
blow to the rest of Santiago's populated areas.
The only factor hindering the PRIS industrial zoning has
been the liberalization of local land-use plans since 1979.
Through these, the proclivity of municipalities for locating
industry in their territories, despite inter-municipal
ordinance, has again emerged. In Maipu for instance, its
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industrial park --regulated by the local land-use plan--
allows the installation of industry classified by PRIS as
smoke-propagator industry, though it was banned from that
sector of Santiago by this plan due to the dominant winds
heading toward the downtown area. Despite the fact that
communal ordinance cannot be less restrictive than PRIS, the
agencies responsible for intercommunal planning (DDU at
MINVU, and SEREMI-M) have been permissive on this matter.
Traffic network
After thirty years, almost all of PRIS-designed network is
in place. The radial-concentric road system has allowed
Santiago's motor park to rise from 15,000 (1960) to over
200,000 (1980) vehicles " without having major traffic
congestion problems. The most remarkable project designed by
PRIS has been the outer-ring road ("Circunvalacion Americo
Vespucio"), which has connected all the peripheral communes,
being in this way an effective reducer of traffic
congestion.
It is clear that imperial plans lend themselves for traffic
planning, being this the reason why advocates of this type
of planning have traditionally been traffic engineers. It is
a task that does not leave much space for a non-specialized
public participation, its design requires intense
professional skills and knowledge, and updating is done
after long periods of time (e.g. every ten years).
" Figures taken from INE.
Inter-municipal planning coordination
At a physical level, and in a very simplistic manner --by
just imposing its precepts to the local planning
instruments-- PRIS did accomplish what its authors had in
mind regarding coordination between local governments.
Specifically, with respect to industrial zoning and traffic
infrastructure.
In a reversal of municipal prerogatives, since 1979, growth
control of the suburban area for all the Greater Santiago
has been centralized in SEREMI-M, with no intervention at
all from the local Public Works Departments -- DOMs, or
planning boards. No coordination has been necessary then in
this centralized system for exurban land development.
Growth control
Between 1960 and 1979 Santiago consumed nearly 23,000
hectares (57,000 acres), i.e., two folded its surface in
this period. At the same time, density barely increased from
90 persons/hectare to 97 persons/hectare (36 to 39
persons/acre) **, and even decreased in the central commune
(where the plan considered a strong densification). This
commune reduced its density from 137 to 90 persons/hectare
(55 to 36 persons/acre). PRIS had specified for this commune
an increase in density up to 500 persons/hectare (200
persons/acre). With respect to the protection of the
suburban cultivated area, between 1955 and 1975 Santiago
urbanized nearly 21,000 hectares (52,000 acres) of irrigated
38 Gross, Patricio; Rodriguez, Alfredo, "Sintomas de calidad
ambiental urbana: Santiago de Chile", Working Paper, Institute of
Urban Studies, Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, 1983.
62
land, and about 850 (2,000 acres) of rain-fed land .
If PRIS authors were concerned in 1960 with the possible
occupation of 60,000 hectares (148,000 acres) of exurban
land as they stated later in a specialized journal, the
situation in 1980 shows a satisfactory result: only a third
of that land was actually urbanized in the following twenty
years. But their real objective was to contain completely
Santiago within PRIS limits as we can infer from their
calculations of Santiago's population containment-capacity,
in the same article [Honold-Poblete: 19661.
Reality has shown how naive was the concept of growth
control solely based on the creation of "legal" city
barriers. These were disregarded in the first place by the
state housing agencies (CORVI and CORHABIT), who used this
cheaper land to reduce direct investment costs * (the lots
were generally state-owned rural land, either in-stock or
obtained through eminent domain). It also facilitated the
process of illegal land take-overs that occurred during the
late 60s and early 70s, by signaling the jurisdiction of the
city police: out of the urban limits, the use of police
force to end a land take-overs required a more cumbersome
legal procedure for the government.
The latter made PRIS urban limits extremely vulnerable. For
the government (specially for Allende's given its
constituency) the political cost of repressing these actions
was too high, and once occurred it was also difficult to
reject a minimal urbanization. (Only the military government
Mewes, Felisa, "Evaluacion de la superficie de riego perdida
por crecimiento del Gran Santiago", Faculty of Agronomy,
Universidad de Chile. Santiago, n/date.
* Called in Chile "loteos brujos" (bewitched parcels).
was able to repress these land take-overs for some years
(1973-83)).
From the agriculture's point of view, the likelihood of
urbanization of the suburban area made this land financially
risky for investment, backfiring one of the purposes of the
urban limits, which was to develop this land so to assure
Santiago with a cheap source of food supply.
In 1979 the no-growth objective was changed. The protection
of the common good no longer meant direct efforts to
preserve surrounding agricultural land, or promoting urban
densification, but instead making land markets operate
freely, believing that a free market rule is the best
arbitrator in conflicts regarding the public interest, and
in this case land-use.
In urban planning, the introduction of market rules aimed
also at reducing land prices by increasing the stock of land
that could be subject to urbanization. The argument was very
simple: if land supply increases, prices must necessarily
drop. However, it proved mistaken after some years (period
1979-81): supply of land with potential for urbanization
increased, but because of a semi-monopolistic land tenure in
suburban Santiago, land-owners expectancy and ability to
hold land off supply determined that the supply increments
went always behind demand expansion. So, land shortage
persisted (sufficiently to keep prices high), although the
supply of land zoned as for urban use had increased
[Sabatini: 1982?].
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Creation and improvement of accessibility to green areas
Santiago has a semi-desert type of climate, which makes the
maintenance of parks and new plantations very expensive.
Normally, parks must have their own irrigation
infrastructure to survive the periods of no-rain (October-
March). The investment and maintenance costs implied require
that their implementation, as well as their administration
must be given substantial consideration before any action is
taken. This was not the case in PRIS, where the green areas
were just defined, drawn on a map, and decreed. No plan was
designed; no designation of an agency or institution to
implement, finance, or maintain these areas was conceived.
Although the authors' intentions in avoiding a misuse of
these spaces by local governments was essentially fulfilled,
it was not enough to stop other central government agencies
(many of them were used for state housing projects [Violich-
Daughters: 1987]), or to contain the pressure from the land
take-overs of the 60s and 70s.
A more detailed analysis of what happened until 1980 (time-
frame of PRIS) in the implementation of these areas is
revealing. Of the four rural-forest-reserve areas proposed,
none had been implemented. (An ambitious proposal was one
that envisaged the re-forestation of the foothills of the
Andes in all the city's extension). Of the nine suburban-
forest-reserve areas, only one began its implementation in
the mid 80s (La Reina). Of the nine intercommunal parks
proposed, five already existed by 1960; of the other four,
only one had been implemented (La Castrina). Of the thirty
five municipal parks proposed, one already existed (Lo
Franco), and only five had been implemented (El Progreso,
Las Mercedes, Antonio Varas, and Los Saldes). Of the eight
"special areas" (stadiums, and private parks) defined by
PRIS, five already existed in 1960, and none of the other
three had been implemented as parks (National Stadium park,
Colo-Colo Stadium park, and Lo Hermida). Of the twelve park-
avenues proposed, two were totally finished (Llano
Subercaseaux, replanted, and Manquehue Avenue), and three
were only at a partial stage of implementation (Isabel
Riquelme, Tobalaba, and the extension of Bustamante).
Finally, the development of a "green belt" for Santiago
needs no further analysis due to the utilization within this
period of most of the suburban area by urbanization (only
the area west to Santiago, Maipu, was unaltered until the
mid 70s).
Again we find here the typical flaw that affects physical
planners: in relation to implementation of green areas and
open spaces no plan was made for carrying out these
prescriptions. It was supposed that municipalities would
eventually produce them, due to the fact that these were in
their territorial jurisdiction and that they could not be
legally subject to any other use. That is to say, the plan
acted in the usual restrictive way, instead of promoting the
need and creation of these areas. More on the line of "what
cannot be done", instead of "what should be done".
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CHAPTER III: PLANNING POLICY IN CHILE BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980
Summary
Chile, between 1960 and 1980, was subject to one of the most
dramatic political changes that a country can undergo in
such a brief span of time. In just two decades the role of
the state as well as the economic system, were several times
redefined. From a "hands-off" state, to a state leading the
private sector, to a central planning state, to a subsidiary
state. From increasing state ownership of the means of
production to privatization policies. From foreign ownership
of basic mining resources and finance to nationalization.
From "communitarism", to "collectivism", to a renewed faith
in private property. Surprisingly, during the whole period,
PRIS, as the land management plan for Santiago, was in
place. Such an ideologized subject as urban land, in a
context as that of Chile's in this period, should have
implied several revisions or even the abolishment of a plan
like PRIS. However, this was not the case. But, as I have
shown in chapter II, the fact that the plan remained all
this period not necessarily denotes that it was an effective
planning tool.
The purpose of this chapter is to extract from the Chilean
planning policy environment during the period 1960-1980 --
time-frame of PRIS-- possible causes that could explain why
this plan, though it managed to survive all that time, was
permanently relinquished by succeeding state planners.
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I have already discussed in chapter I general problems faced
by most metropolitan plans, typically, lack of
implementation strategies, physically-oriented, static
nature, etc. PRIS was not an exception. In this chapter I
intend to examine more closely the historic process that
took place in the planning environment in Chile, and
Santiago's specifically, while PRIS was in full effect *
Find here some causes that could further explain its gradual
abandonment as an effective planning tool.
My hypothesis is that top-down physically-oriented urban
planning, absent of social planning, or of a state actively
involved in land-use management, suited well with the
requirements of the urban planning style in Chile of the
early 60s. A period when government was in a line of a
"hands-off state", and long-range planning was a fairly new
activity for governments, basically encouraged by
multilateral lending institutions. But, eventually, during
the late 60s and early 70s, as the socio-political process
became highly active (even volatile), and succeeding
governments took more and more active roles in planning,
static physical prescriptions for urban growth like of this
plan, were overpowered by a social dynamic process of
participation, and by rapid urban growth. Planners, who were
beginning by then to lay hands on social science and
economics, needed to adapt planning and to make it more
comprehensive. Also more participatory and short-ranged.
PRIS had no built-in mechanism, neither an institutional
framework, that would allow its adaptation to this process.
Consequently, it was gradually left aside, while other types
of urban planning instruments and planning scales were
introduced. Nonetheless, this does not necessarily imply
4 As I have pointed out in chapter II, technically, PRIS is
still in effect. But in 1979 its growth control strategy was
drastically substituted.
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that other types of plans could have effectively replaced
PRIS in its growth management function. Frankly, no plan
would have been too effective in controlling city growth in
the hey-days of the late 60s and early 70s.
After 1973, and during the first years of Pinochet when
public participation was not a primary governmental policy
goal, PRIS top-down physical planning style again seemed to
have a chance. As stated in chapter II, this plan was
updated by then (1976). But soon, economists belonging to
the neo-liberal school of thought, and based in the national
planning office --ODEPLAN, established an hegemony over
urban planning. -Land market --not PRIS-- would eventually
grow in charge of land-use planning in Santiago (at least in
the formal economy) and PRIS growth control strategy would
become obsolete after 1980.
INTRODUCTION
The four administrations that held power starting in 1958
(Alessandri, Frei, Allende, and Pinochet) faced in different
ways persistent economic and social problems that were
hindering chilean development since the mid 1950s: constant
inflation, decreasing rates of growth, dependency on single
export (copper), increased centralization, increasing
housing deficit, and higher rates of urbanization than of
investment. All four governments were determined to produce
structural changes in Chile's economy. For the governments
that held power between 1958 and 1973 this intent of
transformation was inspired on the structuralist theory,
mostly encouraged by ECLA and the Alliance for Progress
during the 60s, which demanded for social planning and
change. For Pinochet's government (1973-1990) instead, the
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target was a redefinition of the role of the state: a state
that would become subsidiary to private initiative, instead
of having a protagonist role as it had been in the past
forty years.
At the same time, these four governments put into practice
diverse theories of economic and social development, having
had the chance to implement them consecutively; the first
three democratically elected, and the last after a military
coup. All four enjoyed within the first years of holding
office sufficient degree of legitimacy to pursue these
structural changes [Cleaves: 1974] 42. But in each case,
social (or military) forces opposing those changes became
powerful enough to frustrate, or even reverse them. Initial
lack of data to pursue their structural reforms made them
lose the initial political support needed for change. Thus,
when enough data was available, pragmatism replaced ideology
as the driving force for governmental action, but the
political power of the initial stages was usually lost by
then. Eventually, contingency planning would be the only
possible course. The exception to this was the military
government, which, having taken power abruptly, required
over five years to structure a coherent political program.
Thus, its action became gradually more ideologized in the
period 1973-1980, but counting with the necessary power to
put it into effect.
The above situation created the need for those governments
in office before 1973, to put in place any significant plan
during the first half of the presidential term, while
legitimacy for reform still endured. In the case of
Pinochet's, the situation was reversed, and most plans of
42 Peter Cleaves sustains this for Alessandri, Frei, and
Allende. I have included Pinochet.
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importance were introduced after several years in office
(1979-81).
During the period 1960-1973, a social process of increasing
levels of participation was taking place in Chile. The
electoral base grew at an impressive rate, while a process
of migrations urbanized large sectors of the population,
population that began demanding greater degrees of
participation in the political structure and institutions.
Planning in these years became the tool for social reform
and economic development [Dominguez: 1981], and urban
planning was to address the main conflicts derived from
cities' spectacular growth [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
Nonetheless this participatory environment, PRIS offered no
implementation strategy that could channel this need.
Several planning institutions were added to the existing in
the mid 60s: Ministry of Housing and Urbanism (MINVU),
Development Corporations with specific housing and urban
planning tasks (CORMU, CORHABIT, COU. etc.), and a national
planning office (ODEPLAN); all of which made state planning
more specific and at the same time created more planning
teams that had responsibilities in urban planning at the
level of the central government. Thus, during this period
1960-1973, coordination between planning institutions, and
broadening and channelling community participation became
the key issue for state planners.
After 1973, during Pinochet's regime, city planning
gradually became subordinated to policies of economic growth
and development, while market rules were proclaimed to
eventually replace community participation as a means for
the population to satisfy their needs in housing, health and
education. The state would only intervene when private
initiative operating in a free market would fail to provide
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these "commodities".
With respect to social planning, by the time of PRIS
promulgation Chile had already a long tradition in this
matter. It had started in the 1920s when a pioneer system of
social security and low-cost housing was founded. The social
concern of subsequent governments peaked during Frei's and
Allende's, when community participation began to be
incorporated into the decision-making structure of local and
central governments, and social expenditure rose over 20%.
Planners during the first three of these administrations
were subject to a constant tension between wanting to pursue
plans with long-term goals, and having at the same to adapt
them to decisions taken in the political domain, where plans
are evaluated on the basis of short-term electoral goals
(Dominguez: 1981]. Chilean state planners --usually with an
inclination for comprehensive planning [Violich-Daughters:
19871-- were increasingly in the role of advocacy planning
until 1973. Their primary concern began to be issues of
poverty, basic needs, and community organization, rather
than harmonious urban patterns, inner-city spatial
distribution, open space, etc.
In Pinochet's era the situation was different. The
government gained nearly total political control and banned
all community organizations from pressing the state. The
government had the power that enabled its planners to apply
public policies with no substantial opposition. This
situation facilitated a return to a top-down planning style.
Nevertheless, city planners in this regime took almost five
years (1973-79) to make operational a consistent urban
theory: the adaptation of the subsidiary state concept and
the liberalization to land management.
PRIS, as said, remained during the entire period 1960-1980
as the metropolitan land-use plan for the greater Santiago
area, but deserving diverse degrees of attention by the
planning professionals of succeeding governments. The city
in the meanwhile was subject to dramatic physical and social
transformations --mainly growth and social segregation--
that took place, on behalf and despite, the existence of
this planning instrument.
To understand the planning policy environment in this period
(1960-1980) it becomes essential a more detailed review of
the plans and institutions during the four political regimes
that took place in Chile within those years.
PLANNING POLICY DURING THE ALESSANDRI REGIME (1958-1964)
National planning
Alessandri's government was in office when PRIS was
promulgated in 1960. Its political program had as a basic
premise that the private sector was to have a leading role
in Chile's development, called accordingly the "dynamic
force". It was a government that tried to impose a "hands-
off" style, but economic, political, international, and
natural forces pushed it to do national and long-range
planning. Though constantly declaring independence, had its
constituency in the conservative parties (Conservative and
Liberal) and the large business associations (SOFOFA and
CCHC).
Alessandri's planning style had a managerial approach to
public policy [Faundez: 1988], trying to face problems in a
technical way rather than with political compromise. In
general, it was an administration reluctant to planning, but
forced to do so under pressure of the Alliance for Progress
program, and of a natural disaster --the 1960 earthquake
[Dominguez: 19811.
CORFO, Chile's then leading planning institution, was
transformed in this context from an originator of new
investment projects (as it had been during the previous
Radical governments 43) into a provider of credits for the
private sector [Faundez: 1988].
Priority was given to stop inflation and stabilize macro-
economic variables: balancing national accounts,
specifically trade and balance of payments; and to increase
the rate of investment. Despite intentions, the rate of
investment in the period decreased and the government was
pushed to borrow from abroad. This gave the opportunity to
bilateral lending institutions to force Alessandri's
government to planning, all of which were on the line of
encouraging government planning. In 1959 the government had
approved a ten year national plan, "Plan Nacional de
Desarrollo Economico", which included among other topics, a
national housing plan (Programa Nacional de la Vivienda).
This plan however, was later considered by the World Bank,
and by the Committee of Nine ** as lacking of many social
considerations, specifically, agrarian reform, income
redistribution, and employment plans, and hence it was
revised in order to obtain loans from USAID and IDB
[Dominguez: 1981].
*3 1938-1952.
** Task force of the Alliance for Progress.
Alessandri's lost battle to contain inflation greatly
strengthened the labor movement and of grassroots
organizations. The number of annual number of strikes
increased from 260 in 1960 to 564 in 1964 [Faundez: 1988],
expanding also the trade-union militancy, and strengthening
the confederation of unions --CUT-- recently created (1953).
These groups were to become the supporters of the next two
governments.
Housing Policies
Alessandri's regime was devoted to housing construction,
what has been called the "viviendista" approach, an approach
often considered in Chile as competitive with comprehensive
urban planning. The housing deficit by then was 25,000 units
(1960), and CORVI, the housing agency was devoted to
confront this problem. The most significant policy
instrument in this matter was the DFL2, a law passed by the
executive that gave exceptional tax exemptions to affordable
housing. This prompted the impressive figure of more than
30,000 units built annually only in public housing projects
as the average of Alessandri's term.
Planning education and planning institutions and professions
Until the 60s there was no planning education in Chile,
exercising this task abroad-trained or self-trained
engineers, architects, agronomists, and economists. These
professions by the time were trying to have the supremacy in
the emerging planning field, and worked on it by
monopolizing the planning jobs in different departments of
public planning agencies: in CORFO the engineers (which had
some backing from President Alessandri, being himself an
engineer); in the Division of Architecture of the Ministry
of Public Works (MOPT), and where PRIS was developed, the
architects; in the Ministry of Agriculture the agronomists;
and in the Office of Budget the economists. To avoid
conflicts, Alessandri shared planning responsibilities among
these institutions [Dominguez: 1981]. But this created a
sense of planning boundaries, instead of a multi-
disciplinary planning environment. PRIS would always be
considered the plan of the architects.
At the time of the 1960 earthquake on the southern part of
the country, two public agencies demonstrated real capacity
for strategic planning: CORFO, and the Division of
Architecture of MOPT [Dominguez: 1981], which probably gave
momentum to PRIS, promulgated only months later. However,
the connection between economic and land-use planning,
almost non-existent until this natural disaster, was not
assimilated yet by PRIS planners.
It was also evident after this natural disaster the need for
regional planning, task in which the next three governments
would strongly pursue.
At the level Santiago's municipalities, which became
responsible for the implementation of PRIS, most of the
planners had little preparation as such, and were so
outdated from the evolution of the planning profession, that
many still were in the tradition of the "city-beautiful"
movement of the beginning of the century, with little
concern for social or economic problems [Dominguez: 19811.
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PLANNING POLICY DURING THE FREI REGIME (1964-1970)
Political program
Frei's program was named "Revolution in Liberty",
implicating the need for political change at the light of
the social doctrine of the catholic church ("communitarism"
*5 as opposed to marxism). The program was a serious
attempt to combine both, economic growth with social
justice, based on a combination of economic and social
reform, with major changes to the political system [Faundez:
1988], and conceived as to last for at least three decades
(1964-94). The program considered planning as a necessary
tool for social reform and economic development, which
coincided with the Alliance for Progress prerequisites for
providing financial assistance [Dominguez: 1981]. Frei'
government began with a solid legitimacy for reform given
its 56% in the ballot, the highest in Chilean democratic
history. Also contributed to this fact that the rest of the
electorate was in a position of even more radical changes
(Allende supporters).
The three key elements of this program were agrarian reform,
control of copper production(Chile's main export), and
"popular promotion" (promocion popular). The latter was an
effort to broaden public participation and representation on
the political system through lending power to grassroots
* A concept never well defined, but supposed to replace
capitalist property relations in an alternative to socialist
collectivism.
organizations ". This was an attempt to overcome the over-
representation that trade-unions and business associations
had in the existing institutional structure had gain in the
Alessandri period. Also were part of Frei's platform, an
educational reform (mandatory primary education), massive
construction of low-income housing (360,000 in six years),
and income redistribution through a tax reform [Dominguez:
1981].
The political reforms of the CDP government were to be
carried out through three main channels [Faundez: 19881:
1. Popular promotion, aimed at the urban poor
("marginales")
2. Trade-union reform, aimed at the same time to promote
unionization, but freeing it from the control of
political parties, and
3. Constitutional amendments to increase the executive
branch' power to legislate on key aspects of economic
policy.
The informal sector
The Christian Democrat Party set in motion a broad policy
for the organization and integration of two social actors
until then almost totally excluded from the political and
economic systems: the urban poor, and the peasants. While
the latter benefitted from an agrarian reform, as well as
*6 See Ahumada, Jorge: "En vez de la miseria", work on which
much of the CDPs ideology is based. This book blends theory and
practice.
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from a new law for unionization, for the urban poor Frei's
program considered the stimulation and creation of a large
network of community organizations, backed by the
"Consejeria Nacional de Promocion Popular". A salient
feature at the territorial level was giving legal status to
neighborhood associations ("Juntas de Vecinos"), which
existed since the 1930s but with no link to governmental
action. In the new setting they were incorporated to the
municipal decision structure. Also women were organized in
Centros de Madres (mother's associations). During Frei's
term, 3,487 neighborhood associations were created, and
47
9,000 mother's association
Frei's popular promotion concept, which, suggestively,
called the poorest "los marginados" (non-integrated),
focused the problem within these groups, i.e. they were seen
as structurally incapable of overcoming their marginality by
themselves. Thus, it was necessary an outside agent, namely
the state, to assume the responsibility in organizing and
empowering these groups so they could integrate actively
(through the decision- making process), and passively
(through the distribution of goods and services "). In
other words, it was a mid-point between top-down social
planning and a the restructuring of the state (which Allende
would try later).
'7 Presidential Address to the Nation, 1970. (Cited in:
Rodriguez, Alfredo, "Como gobernar las ciudades o principados que
se regian por propias leyes antes de ser ocupados", in Revista
Interamericana de Planificacion, No. 65, March 1983).
48 See: Alvarado, Luis; Cheetham, Rosemond; Rojas, Gaston,
"Movilizacion en torno al problema de la vivienda", in Revista
EURE, no. 7; Santiago, April, 1973.
This policy was carried out through promoting social
organization, and by broadening the traditional scope of
state-built housing projects, stimulating self-construction
techniques, sites and services programs, and creating a new
special loan system called "Planes de Ahorro Popular" (PAP),
aimed at the very poor. Social expenditure raised within
this period from 16% to nearly 20% ' an impressive figure
for a non-developed economy.
The program of popular promotion included the strengthening
of the local decision-making process by giving legal status
to the Juntas de Vecinos (communal neighborhood betterment
groups), incorporating them into the formal municipal
decision structure '0. These organizations were particularly
efficient in exercising pressure to the local and central
government for providing services to settlements resulting
from land take-overs --a growing practice in the last years
of Frei.
Despite this social concern a sense of "spill-over effect"
began to take place starting in 1967, when massive land
take-overs by homeless people began in Santiago. These
groups were showing great capacity for organization and for
challenging the state. The creation of community
organizations (Juntas de Vecinos) which followed these
actions, became highly politicized, and eventually
controlled be the left parties. These organizations would
press the central government for tenure and definite housing
solutions, as well as municipalities for service provision.
'' Arellano, Jose P., "Las politicas sociales en Chile: breve
revision historica", in Revista Interamericana de Planificacion,
no. 68, December, 1983.
50 Law No. 18880.
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According to Castells 51, Frei's contradiction was that
these redistributive policies were not complemented by a
significant change in the production structure, thus, the
generation of a social mobilization in these conditions
could only backfire.
The style of land management inherent to PRIS could
certainly not be useful in this context. Complete moratorium
on land annexation was not possible and PRIS did not offer
the tools for land acquisition (via eminent domain,
compensation, etc.) to give this process some formality.
Planning scope
With respect to urban planning, Frei's administration was
focused mainly on planning at a regional level. This was
based on the theory of growth poles. Centralization was to
be reversed by investing and developing few urban centers
distributed in the national territory (medium size cities),
in the hope that its development would spread to the
surrounding region, and at the same time reduce the
migrations to the capital city. The city of Santiago in this
way, was not the central focus of attention for Frei's urban
planners.
At the communal level, between 1965 and 1969, and under the
auspices of USAID, a series of comprehensive studies called
pre-investment studies ("Preinversionales") were undertaken
in several locations in the country. The program was made to
encouraged and strengthen the municipal level planning,
si Castells, Manuel; Et Al, (Equipo de Estudios Poblacionales -
CIDU), "Reivindicacion urbana y lucha politica: los campamentos
de pobladores en Santiago de Chile", in EURE no 6, November 1972.
requiring local participation in the making of these studies
[Violich-Daughters: 1987]. They were done by private
consultants under the coordination of the Urban Development
Division (DDU) of MINVU, in accordance to the new regional
planning strategy of Frei's government encouraged by ODEPLAN
and based on the theory of growth poles. Between 1965 and
1970, twenty six preinversional studies are made for
different cities and "micro-regions" 52.It was in these
studies, where many urban planners focused their attention
during this period. Though it was a first intent to
introduce comprehensive planning at the local territorial
level, these studies were never made operational. Its
complementation with metropolitan plans like PRIS would have
signified a comprehensive approach to city planning not yet
accomplished.
Planning institutions and implementation of programs
The strong popular support was instrumental for Frei to
request Congress special prerogatives ("facultades
extraordinarias") for effecting a profound administrative
reform. On behalf of these, it created the first housing and
urban planning ministry in Latin America (Ministerio de
Vivienda y Urbanismo - MINVU), together with specialized and
semi-autonomous corporations to deal with specific housing
and urban issues (Corporation of Urban Improvements - CORMU,
and Corporation of Urban Services - COU), and incorporating
the Ibanez housing agency (CORVI), to the new institutional
52 Among others: Puerto Montt, (1965), Talca (1965-66), Chillan
(1965-66), Copiapo (1965-66), Antofagasta (1966), Ovalle-Vicuna
(1967), Calama (1967), La Serena (1967-72), San Felipe-Los Andes
(1968), Tocopilla (1968), Concepcion (1968), Chanaral (1969),
Taltal (1969), Santiago (1969-70), Linares (1970), Limache-Olmue
(1972).
setting under the coordination of MINVU.
Most of the existing urban planning agencies came from the
Ministry of Public Works. The original plan was to split
this Ministry between MINVU and a new Ministry of Transport,
giving in this way consistency to housing and urban planning
investment programs. However, a delay in getting approval
from legislature (still needed by Frei if dissolving an
existing ministry) allowed the formation of resistance among
public officials within MOPT, even though these were members
of the new government [Cleaves: 1974]. The result was that
MOPT survived, remaining within its departments some
duplicate functions with MINVU, factor that would contribute
to the weakness of PRIS.
The intention in creating the corporations was to originate
semi-public agencies under the Chilean law affecting private
parties ("Ley de derecho privado"), which allows an
individual or an organization to "do anything not explicitly
prohibited". In the law affecting public parties, it is
exactly the opposite: the only actions that can be performed
are those explicitly stated by law [Cleaves: 1974]. This
gave the corporations enhanced efficiency, but also, a great
potential for expanding their functions, and duplicating
activities. Without becoming illegal, CORMU, CORHABIT and
CORVI, could all buy, expropriate, renovate, construct, and
sell property. Due to this reason, a lack of coordination
was a constant during the years of Frei's regime among these
planning agencies. After a while specificity of functions
was abandoned, and all of them were carrying out the same
planning, design, and construction activities ("mania for
construction" [Cleaves: 1974]) This was a way of increasing
their participation on economic and political resources and
thus becoming more powerful. Personality characteristics,
planning methodology (absence of link between theory and
practice), and political factors were also among the reasons
for this phenomena [Cleaves: 1974].
During this period it was also created ODEPLAN, an advisory
agency focused on national planning issues. Plans proposed
by ODEPLAN were treated as technical advice for the
traditional decision-making process located in the different
ministries [Violich-Daughters: 1987]. At the regional level,
eight territories were defined, each under a regional
planning unit (ORPLAN) coordinated by ODEPLAN 53. The main
constraint of ODEPLAN was its advisory status, which was an
impediment for investment decisions, being these task of the
corresponding ministries.
In the administrative reform, the urban planning function
(as well as CORVI) was removed from the Ministry of Public
Works and placed in MINVU, carrying the Intercommunal Office
(office of PRIS) with it. A new planning and budgeting
office ("Division General de Planificacion y Presupuesto")
was responsible for preparing national plans for urban
development and housing to be incorporated to the national
budget. This new scheme could have been a major opportunity
for interrelating housing programs and urban development
programs due to MINVU's planning and executive functions
(legislative capacity) [Violich-Daughters: 19871, a chance
to make PRIS work as an instrument of urban development.
However, the mentioned independence of the development
corporations greatly frustrated this objective, because each
of them was involved in planning and building housing
projects.
5* Santiago's ORPLAN only came to existence in 1971.
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At MINVU, DDU became involved mainly with two interrelated
activities at the local or municipal level of planning:
technical assistance to municipalities (encouragement of
local initiative, elevation of technical standards of
municipal administration, improvement of local land-use
plans), and the pre-investment studies, conducted by foreign
and national consultants. The latter were performed mainly
on medium size cities. This had the effect of deviating
MINVU's planning away from Santiago [Cleaves: 1974]. It also
increased MINVU's lack of coordination with the corporations
due to these studies lacking from a general urban policy
framework for Chile. This would have served as guideline
principles for the corporations' activities in, for example,
increasing urban density, and in urban renewal; both
proposed by PRIS. As Cleaves points out, DDU failed to
provide a methodology that would have had a saying in
CORMU's controversial urban renewal scheme (like the one
experimented in a giant urban renewal project in a downtown
area 54) and CORHABIT's "viviendista" approach. This agency
had started to construct giant housing projects for low-
income groups in the peripheral areas of Santiago, in
contradiction to PRIS regulations.
Municipal planning
In 1967 three Municipalities (Las Condes, Providencia, and
La Reina) created an Association of Majors ("Junta de
Alcaldes") based on the recent law that had modified the one
that regulated these government bodies 55. The new law
allowed Municipalities to contract, in coordination,
r* Project "Remodelacion San Borja".
ss Article No. 56, law 16,627; May 13, 1967.
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services and public works and also to hire credits with
CORFO, private banks, and IDB 56. This experience could have
represented a major breakthrough in intercommunal planning.
Nevertheless, it missed a permanent and structured technical
organization to promote a comprehensive development
strategy, limiting its action to infrastructure, transit,
parks, and health and education services [Chellew, et al:
1970].
PLANNING POLICY DURING THE ALLENDE REGIME (1970-1973)
Structural change without political strength
Essentially, Allende's regime can be described as one that
tried to do deepen structural reform (calling Frei's program
"reformism"), but without solving its insufficient political
power (36% of the ballot). Implementation of planning policy
in this environment became increasingly disconnected from
theory, due to the government's need to focus mainly on
contingency planning.
Despite having a radical final objective, the UP was
committed to pursue its program through the "rules and
principles of the prevailing order", i.e., act within the
constitution. Allende sustained that the armed struggle
(proposed by the extreme left) was in a way redundant with
the Popular Unity government, due to this government already
reversing the capitalist order. The government knew however,
that holding the executive branch of the state was by no
means enough to transfer power from the dominant class to
56 Up to 23,000,000 Escudos, approximately US $2.5 million
(1967=100).
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the workers and bring about a socialist order, but on the
other hand --due to the prominent role of the presidency in
Chile--it knew that it was instrumental to start reducing
the power of these opposing forces of capitalism. By
strengthening and transferring political power to existing
and to-be-created grassroots organizations (representing
basically the proletariat, peasants, urban poor, and sectors
of the middle class), and, accordingly, creating a socially-
based pressure, the UP government sought to neutralize an
adverse Congress and Judiciary, and the conservative
political parties. The CDP concept of "popular promotion"
was changed then to the creation of "popular power" as a
mean of conquering the state-power.
Whether the UP could have succeeded in structural reform had
the coup not taken place in 1973 is something that political
scientists have not yet agreed. Regardless of this
discussion, what matters here is that counting with only a
third of the votes made the UP government highly committed
to the expansion of its electoral base, creating in state
planners a permanent conflict between the government's short
term requirements and the structural theory long-term
policies requirement [Dominguez: 1981].
Obviously PRIS was incompatible in this planning
environment: it did not encourage public participation, and
its goals were all of long-term nature.
Planning institutions and implementation of programs
At the executive level, according to an agreed formula of
insuring participation to all coalition parties, the
appointments to the ministries was done proportionally,
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holding most of the cabinets, members of the three main
parties of the coalition: Communists, Socialists, and
Radical. As a way of counter-balance, all ministries had
always an Under-Secretary from a different party. In the
area of planning, the Socialist party held MINVU, the
Ministry of Economy, and ODEPLAN; and the communist MOPT.
The decision making process was governed by the principle of
unanimity, which soon proved inefficient due to each party
voicing their disagreements over state policy [Faundez:
19881. Final decisions were often poorly-structured
compromises, transferring policy disagreements from the
level of formulation to the level of implementation
[Faundez: 19881.
However, the UPs sectoral policies on education, health and
housing were consistent with the overall objective of
bringing about a more equitable distribution of resources
and augmenting the levels of social participation [Faundez:
1988].
Housing policies and urban consequences
In the housing area, the government's guiding principle was
that "housing is an unalienable right and an obligation for
the state to provide it to its people", and that a house
"cannot be treated as a profitable commodity, and thus is
not to be guided by economic rules, but by social
conditions". The program proposed increased expenditure on
public housing, to be carried out mainly through CORHABIT.In
this sector, the government was devoted to increase owner
and community participation. As said, public spending on
housing expanded (to almost 3% of GDP), provoking a raise in
the housing starts up to 86,972 [Haramoto: 1983] in its
first year (1971). But in the next two, this figure dropped
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to the annual 30,000 starts of Frei's and Alessandri's
regimes, in middle of a housing industry crisis, unable to
satisfy such high levels of construction.
The informal sector
According to Dominguez, state planners were devoted in this
period to increasing the levels of participation of workers
in the decision-making process, and adapting the state to
work in partnership with their organizations, making this
process unified and integrated nation-wide. The social-based
planning style began by Frei, would become increasingly
exercised during the Allende government. By 1973, and after
three years of in office, more than 400,000 people were
living in "campamentos" as result of land take-overs. During
this period these actions would have the support of the
Ministry of Housing, agency which was then favorable to
attend their petitions to the state. The supposed
"marginals" were in a way gaining control of the city
[Rodriguez: 19831. Legitimacy of private land ownership was
challenged as social mobilization was becoming a powerful
force in public policy.
In Allende's period public social expenditure raised over
30% of GDP, but with no increase in tax revenues, which
obviously prompted hyperinflation.
Despite multiple social organizations created within
Allende's term, stimulated by the government, or political
parties, with revindicatory purposes: "Comites de Vivienda",
"Comites de Salud", "Comites de Recreacion", "Juntas de
Abastecimientos y Control de Predios", "Comandos Comunales",
"Comites de Autodefensa", etc., this government was unable
to channel this organizational capacity beyond the meeting
of basic needs [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
Metropolitan planning in the traditional method of PRIS,
resulted nearly impossible in these conditions. Its style of
land management could certainly not be useful. As Ignacio
Santamaria, a well known and respected planning professor in
Chile, who started believing that urban science had lost
track to chilean reality, stated in 1972:
V... neither the existing regional development
strategies of ODEPLAN, nor the local or
intercommunal plans --made for urban structures
with controlled growth, and with extremely slow
legal and bureaucratic procedures-- have the
flexibility, opportunity, and even language to
respond creatively to these new social forces
which are making the city".
With respect to central government planning, he affirms
that, despite having greater financial resources and
expropriation attributions than of the Municipalities, it is
"only capable of maneuvering behind the spontaneous
initiatives of the 'campamentos', giving in each case
partial and ad-hoc solutions, which generally oppose its own
ministerial plans and those of ODEPLAN". These solutions
were called "operacion campamento" (settlement operation),
as part of a housing emergency plan carried out by CORHABIT.
According to Santamaria the lack of some institutional form
of this phenomena, jointly with an absence of an appropriate
urban theory, reduced the solution to a merely housing
approach, reinforcing the disproportionate growth of
Santiago in relation to its productive employment
generation. Again a renewed "viviendista" approach to city
planning.
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In the forefront of granting decision power to community-
based organizations was MIR, a radical leftist group who did
not belong to the government coalition and whose main
support came from disperse groups in the shanty-town areas
in Santiago [Faundez: 1988]. MIR had been organizing urban
(as well as rural) land seizure since the late 60s. Soon
after Allende took office, it started organizing "comandos
comunales" (communal councils), at the level of municipal
territories in order to establish popular-based pressure on
state institutions. The most known case in this strategy was
the "Campamento Nueva Habana", located in the south-east of
Santiago. This experimental MIR-project was a self-directed
layout of parcels that accommodated 1,500 families, having a
strict social organization that grouped blocks under the
authority of a block-chief. The latter in turn, formed a
representative assembly that oversaw Task Forces (Frentes de
Trabajo) on different basic-needs areas (policy, health,
culture, recreation, protection, construction, and
distribution) [Violich-Daughters: 1987]. These Task Forces
would press the local and central state agencies for street
paving, water supply, garbage collection, and police
protection. Members of the Task Forces, composed by workers
and professionals, would all receive an equal wage for their
job.
MIR's strategy of land take-overs presented the government
with the dilemma whether to enforce or not legality
[O'Brien: 1976]. If law was not enforced the political
opposition (and eventually the military) had a justification
for accusing the government of breaking the constitutional
order. On the other hand, using the police to enforce the
law could create sharper divisions among the left and
increase the contradictions in the decision-making process.
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The problem for Allende (which up to certain extent also
occurred to Frei) was how to channel this community energy
that resulted from the land take-overs, which up to 1972
totalized 275 in Santiago, beyond the meeting of basic
needs, and to gain sustained participation on the broad
social areas of child care, medical attention, recreation
and schools [Violich-Daughters: 19871.
Urban planning
As Frei's government, Allende's focused more in regional
planning than city planning. Although agreeing in general
terms with the regionalization issue, Allende's planners
were critical of the growth poles approach of Frei's. The
new government believed that concentrating investment and
incentives in only a few designated centers unnecessarily
weakened the growth of urban and rural areas outside these
poles. It proposed instead a regional system of integrated
areas (Sistema Regional de Centros Poblados -- SRCP) whereby
the local resources of an area, both urban and rural, would
become the basis for a region's development ".
The major critique to the growth pole theory by Allende's
planners was that with its application the centers with
greater potential for growth tended to concentrate the
largest amount of investment, increasing not only the intra-
s In 1972 the government decided that a new definition of the
structure of the national planning system was needed, and thus
representatives of ODEPLAN, DPDU (of the Ministry of Housing),
MOPT, CORFO, and several academic institutions began a study of a
new strategy of spatial development for the long run. The results
of this study were to be discussed on a broad participatory basis
"with the workers country-wide" fulfilling the government postulate
of popular participation in national planning [Bedrack]. However,
this work was interrupted by the 1973 military coup.
regional disequilibriums, but also those within a region.
The paradox in this logic was that instead of distributing
population and resources, Frei's policy created greater
levels of concentration. It was sustained then that it
resulted mandatory to change first the socio-economic system
that generated the problem {Bedrack: 1972].
The SRCP were defined not as a group of urban centers of
different sizes located in a given territory, but as a group
of centers hierarchal and functionally related among each
others, with complementary and at the same time specialized
characteristics, and having intense and active inter-
dependencies [Bedrack: 1972). The time span given for
developing such a system was thirty years. Nevertheless,
this plan was left at a very early stage of design, and no
substantial changes were introduced to the pre-existing
regional planning system [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
With respect to Santiago, the SRCP structure was to
eliminate in a certain degree, dependency of the peripheral
areas on the central structure. These areas were to be
integrated to the centers proposed in the strategy [Bedrack:
19721. The productive activities as well as services of the
"national center" were to suffer a "gradual process of
deconcentration" toward the regions [Bedrack: 1972].
The updating of the metropolitan plan (PRIS) had been
delayed during the Frei period due to the pre-investment
studies. By 1970 Santiago's preinversionales studies were
complete and gave ample data to work on PRIS. Also, in the
late 60s the Ford Foundation had done a special study to
develop a comprehensive methodology on Santiago's planning,
work that had not led to a new metropolitan plan. In 1970,
MINVU assigned the Office of Intercommunal Planning with the
task of making use of this new data, updating and broadening
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the scope of PRIS. Nevertheless, political problems faced by
this administration, which made it focus less on long-range
planning and more on housing needs [Violich-Daughters:
1987], left this work unfinished.
Metropolitan government
Since the late 60s the notion of having a Metropolitan
Government for Santiago had been under discussion in several
planning and academic institutions. The need of a government
that would provide services and serve as well for guiding
policies and programs in land-use control, act as an
arbitrator over the economic burden implied in this control
function, and enhance citizen control over metropolitan
policy. In 1972 the Center of interdisciplinary urban
studies - CIDU, at the Catholic University, had made a study
in which proposed three possible strategies for its
implementation S8:
1. Voluntary association of Municipalities using the
existing constitution (article 101).
2. Obligatory federation of Municipalities through a
modification of their law (No. 11,860).
3. Constitutional amendment to create a metropolitan
agency at level of central government.
In all cases the proposition established the need for
integrating metropolitan planning with national planning,
58 Chellew, Patricio; Escudero, Juan; Seelenberger, Sergio,
"Planificacion y gobierno para el area metropolitana de Santiago:
algunas alternativas", in EURE, vol 3:8 pg 99-119, December 1973.
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and at the same time, preserving the traditional municipal
governments due to its democratic generation, installed
capacity, and links with grassroots organizations. The
argument for justifying a metropolitan government in CIDU's
study, was that the loss efficiency of Santiago, due to its
explosive growth, affected not only this city, but the
entire country, which is its area of influence. According to
this study, the state had acknowledged this issue in the
past by becoming increasingly involved in Santiago's
planning and management with central government agencies.
But these institutions were not well suited for these
functions, specially regarding responsiveness to diversified
demands, and inter-sectoral coordination. On the other hand,
local governments were incapable to deal with the scale and
magnitude of Santiago's problems.
The study however, warned of two potential risks in creating
an agency of this kind: municipalities with greater
financial resources could have dominated this organism, and
that this it would respond more to metropolitan pressures
than to national interest, when both were in conflict.
Because implementing the propositions in this study were
over the political capacity of Allende's government, no
actions in this direction were ever taken. However, it could
have been the perfect backup agency for implementing a
comprehensive land-use plan like PRIS.
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PLANNING POLICY DURING THE PINOCHET REGIME (1973-1980) "
Redefinition of role of the State
Pinochet's government represents the major change in the
orientation of the role of the state in the preceding 40
years of Chile's history. After two years of political
consolidation (1973-1975) the economic model of import
substitution, in place since the late 30s, was abandoned and
changed to another inspired in free market and monetarism.
The state was to become subsidiary to private initiative,
and the market, on the eyes of the government, would be the
most efficient allocator of resources. Again, as in the
Alessandri government, the accent was to be laid on economic
growth over social development. With the support of IMF, and
bilateral lending institutions like World Bank, and inspired
on the "Chicago model" of economic growth, deregulation and
privatization policies become the key concepts in all
sectors of the economy.
The informal sector
The military regime began reversing the participatory role
that poor social groups had acquired in the political system
during the past two governments. Again top-down planning was
introduced, while in the economy the state role was believed
as subsidiary to private initiative. The new goal is to
incorporate people as individuals to the market, which is
considered as the most efficient and equitable allocator of
resources. Focussing more on the market and consumption
s' Pinochet's rule continued until 1990, but the time-frame of
this analysis is until 1980.
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instead of an organized community. While economic freedom
was pursued, community participation was repressed.
The emphasis was laid more in the consumer, as opposed to
the organized community, as it had been in past regimes. The
authoritarian model did not stimulate social-based
organizations, and instead required their atomization,
distancing itself from what had been the tradition in
Chilean governments since the 1920s.
For this government the city space was the space of
discipline. A discipline that is mandated by market forces,
forces that translate a "natural" growth and location. In
consequence, radication policies, which were carried forward
during 1975-1983, reestablished the "social order": social
classes living in their own spaces [Rodriguez: 1983].
Participation was to be only possible through market
channels, i.e., individually-based. Those community
organizations which remained (Neighborhood Associations,
Mother's Associations, Sport Clubs) were allowed to do so
because they were instrumental for control of the population
and of their support. They were to serve as a channel of
communication (on a territorial basis) between the people
and the authorities over aspects dealing with their
neighborhood exclusively, and with delegates designated by
designated majors. However, they were strictly regulated.
Majors were subordinated to the Ministry of Interior. Also,
a legislative body at the level of municipalities
(Regidores) was eliminated. A vertical hierarchy of power
was instead imposed.
From 1975 onward, municipalities became agents of social
development, understood as closely linked with the interior
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security of the state ". From local administration (service
provision), to redistributive functions: health, housing,
employment. This policy had a decentralization rhetoric, but
due to the fact of the vertical authoritarian structure, it
was in fact highly centralized.
"Rearranging the social space of the city,
establishing a vertical order, and, on the
other hand, dispersing the population through
punishment and repression, it has been intended
to rearrange the city, in a way that it allows
the individual and private appropriation of the
urban goods" [Rodriguez: 1983].
During the first seven years of Pinochet, social public
expenditure dropped for the first time in more than fifty
years, from 20% to 16% of GDP. This owing to two
complementary policies: reduction of public expenditures to
reduce inflation, and a neo-liberal conception of a
subsidiary state that transferred responsibilities to the
private sector, and which this did not assume.
Planning institutions
While Pinochet's government operated basically with the same
planning institutions that had been set up by Frei's regime
[Violich-Daughters: 1987], substantial restructuring within
these took place. Under the new "National Planning System",
ODEPLAN gained a pivotal role, expanding from a role of
merely advisory to the President, to one leading the
coordination of all planning activities in the different
ministries (including those of MINVU). It was to act as a
clearinghouse institution for the production of a "National
60 See new law for municipalities no. 573 july 12, 1974
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Indicative Plan", the first of which was adopted in 1976.
The executive director of ODEPLAN gained status of secretary
of state ("rango de ministro"). From then on it was ODEPLAN,
and not each Ministry, that had the task of determining
objectives and targets, and to coordinate sectoral
objectives into the National Indicative Plan [Violich-
Daughters: 19871. Counting with the Finance Ministry's
approval and having being decreed, the ministries had to
execute their respective sectoral directives.
A national commission for administrative reform - CONARA was
established to resolve conflicts among competing and
overlapping state institutions. In some cases (e.g. transit)
inter-ministerial commissions were created for a more
comprehensive approach.
Regional planning
Regionalization remains as primary issue, and a new
regionalization design is enacted " . Thirteen regions were
considered instead of the eight defined under Frei, each
with a governor (intendente) appointed by the President, and
with activities controlled by the Ministry of Interior.
Santiago became part of a thirteenth region called
Metropolitan Region.
Every region had from then on a duplicate of the central
executive layout, Regional ministries (SEREMIs) under a
planning and investment plan coordinated by a regional
ODEPLAN (SERPLACs). The latter was to define regional
development goals to be approved by ODEPLAN and thus
incorporated to the National Indicative Plan. For this
61 Law No. 575.
purpose it was also created the "Fondo Nacional de
Desarrollo Regional" - FNDR, a resource fund for investment,
approved in the national budget, on which regional SERPLACs
had total autonomy over its allocation to projects presented
by different SEREMIs within their region. The coordination
for this resource has been administered at the national
level by the "Subsecretaria de Desarrollo Regional",
depending, interestingly enough, from the Ministry of
Interior, a political ministry, instead of from its natural
place: ODEPLAN.
According to Violich-Daughters, two counter-effects had this
decentralization policy to become more effective: in the
first place, while more political power was given to the
regions, the state apparatus was reduced dramatically in its
size (from 700,000 employees in 1973 to 147,000 in 1987
according to ODEPLAN), having in consequence less to say in
local decisions, which from then on were mostly in hands of
the private sector. In the second place, the absence of a
democratic system, made the local authority (Intendente) a
delegate from the President. i.e., the central government.
Urban ideology
In 1979, and within the deregulation macro-policy context
described, and following orientations given by ODEPLAN, the
Division of Urban Development (DDU) of MINVU elaborated the
National Policy of Urban Development (PNDU). The main
objective was to compile sectoral policy with macro-economic
policy. Applied to urban planning, the liberalization policy
was interpreted as the acceptance of the notion that cities
have a "natural growth tendency", which local or central
governments should regulate the least [Lopez: 1981]. This
natural tendency was observed in Chile by MINVU planners, as
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determined by demographic, socio-economic, and tax factors;
and by people's location preferences, as well as by an
absence of agricultural planning.
Major arguments for implanting this new policy were to
create incentives for private investment, and to smooth the
gradient price curve for urban land. The only limit for
deregulation policies in this area would be the "state
obligation to protect the common good", a concept never
accurately defined. With the proclamation of PNDU, the
government abandoned two decades of urban growth control by
the state.
Metropolitan planning
With respect to a metropolitan government for Santiago, the
military government selected the third strategy proposed by
CIDU's study in 1972 (Metropolitan agency at level of
central government), becoming Santiago and its region
governed by an "Intendencia Metropolitana" with a
jurisdiction on the Metropolitan Area of Santiago, and
Santiago itself becoming the Metropolitan Area. This agency
would respond to both, Ministry of Interior and ODEPLAN,
generating a permanent conflict of objectives, specially
under a military governor (Intendente), which also had to
respond to his hierarchal military superior. The Intendencia
government's jurisdictional control over Santiago's
metropolitan planning has been far from clear [Violich-
Daughters: 1987], committing itself mostly to housing plans,
biased with political orientation and favoritism due to its
institutional relationship with the Ministry of Interior.
MINVU on the other hand, and in agreement with the National
Indicative Plan, created a regional office for Santiago
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(SEREMI-M), which took in charge the control of PRIS.
SEREMI-M also coordinated the creation or modification of
the region's communal land-use plans (Plan Regulador Comunal
- PRC), all of which by the early 80s were already in
agreement with the new planning strategies of the
government, specifically, they became more flexible in their
land-use regulations. SEREMI-M became also in charge of
regulating new urban development on the expansion area
("area de expansion urbana"), name given to the suburban
area in the 1979 modification to PRIS, made with the purpose
of a land market liberalization.
Also in 1979, and under the need of harmonizing the PRIS
with the PNUD, the Department of Urban Development and
Infrastructure of SEREMI-M finished the studies for the
liberalization of Santiago's urban limits and prepared the
reformulation of PRIS. The analysis considered the potential
for urban growth of several sectors located in the suburban
area. Using twenty one variables, grouped into three
"components" (environment, population, and organization),
each sector obtained a compound coefficient that signed out
its growth potential 62
The better coordination between public institutions, and the
planning subordination of MINVU to ODEPLAN, gave the new
version of PRIS greater consistency with national economic
policies. In October 1979 by Supreme Decree 420 it was
promulgated a code that regulated the Urban Expansion Area.
SEREMI-M held the decision-making process for new
developments. Developers (though not the Intendencia
Metropolitana for its housing projects) had to be granted a
special authorization to build in this area after compiling
62 MINVU, "Estudio del area de expansion de Santiaqro",
Santiago, 1979.
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with municipal land-use codes. With respect to the urban
area, PRIS was left almost intact. This probably due to the
fact that the plan --because of its scale-- had enough
flexibility with respect to zoning codes to be compatible
with the PNDU. It was then the turn to reform --based on the
same premises-- the local (communal) land-use plans --PRCs.
Those of greater Santiago were all revised between 1979 and
1985.
In 1985, after six years of being the PNDU the official
urban ideology, planners within MINVU, which had been in a
low profile resistance to the new ideology of urban
policies, were able to gain enough muscle to get the
government to reformulate and decree a new PNDU, which
blended a market view of urban development with a stronger
role for the state. Parts of the 1985 PNDU were the total
antipode of the 1979 PNDU, stating for example that urban
land is a scarce resource. Nevertheless, for Santiago this
new PNDU had no impact because it was not transposed into
PRIS or any other plan, i.e. for MINVU, it was going through
the motions for institutional conformity.
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions for this study can be made on the two different
levels of analysis raised in this thesis. The first
referring to PRIS as a metropolitan land-use plan in
general, and the second to this plan in Chile's context
within the period of analysis of this study.
It is clear to me that PRIS was subject to the usual major
flaws that affected land-use planning during the 60s and
70s: lack of flexibility, poor implementation strategy, and
a physical bias of its professional team. These factors,
added to the long term strategies of this instrument, made
it look like an immutable object by succeeding planners
dealing with urban planning in Santiago in the following
years, and thus they disregarded many of its prescriptions,
mainly in the growth management aspects. More loosely
policies, with shorter term tactical plans could have been
more implementable than PRIS static and long term
propositions. If urban development strategies, with an
active state managing growth, would have been considered,
instead of a restrictive growth control scheme, probably
PRIS would have been a powerful instrument. If PRIS, instead
of the "end state" concern, would have had a more "more
process-oriented" concern for the means of promoting and
controlling development, as the vital implementation
function [OECD< Ian Haywood: 19771, probably would have had
a leading role in Santiago's planning because it would have
had incorporated all the social dynamic process of the 60s
and early 70s in Chile. The static nature of PRIS made it
become increasingly disconnected of national planning
objectives, specially in a context like Chile's 60s and 70s,
when these were constantly changing, often contradicting
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preceding ones, even during a same government (case of
position toward urban land as a resource in Pinochet's).
In the mid 60s, urban planning became also task for other
social- science-based professions. Economists, sociologists,
anthropologists began to have a say in development planning.
Thus, urban planning became a more interdisciplinary
activity, and goals were more socially oriented than what
PRIS could offer. Because PRIS was not designed to
incorporate new approaches, it was bypassed, and seen with
mistrust by agencies and institutions outside the Ministry
of Housing, who disregarded it as a physical oriented plan.
Also during this period a more process of growing public
participation was taking place in Chile, and PRIS did not
offer a chance of incorporating and using this dynamic.
PRIS no-growth statement, understandable as a reaction to an
explosive concentrated population growth (the Chilean
version of the baby-boom), in the peak of the immigration
phenomena, but not when these conditions changed, made the
plan become impracticable and obsolete. In consequence,
succeeding governments until 1973 bypassed many of PRIS'
statutes in growth control, namely urban limits. Later, the
military government removed them with the SD 420/79.
With respect to PRIS' planning policy context, it becomes
necessary in any analysis to understand that this was one of
the urban planning instruments among several that were
concurrently in place, usually overlapping in territorial
jurisdiction, and with also overlapping time-frames: local
land-use plans, pre-inversionales, national urban policies,
national housing plans, national development policies, etc.
Most of these instruments were produced by different
professionals teams, working in different state
institutions, in different periods of time, and enjoying
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diverse degrees of power. The hierarchical chain NATIONAL
SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS---> REGIONAL PLANS --- >
METROPOLITAN LAND-USE PLANS---> MUNICIPAL LAND-USE PLANS,
which was put in operation in Chile during the period of
this analysis, and which is supposedly a step-wise approach
to integrate national objectives with land-use planning, has
not been at all an harmonious system. Santiago, where all
these plans are in place, has never been able to deal
appropriately with them due to many contradictions among
each other, but mainly because professional borders have to
be crossed from one level to the next.
Sometimes these plans have been created with the implicit
intention of causing the revision of another plan. It
happened to Santiago's local land-use plans when PRIS came
into effect (1960), and to PRIS and local land-use plans
with the National Policy of Urban Planning (1979). In the
latter case, PRIS was an opposing force to a free land
market system, and probably the intention was to abolish
PRIS or make a new metropolitan plan for Santiago. But this
would have found opposition in professional groups within
MINVU staff which was still advocating for this plan. Also
in professional associations (mainly architects). In
consequence, enough modifications were introduced to
undermine its statutes and neutralize it. In the aftermath,
the plan was still there, but rather inoffensive.
Because PRIS was an imperial style of plan, and thus, was
rarely modified, other planning instruments ran at one time
or another in conflict with this plan. Not to having a
sponsor institution, namely a metropolitan government,
usually caused PRIS to lose these disputes with other
instruments. Because planners behind PRIS (department of
planning at MOPT, and later DDU at MINVU) were not among
those with the most leverage in the executive power, PRIS
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did not stand a chance when ODEPLAN imposed a different
approach to planning.
Maybe when MINVU was just founded in 1966, was the golden
opportunity for PRIS to take a leading role in Santiago's
urban development, but the institutional conflicts among the
development corporations, and the duplicity of functions
between MINVU and MOPT, described in chapter III, hindered
this chance. PRIS was sentenced to be the plan of the DDU,
instead of guiding all the planning institutions that were
involved in Santiago's development.
Short term goals of the different administrations was also
responsible for lack of significance of PRIS. The housing or
"viviendista" approach always produced better political
rewarding, and in consequence, was more attractive to
governments that desperately needed political support
(always insufficient in Chile's 60s and 70s).
Also, a problem of scale affected PRIS. When its study began
in the early 50s, metropolitan scale planning was gaining
momentum in Chile and elsewhere. However, when the plan came
into effect by 1960, several factors were making state
planners focussing more at the regional level of planning: a
devastating earthquake in the south, international financing
agencies, and a process of imbalanced urbanization toward
Santiago. Regional scale planning became increasingly
appealing to planners in the mid 60s and early 70s, and much
energy was devoted to this approach. In the late 70s and 80s
instead, municipal planning was the scale planners were
looking at, and the effort this time was being assigned to
decentralize planning. In consequence, PRIS' metropolitan
scale of approach was never in the mainstream of development
planning in Chile after the 50s.
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In spite of this, in the early 70s PRIS again could have had
an opportunity for becoming a key planning instrument if the
studies of CIDU regarding the creation of a Metropolitan
government agency would have thrived across the national
executive power and legislature. Having a backup agency
could have provided advocates at a high level in the
hierarchical structure of government agencies. Needless to
say: improved coordination for operating at the metropolitan
level mainly with service provision, as well as gaining
momentous in guiding development, and attracting qualified
professionals (case of BRA in Boston). Nevertheless, the
fact that local governments --municipalities-- were subject
to increasing political confrontation in the 60s and 70s,
and that these governments were an alternative source of
power, a sort of political buffer from the central
government, made this initiative distrustful to the
political parties. They were unsure which side would be
favored by this mid-level agency, how much power it would
have, and who was going to be in control it. Consequently
the idea never raised enthusiasm in the legislature.
During Pinochet's government, and after institutional
reform, a pseudo-metropolitan government was created
(Intendencia Metropolitana), but by that time urban planning
in Chile had been taken over by economic planning, whose
supporters were in ODEPLAN, agency which had gained a
leading role in Chilean planning, and which possessed a
cohesive staff, dominated by free-market oriented
economists. Added to this, the new organizational structure
of government left this agency under the command of the
Ministry of Interior, a political entity, which by nature
has short-term goals. Intendencia Metropolitana in
consequence was mostly devoted to housing and employment
projects. SEREMI-M, the metropolitan branch of MINVU was
left with the responsibility of PRIS.
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Added to the above, hindering Intendencia Metropolitana's
effectiveness in urban planning was the fact that its
executive director (Intendente) was since its creation a
general of the Chilean Army. Managing urban development is
not something military feel comfortable with because it is
not in their style of work. Discussion, negotiation,
compromise, consensus, are not concepts with which military
are familiar. Usually, military governments prefer to devote
their energy to public works and construction projects,
where top-down planning (more equivalent to their vertical
command style) proves effective. This is why this agency was
very efficient in implementing public works projects that
PRIS still demanded from its original conception, mainly
related to road system and parks. But, no effort was made to
import PRIS from SEREMI-M and transform it into an effective
instrument for urban development or growth management.
Final words
Ironically, PRIS was able to survive all these years, not
because of its flexibility or practicality, but because of a
combination of external factors: Chile's legalist inertia,
which makes it easier to create a new instrument than to
nullify an existing one; professional boundaries, which
other professions located in different agencies might
challenge but not abolish; and also, and simply because no
alternative plan was ever seriously proposed.
PRIS however, was certainly a good start for integrating
national planning objectives into land-use planning at a
metropolitan scale, an objective that has not been strongly
pursued in the last decades. I believe that a plan like this
should be understood in the future, not by its outdated
propositions, but by what it represents in terms of legal
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power, scale, and permanency: an instrument coded into the
legal system, of a metropolitan scale, and having enough
presence to remain in place for three decades. I believe
that if new growth management techniques and modern zoning
codes are introduced, as well as public participation,
expanding the scope of physical planning and linking it
directly to the resolution of critical and social and
economic issues, PRIS could become an effective planning
instrument for and of Santiago's inhabitants.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
CCHC Chilean Chamber of Construction ("Camara
Chilena de la Construccion").
CDP Christian Democrat Party ("Partido
Democrata Cristiano").
CIDU Department of Urban Studies at the
Catholic University of Chile. ("Centro
Interdiciplinario de Desarrollo Urbano").
After 1984 it became the Institute of
Urban Studies - IEU. ("Instituto de
Estudios Urbanos").
CODECO Municipal Council ("Corporacion de
Desarrollo Comunal"). Semi-legislative
bodies at the level of municipalities
stipulated by the new constitution of
1980, but not in operation until 1990.
CONARA Commission for Administrative Reform
("Corporacion Nacional de Reforma
Administrativa"). Task force established
during the first years of the military
government for detecting unnecessary
duplicate functions of different
government agencies and proposing
administrative reforms.
CORFO National Development Corporation
("Corporacion de Fomento y la
Produccion"). Chile's leading planning
agency since its foundation in 1939.
CORHABIT National Housing Corporation ("Corporacion
Habitacional"). Founded in 1965. Assigned
for lower cost housing projects than
CORVI.
CORMU National Urban Renewal Corporation
("Corporacion de Mejoramiento Urbano").
Founded in 1965.
CORVI National Housing Corporation ("Corporacion
de la Vivienda"). Founded in 1953.
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COU
DDU or DPDU
DFL
DOM
ECLA
FNDR
INE
MINVU
MIR
National Infrastructure Corporation
("Corporacion de Obras Urbana"). Founded
in 1965.
Urban Development and Budgetary Division
("Division de Presupuesto y Desarrollo
Urbano"). Office responsible for PRIS at
the Ministry of Housing since its
foundation in 1965 until 1976;
specifically, in the office of
intercommunal planning. After
administrative reform of 1974, when
budgetary responsibilities were
transferred to ODEPLAN, it became DDU, and
the Intercommunal plans were relocated at
the regional branches of the MINVU.
Presidential Decree ("Decreto con Fuerza
de Ley"). Executive decree that needed no
approval by Legislature, because it was
based on special prerogatives conceded by
the latter to the President.
Municipal Department of Public Works
("Direccion de Obras Municipales").
Municipalities with a population larger to
5,000 require that these entities count
with an Urban Advisor ("Asesor Urbano") to
be in charge of local urban planning.
Economic Commission for Latin America
("Comite Economico para America Latina" -
CEPAL). Agency of the Organization of the
United Nations. Founded in 1965.
Special Fund for Regional Development
("Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional").
Created during the military regime in an
effort for developing the regions.
National Institute of Statistics
("Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas").
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
("Ministerio de la Vivienda y Urbanismo").
Founded in 1965.
Leftist Radical Movement ("Movimiento de
Izquierda Revolucionaria"). Organized
massive land take-overs during the late
60s and early 70s.
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MOP or MOPT Ministry of Public Works and
Transportation ("Ministerio de Obras
Publicas y Transporte"). After 1965, when
the Ministry of Transport was created, the
final "T" was dropped.
ODEPLAN National Planning Office ("Oficina
Nacional de Planificacion"). Founded in
1965 as an advisory agency for the
President. After 1974 its executive
director obtained ministry status ("rango
de ministro").
ORPLAN Regional Planning Office ("Oficina
Regional de Planificacion Nacional").
Conceived in the late 60s as part of the
effort for regional planning. After the
1976 administrative reform they became
SERPLAC ("Secretaria Regional de
Planificacion"), which duplicated ODEPLAN
in the regions.
PDC Communal Development Plan ("Plan de
Desarrollo Comunal"). Comprehensive plans
produced by SECPLACs, ODEPLAN's branches
at the municipal level, starting in 1980.
PNDU National Policy of Urban Development
("Politica Nacional de Desarrollo
Urbano"). Document with legal status that
gives the main guidelines for urban
planning and policy design. The first is
from 1979, and it was reformulated in
1985.
PRC Municipal Land-Use Plan ("Plan Regulador
Communal").
PRIS Santiago's Land-Use Metropolitan Plan
("Plan Regulador Intercomunal de
Santiago"). 1960.
SD 420/79 Supreme Decree number 420/79. ("Decreto
Supremo 420/1979"). 1979 reformulation of
PRIS policy on city growth.
SEREMI Regional Ministry ("Secretaria Regional
Ministerial"). Created with the 1976
administrative reform. Each of the
thirteen regions has these duplicates for
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thirteen regions has these duplicates for
every national ministry. MINVU's SEREMI-M,
corresponds to the Ministry of Housing's
metropolitan region branch, and is the
agency in charge of PRIS since that date.
SERPLAC Regional Planning Office ("Secretaria
Regional de Planificacion"). Duplicate of
ODEPLAN at the regional level, and
responsible for the allocation of the
share of the Special Fund for Regional
Development -FNDR.
SERVIU Urban Housing Bureau ("Servicio de la
Vivienda Urbana"). Agency created after
the 1976 administrative reform to replace
the housing and urban development
corporations. Mostly dedicated to the
allocation of affordable housing
subsidies, and urban street paving.
SOFOFA Association of Entrepreneurs of Heavy
Industry ("Sociedad de Fomento Fabril").
SRCP Regional System of Urban Centers (Sistema
Regional de Centros Poblados"). Regional
policy studied by the Allende regime
(1970-73) but not implemented.
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ANNEX 1: BRIEF OUTLINE OF CHILE'S LAND-USE PLANNING SYSTEM
Chilean land-use planning for cities and municipalities is
regulated by several types of plans and codes, often
superimposing one another in their jurisdictions. Each of
these type of instruments has different origins and history,
which start with the first building code of 1929, created as
a reaction to an earthquake in a southern region of the
country, and which showed the need for regulating the
quality of construction.
Land-use plans can be summarized as variations of a "Plano
Regulador", equivalent to the Master Plan or Urban General
Plan used in the United States, though far more legalistic
[Violich-Daughters: 1987]. These plans basically consist of
a map which zone land-use and transportation patterns, and a
complementary land-use code. They are produced by teams of
architects and engineers who, previous to 1980 were
employees of a governmental entity (municipality, or
Ministry of Housing), and after that date, certified
consultants.
The oldest of these plans is that of the commune of Santiago
(1939), which was designed under the supervision of the
Austrian city planner Karl Brunner. During the 50s and 60s,
most urban communes in the country created their own Plano
Regulador, greatly influenced by Santiago's. In Greater
Santiago between 1979 and 1985, and with the intention of
gaining consistency with general planning policy, all of
these local land-use plans were revised; work done by
private consultants under the supervision of the Ministry of
Housing.
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During the 60s, the metropolitan scale was introduced to
land-use planning, and the three largest cities were given
their metropolitan regulador plans: Santiago (1960),
Concepcion (1965), and Valparaiso-Viza del Mar (1970). PRIS,
subject of this study, is the metropolitan regulador plan
for Santiago.
In the 60s and 70s it was introduced a strategic land-use
plan (Plan Seccional), which, at a smaller scale than a
local Plano Regulador, intervenes in a special urban
situation with special land-use regulations. These are
normally used for urban renewal purposes, and are created by
municipalities in combination with the Ministry of Housing
(MINVU). Not many of these plans have been implemented, but,
nonetheless, some have been quite successful.
Jointly with these specific plans there is a general
umbrella law (Ley General de Construccion y Urbanismo) and a
complementary ordinance (Ordenanza General de Construccion y
Urbanismo) which are the general building and urban
development codes for the whole country. These instruments
have been revised several times since the first in 1931,
being the latest in 1976.
At the local level, these instruments are duplicated with
more specific regulations: local building and urbanization
codes (Ordenanza Local de Construccion y Urbanismo), which,
together with local the Plano Regulador, are responsibility
of the municipalities, specifically, the "Direccion de Obras
Municipales" -- DOM (Public Works Department).
Starting in the 80s, and under a the new institutional
structure, whereby the national planning office (ODEPLAN)
has municipal branches (SECPLACs), new comprehensive
development plans (Plan de Desarrollo Comunal) have been
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produced and compiled with local land-use plans. However, at
the regional and metropolitan levels this has new approach
has not been implemented.
121
ANNEX 2: NOTES ON OTHER EXPERIENCES
London
"The British post-war system was a response both to the
devastation of the last war and to a desire to create a new
order and a sense of equity. Plans were seen as models of an
ideal situation which, given time, would be realized on the
ground. Legislation gave teeth to a system which it was
assumed would be good for the public. One of these assumed
desires was for better environmental standards and that such
standards could only be achieved by separating work areas
from residential areas with cities as work-places and
suburbs providing housing through the grouping and
segregation of land use activities". At least three
consequences derived from this planning style: first,
planning was descriptive rather than prescriptive, and
second, concentration on zoning planning led to an emphasis
on spatial aspects of planning in detriment of non-spatial
elements [OECD, Ian Haywood: 19771.
Paris [Trilling: 1981]
In 1956 the planners of the french Ministry of Construction
started designing the Plan d'Amenagement et d'Organization
Generale de la Region Parisien - PADOG. Its main goal was to
limit the growth of Paris, which was believed to be at the
detriment of the rest of the country. It was adopted by the
Gaullist government, which had taken office in 1958, in
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1960.
"The PADOG was the beginning of a sustained effort to create
comprehensive land use planning at the level of the
metropolitan Paris region and to provide for a spatial
structure of activities that would improve upon projections
of existing non-planned tendencies"..."Substantively the
PADOG embodies the no growth, protectionist ideological
tenor of the inter-war period"..."the view that the capital
should not be allowed to expand demographically and
geographically"..."in the french called Malthusianism" a
fear that the economic and demographic expansion was not
sustainable and needed a protracted, sustained stagnation.
The existing process had to be countered by techniques of
positive regional planning.
The question to planners was at what rate should Paris be
allowed to grow relative to provincial cities? PADOG worked
on the assumption that migrations to Paris could be reduced
from 50,000 to 25,000 people a year through the limitation
of employment creation. This was pursued by limiting the
construction permits of offices and factories (physical
control).
PADOG proposed massive improvements in the transport
infrastructure aiming at reducing congestion in the center.
Two deep-level express lines, RER (Reseau Espress Regional)
was to serve the Paris suburbs, and would operate in
combination with the Metro.
The planning unit for which PADOG zones is an area of 5000
square miles containing a central built area of 463 square
miles (1,200 square kilometers) containing a population of
7,313,911. Four zones were considered:
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1. The noyau central (central core), where, in
conjunction with the Plan Directeur, calls for
preservation. It creates a nearby growth-pole (La
Defense) to channel new commerce, and service activities
(located in the third zone).
2. Ten peripheral arrondisossements, with a population of
two million (two thirds of central Paris). PADOG calls
here for renovation, recuperation of misused land, and
reduction of population. The density of this zone was
often higher to 800 inhabitants per hectare.
3. Banlieiu outside the 20 arrondisossements, with 214
communes and with four million inhabitants, and to
receive the population removed from the second zone.
Proposes the creation of three development nodes to serve
as well, the inhabitants of this zone, and those of the
second zone, where spill-over growth from the three core
zones (commerce and service industries, administration,
and the university) would be channelled. The most
important of these nodes is La Defense, with high-rise
buildings (office, and housing), and infrastructure to
accommodate 800,000 people.
4. Rural belt with a population of 1.2 million and
preponderant agricultural activity. Thirty towns are in
this are, a dozen with population between 10,000 and
30,000. PADOG tries to maintain a non-built zone, a sort
of green-belt inspired in the London Green belt.
PADOG was a "decisive document" in the sense that it
reversed a post-war "hands-off" policy by restructuring the
Paris metropolitan region with a coherent giant public works
program.
124
PADOG criticism can be broken into three major difficulties:
1. PADOG's planners Malthusian attempt to limit growth
was misconceived. It was argued that excessive growth of
Paris would hinder competitiveness with other European
capitals, and planed a population of 12 million for the
year 2000. Nevertheless, between 1962-64, Paris grew at a
rate three times higher than PADOG's assumption (average
of 165,000).
2. Planning boundaries were to tightly drawn, and the
allocation of constructible land was scarce to meet the
growing demand. Also, the lack of integration between the
central agglomeration and the wider city was unrealistic,
suffering the plan constant "violations".
3. PADOG's time horizon (1970) was too modest. This short
term view encouraged a search for mitigation type of
thinking rather than looking for fundamental solutions.
PADOG must be seen as both, "an artifact of its time, and a
stepping stone". It was an advanced document in the right
direction, "and set the stage for an ambitious land -use
planning effort, notably in the spheres of transport and in
the initiation of the suburban nodes." Its effectiveness
fell on its basic premise, that it was both desirable and
possible to halt demographic and physical growth of Paris.
However, it is thanks to PADOG that the principle tools of
management of the Paris region were created and implemented.
Also, two major concrete realizations owe to this plan: RER
and La Defense.
The control and supply of land is controlled in Paris by the
Land and Technical Services Agency (AFTRP), created in 1962,
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through acquiring land for development, protect forests and
to intervene the land market. This is done through pre-
emption rights on zones of differed planning (ZAD),
established in 1964-65. These were designed to ensure that
the announcement of proposed development under the regional
plan (1965) would not lead to an increase in land prices and
speculation. Complementary to ZAD tool as a mean for combat
against speculation of urban land, a legal maximum
occupation coefficient has been established, 1:1 for all
France, and 1:5 for Paris [OECD, Christian Hortus: 19771.
United States
Most of metropolitan areas in the US are suffering from an
overlapping myriad of units of local governments (in larger
cities these can larger than a thousand). Most metropolitan
residents are served at least by a county, a municipality or
township, a school district, and one or more special
districts (sewer, street improvement, fire protection).
These government are weak, and the overlapping situation
weakens them further (struggling for resources from the same
land parcels). Also, the nature of these governments --
considering mobility of population-- inhibit long-range
planning and the presence qualified decision-makers
essential to local government. There is a lack of
administrative structures capable of handling overall
system-wide problems [Patterson: 1988].
Recent experience has showed some successful metropolitan
reorganization: Toronto, Miami, Nashville, Jacksonville, and
Indianapolis. Other case have dealt with metropolitan
special cases districts: parks and recreation, sewer and
water utilities, public transportation, and metropolitan
planning. Still however remains a problem of funding these
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agencies, having a role of merely advisory entities. The
federal government for some time has been on the line of
promoting the formation of councils of government "through
requiring them in all metropolitan-wide planning". It has
become more evident that metropolitan scale government is
better at dealing with certain planning issues, specially
transportation planning, and urban renewal [Patterson:
1988].
Three major events have served to weaken planning in regard
to its comprehensiveness both in geographic coverage and
breadth of subject matter:
1. The 1974 Housing Act which decided to award Community
Development Block Grants (CDBG's) directly to eligible
local governments, which resulted in the formation of
Community Development departments devoted to short-term,
limited scope, renewal-revitalization programs.
2. Elimination of "701" funding for planning purposes
(during first Reagan administration).
3. Relaxation of the planning requirements to grant CD
Block Grants. [Patterson: 1988]
The reduced requirements and change in emphasis in federal
funding and accountability have caused cities to have acute
budgetary problems and lacking of devotion for long-range,
area-wide comprehensive planning [Patterson: 1988].
In the British tradition this type of planning is referred
to as "structure planning", while in the United States the
Federal government calls it "level two planning", and the
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states "regional planning", "county planning", or "sub-
state planning". In all case it refers to "some sort of
large-scale physical land-use planning which determines
land-use allocation in an area including few or many local
municipalities" [Fabos: 19851.
In the United States transportation planning became
synonymous of metropolitan regional planning, giving primary
concern to accessibility. Land-use allocation models were
the instrument to develop land based on surveyed
preferences. The equivalent to European comprehensive
planners are the American highway planners [Fabos: 1985].
At the level of metropolitan planning, public planners have
a predominant role. Planning consultants, or private
planners have an insignificant role. This owes to the fact
that metropolitan planning is a long-range activity, a
continuous activity where a bureaucracy is essential [Fabos:
19851.
In the US metropolitan and rural planning instruments have
usually been of single purpose, instead of an integrated
approach [Fabos: 1985].
I... the importance of this middle level or metropolitan and
regional and rural planning is increasing. As land-use
issues have become more complex, as our understanding of the
interrelationships between human activities and the
environment have increased, as local areas have grown into
metropolitan regions, this regional level planning has
become inevitable. A significant growth in this area of
land-use planning is vital and most likely to occur in the
near future" [Fabos: 1985].
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What do we want metropolitan regional agencies to do (at the
urban level) and are they strong enough to do it ? "What we
want them to do is to contribute to efficiency in public
services where these are divided, uncoordinated
jurisdictions"..."We want them to contribute equity --fiscal
equities and social equities-- where larger units will
overcome the parochialism of smaller units". Council of
Governments - COGs, are too weak at present to attain many
objectives significantly [Stollman in Campbell: 1976].
Federal government action contributed to the creation of
sub-state regional organizations in the 60s (COGs). A few
were multi-functional, being devoted to planning and
development, health, education, economic development,
transportation, mental health, aid to the aging, etc. Most
were devoted mostly to planning, and most of these received
comprehensive planning grants from the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965. "Most remain advisory, lack of
regulatory power, and with a few minor exceptions, do not
deliver services. Their emphasis remains on planning and the
results of their planning efforts can be ignored by local
jurisdictions" [Campbell: 19761.
In the US there is an acceptance of the principal that urban
growth should be guided through public policy decision
involving a wide array of community interests group.
Policies are "made principally by locally elected
governments, within prescribed legal and administrative
limits, and with governments at the regional, state, and
national level playing various roles. The professional
contributions are clearly interdisciplinary and residents
have a voice" [Violich-Daughters: 1987].
"The physical concerns in the United States have been
function-efficiency-value-oriented rather than aesthetics-
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amenity-design-oriented, as was traditional in Europe,
where... much of the contents stems from architectural and
engineering criteria, with less attention given to political
processes or to socio-economical analyses" [Violich-
Daughters: 19871.
"Technical work of urban planners is institutionalized on a
more legislatively structured basis; urban plans are
formulated in public view and are exposed to discussion and
reactions at public hearings required by law". Physical
regulations can even be subject to popular vote. [Violich-
Daughters: 1987].
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ANNEX 3: LAND-USE REGULATIONS
Zoning
Is "the demarcation of a city by ordinances and the
establishment of regulations to govern the use of the zoned
land". Its main objectives are usually to improve
efficiency, to promote agglomeration benefits, to specify
minimum health and safety requirements, and to provide land
for public goods and services. Zoning techniques have
evolved through time:
- Zoning based on scale of intensity of use (from single
family-residential to heavy industrial).
- "Bulk Control" zoning ordinance (to control density,
production, and traffic; provision of adequate daylight
and air; and provision of sufficient privacy and open
space). Older zoning ordinances regulated shapes, volume,
placement, setbacks, etc. of buildings More modern
ordinances just control floor-area ratios.
- Zoning for mixed-use development, transit impact, and
cluster and planned-unit development. More comprehensive
but flexible approach.
- Mixed-use zoning may be applied to special
mutually supporting large-scale estate
developments.
- Transit zoning is used for rezoning land
around a public transport station to allow
higher densities and mixed uses.
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- Planned-unit development zoning is used for
parcels of land containing a residential
housing cluster of prescribed density and
appropriate commercial and institutional
facilities. (Rarely used in LDCs). [Courtney:
1983]
More recent zoning techniques include: floating zoning
(defined but not approved until need arises), conditional
zoning (enables the local government to bargain certain
concessions with developer), interim zoning (moratorium on
alterations while city decides purchase or rezoning), and
phased zoning (developer must prove availability of
infrastructure and services, or/and promise of provision of
open space, construction of low-income housing, and
conformity to design standards, in order to obtain permit).
[Courtney: 1983]
Two types of difficulties usually arise from zoning:
-incorrect definition of the framework by which the
social objectives are to be met (older type of
regulations were oriented for the development of one lot
at a time making little sense when applied to large-scale
projects)
- costly and limited implementability which often leads
to opposed results (legal status of regulations hinder
its flexibility). [Courtney: 1983]
More recently however some efforts have been made to improve
this planning tool: amortization for non-conforming uses;
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performance standards; giving priority to use instead of
density; conditional uses to be reviewed by a planning
commission or other entity; historic, cultural and aesthetic
zoning, requiring review by experts; introduction of planned
unit development to be reviewed by a planning commission;
introduction of incentives for developers to provide certain
amenities; etc. [Patterson: 19881
Zoning works best when it is one among diverse policy
instruments. Although necessary for the purposes it seeks,
if alone, it cannot outlaw existing uses, oppose owner
resistance, and often limits desirable changes in land-use.
"in developing countries, where the supply of urbanized land
is increasing more slowly than the growth of urban
population, it may readily lead to illegal development"
[Courtney: 1983].
Subdivision regulations can is a powerful instrument to
determine neighborhood patterns. Once the size and shape of
the lots has been defined, the essential character of land
uses, street patterns, and public utilities is determined.
It also strongly affects the type, size and quality of
structures and the density of population [Courtney: 1983].
This tool can only be effectively applied only to areas
being urbanized for the first time, and even the problems of
enforcement arise. Rapid growth of squatter settlements make
these regulations ineffective. A major problem in developing
countries is that its application is based on its success in
developed countries (mainly US and France) with too high
standards and limited flexibility [Courtney: 1983].
Approval by government agencies is the main way in which
controls over development rights, subdivisions, and building
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are enforced, done through the issue of building permits
[Courtney: 1983].
Urban planning puts into operation the regulatory
instruments described. The most commonly used processes are:
comprehensive general planning, master planning, strategic
planning, and structure planning. The first two tend to
assume a static or slow-growing urban situation, "quite
manageable in terms of public investment decisions, and the
long-range planning of major infrastructure projects. This
is the reason they work well in developed countries. In LDCs
however, where growth is rapid, and financial resources and
infrastructure is insufficient, traditional planning
(comprehensive and master plans) tends to become an isolated
activity, often lacking of effective tools for
implementation. "Zoning and police power, normally the only
tools implied by master plans, are usually inadequate"
[Courtney: 19831.
Structure, or strategic, planning --evolved from the British
planning tradition-- lends itself for LDCs. This strategy
highlights the critical issues, identifies the priority
investment for infrastructure, and establishes priority
areas for development (expansion, renewal, upgrading,
densification). It does not require elaborate data gathering
and becomes an ongoing process selecting key areas for
action [Courtney: 1983].
List of Instruments of urban land policy:
A. PLANNING INSTRUMENTS
Actions taken on the basis of planning decisions
1. Public planning monopoly
2. Building prohibitions restrictions
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B. TAXATION INSTRUMENTS
Actions taken through the imposition of charges
C. MARKET INSTRUMENTS
Following the rules of the free market compensating
the owners with usual market values
D. FINANCIAL SUPPORT INSTRUMENTS
Loans and subsidies granted or regulated by public
bodies
E. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUMENTS
Actions based on the legal power of the public
authorities to establish their own rules [IFHP:
1981].
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ANNEX 4: SUMMARY OF THE NATIONAL URBAN POLICY OF
PINOCHET'S GOVERNMENT (PNDU-1979)
The basic premises of the PNDU can be summarized in the
following concepts 63:
1. "Social benefits" of land, used for urban
purposes, is greater than its use for rural
purposes, and this is shown by the willingness of
people and institutions to pay more for the first
than for the latter.
2. Loss of agricultural land to urbanization is not
a common problem to all cities; being many
surrounded by unproductive rural land.
3. Given the extreme scenario of low density growth
in all cities of Chile, by the year 2000 this type
of occupation would represent a loss of 3.7%
agricultural land.
4. Land is only one of the inputs in agricultural
production. Developed countries have proved that the
most important for increasing productivity is not
land but technology.
5. The absence of market regulation policies in the
past twenty years (1960-1979) was probably the cause
of the urban occupation of the richest soils in
cities' surroundings, which instead, if competed
though price factor, might have been preserved as
rural.
** Pino, Rafael, "Consideraciones para una politica de
crecimiento y estructuracion urbana", Revista AUCA No. 37,
Santiago, August 1979.
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With these principles in mind, the DDU established the
following basic premises in the PNDU *:
1. "Urban land is not a scarce resource. Its
apparent scarcity owes to the lack of harmony
between the technical and legal norms, and a
genuinely free real-estate operating market".
2. "Land use is to be defined by its greater
profitability. Urban land is a resource to be freely
exchanged through the market, limited only by zoning
regulations, technical norms, and public interest
for specific social functions. The use of land is
only determined by an equation that balances social
gains (mechanism for optimal state benefits), and
private lucre, in the sense of making possible
private development, according to the limitations
dictated by norms and urban planning instruments".
3. "Population concentration generates comparative
advantages for the development of social and
economic activities".
4. "Urban land use must be subject to flexible
regulations, defined by market requirements".
5. "The state is responsible for the protection of
the common good: this is determined by those
policies that guide the relations of the urban-land
market, with the purpose of protecting the common
** Ministerio de la Vivienda y Urbanismo - MINVU, "Politica
nacional de desarrollo urbano - Chile 1979", in EURE no 22,
September 1981.
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good and the environment".
Sources:
Lopez, Marco Antonio, "Expansion de las ciudades", in EURE
no 22, September 1981.
Ministerio de la Vivienda y Urbanismo - MINVU, "Politica
nacional de desarrollo urbano - Chile 1979", in EURE no 22,
September 1981.
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APPENDIX:PRIS AND SD 420/1979 ORDINANCES
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VIALIDAD
Taoq idteman fundamentales do, la viali-
dad interconiinail on:
1.-CAliMETERAS . DE ACCESO Ali
OLAN SANTIAGO.
2.-ANtI.LO) DE CIRCUNVAiACION
EN LAS COMUNAS PEIlTIFERICAS.
3.-RISTEMA DE DISTRilIUCION IN-
THiNIEDO.
4.-VIAS i.ADIAiLS INTERCOMUNA-
IES.
5.-RI ST E M A DE DISTRiIIUCION
CENTRAL.
T,on trazadon tie las vin n eeimen %cnindlos
en el lno) tic Zoniifieaci6n tieneral y sus
anchos ne especifican a contttinucion:
1.-CARRETEAR DE ACCESO Ali
(IlAN SANriAO
a) Carretera Panamericana.
a 1.-Aceeco Norte, dividido en dhos ra.
man: In prinimera desde el contado Norte do
Entaciqn ienen al Rio Mapotho, frente a
l calile Walker Martinez, 60 metron; y Ia
seguida dede lieeliuraba iasta el -Rio
iapocho, frenite a Puente Blneg, 60 me-
tros.
a 2.-Sector Urbano, deitde el iRio Ma-
pocho hasia Avenida San .oaquin, 50 ne-
tros (Aveniila Walker Martinez, Robles
y e-tneral Velliwquez).
a 3.-Sector Stir, demde Rnn Jonqutin
hata Avenida Coinn, en San Beritardo,
100 metroe.
a 4.-Aecego Sir, desde Avenida Coloitn
ha-sta enpahninr con el Lmoigitetiiiial al
Sur do No, 60 metroe.
b) Ochagavia.
b 1.-De e AvenitiA Ann Jonquin, en
In c n a d 0 Sa fi-e .11 , linsita el eipal-
toe enn lit Carreteta l'aiiniiiierivaina al Sur
de Lo lE-pejo, 61) metron.
e) Camino a San Antonio (Avenida Pedro
Aguirre Cerda).
e I.- e'le el pnso bajo nivel con eI re.
rrocarril litngitiolinal (Puent-e Melipilla)
lasta el eruer del caminio a IonWitun, 40
nietrom.
e 2.-etile (-I eruce dei. enmino a Lon.
qnt",11 hasta s emp 11alme civn l ernmino a
Valparniso en l'adre Iiarintao, 40 meitros.
e 3.-taminO a Ltnqiin, 50 nietros
(deslte Cerrillos al 'tuniente).
d) Camino a Valparaiso por Lo Prado.
S1 .- itde el cruier ei cPI reeniin Los
Pajnrilto, en el sector Ine lIt-jies, haeia el
'tuiite, 6i0 sami tr -et
r) Camino Macul-Las Viscachas.
e 1 .-. 14 Peiro Alessanedri, de-ile Ave.
laida trarrizaal ha1tista I'uNt11aa di H jee, 30
3net ro,.
e 2.-Prni PI tranon deie Punta dtie lHie.
left hasel i C ti'mito Departlamelital, :10 hc.
tron.
e 3.- M-eode el Catino Despariitamental
hasia1ns Viyenehas, 441 umjetrox.
f) Avenida Vicuna Mackenna
f I.- Die-rsd In Avia. Itiodrigo tie Arm.
ya hasta Waiker Iiarlinez, 45 tmtetroa (1).
Con Ia aveniftil mlupreeeitn dei Ferroe-nrril
de Mantiago a il'itute Alto Ne uitilizarit co-
,0 via tie tItnplemetnaeain a ac-tual raja
que oeupa dilto Ferroearril, en el tramio
comprendido entre el Canino i)eparta-
mental y Ia Avda. Walker Mart inez.
f 2.- Dteie Walker bir-tinez hasta Ia
'iaaa de Puente Alto, 50 metros.
Mi) Inetye In fain que atuaimente ocupa el
terrocarril a Puntta Alto.
f 3.- Cireurvalacin vor eA Poniente do
Puente Alto, 40 mits.
2.- ANXJ.fO Dr rIPCU, iALACTON DE
LAS GUMUNAS 'EiIIFEIliCAS
., Para el tranio que atraviesa lam co-
muas de Maipi, jans Blarranne, Renca,
Quilicura, Conchali y I,as Condevi (limeita-
do en esta iiima en la Avd.a. Fraiwsco
Bilbao), 610 m1tq.
b) En el tramo correspondiente a Ia co-
mna de Run~on, deq-le Franteiseo Biilbao,
por et Norte, hasta el Caintio ie hso lierni-
da, por el Stir, 50 metro.
e) Para cl tr.ma que Se deiznrrolla al Stir
del Canino de Lo llermida hasta el li-
mite de Ians conitaas de utifioa y La Flo-
rida, 60 metros.
d) En el sector correspondiente a las
conunan de La Florida y La Granja has.
ta Ia calle Juan Luits Fuenteq, 60 metros.
e) En Ia comuna de La Cisterna diese
I& calile antes menwionnla hansta el Ca-
mino de Ochagavia, 50 metros.
f) Para el tramo ronprenlido entre' el
Canino Oehngaia y el inite con la -co-
muna de Maipit, 60 nectroq.
3.- SISTEMA DE )iSTItill:'toN
INTERINMEDIO
a) Avenida Costanera Norte.- Comtpren-
de Ions iguientes trantos:
a 1.- Tramio qie se e-%tienle de-sde su
interseceinn con el Carmiino a Valparaiso,
en Pudahuiel, hasta el P neinte Alnel )to-
driguez, 60 metros.
a 2.- Tramo que ne extiente desie el
Puente Maiwel Rodrigueez iasta el Piuente
del Arpobispo (enitpretnel'-lis aetunle ea-
lies Zenteno y Bellavista), 25 ietroe.
a 3.- Tramtio limitarlo desde el I'ente
del Arzobicpo iasta sit itermecoein con Ia
prolongne-i6n (1e In Avenida ilellavista, 30
metros.
a 4.- Deseie Ia intermqeeinn de lam Ave-
nidcain Bellavista y Santa iaria, antest se-
alida, hasta -u empaime enn la prolontra-
cidn de In Avenida i o Salde lineia el Po-
niente a travse dei Rio Maplonho, 30 nietron.
4.- Vi
CIrani Avenita .... ..
Fanla ltosa (San AiNNu1el y L
Granja) ... ... ... ... ..
Avda. Sur (tniioa)
. . . . . . .
Prioneneaeitin de Aveii-ta 'Stir
hnta ilelarista ... ...
Avla. irarraizaval ... ... ...
Avdia . Aimten 1oivar..
Avia. Diagoal Orietiei.
Avla. Frineiseo liilhn . . .
llanengain y Albrez Ical . ..
Ada. ieliodoro Yiifez ... ...
Avdsit. Providenc-iai y A I-
qicuido ... ... ... ... ...
Avia. Lo Shlden ... ... ...
A vda. Tajatiar..........
A voa. Vitnimna..........
A vd . Iteenieta . . . . . . .
Avdi. El Salto ....... ... ..
Avia. I tdependen ia .
Avia. Pernin Vivnec a . . .
Caile UMnpoV1co (delsdeie Q Int.
Normi tl Ponienite) ... ...
's le t'arrawea .. .. .. .. ..
Avda. .inngnin Ptrez.
alc Kan Patblo (Qiinta Ner-
elie ... .... .... ,. . .
Calle Sani Pablo (En S~iabeii
Como via .de eomplementaci6n en el see.
tor central de Ia Avda. antes seialada,"se
consultan las actuales Avenidas Borgono,
Artesanos y Bellavista cusanchadas a 30
metros.
Se consutIlt para nn futuro man lejano
y cuando el iteremento dol trainsito asi .o-
justifique, la babilitaci6n de una autopis-
ta de doble calzada sobre. el Iceho actual
del Rio Mapochn, previn laR. obras ncce-
sariat para la regtlarizavi6n del actual
cantce.
b) Avenida Oriente (Avenida Vicuija
Mackenna)
b) 1 .- D.<ea Plaza Iitalia iaseta el Fe-
rroe-arril de Cirennvalaci6n, 40 imetron.
h 2.- Deee el Ferrovurril dic Circulnva-
Iniritn hasta la Avda. Itodrigo de Araya,
4- tetros.
c) Avenida Sur
r -I .- Eitre la Avda. Pedro Agiirre
Cerda y el Ferrocarril Longittlinial, 33 me-
rons tie alizadas, su trazado es conligoo al
1'arquie Isabel Riquelme.
e 2.- Entre el Ferrocarril iongitndlinal
y la Avda. Santa Ilosa, corre pnralcia a
lie'hio Ferrocarril, se conmilta utn ancho do
33 ne'tros para sts enlzarias.
e :.- Entre Ia Avda. Santa 1otoa y Vi-
eiia Maeacenna se bifrea en den ramani
Ia pritmera continita por enitle Pintor' Cica-
relli eneanehada R.40 metirosq, y Ia segun.
(in presre paralela al Fercearril.de Cir-
etitvalatinitn, cnnsultindoqc para ella 33
mrt-ros; de aneho para Ro calzadast, medi-
dos de. lia litea fetrrea al Stir.
d) Avenida Poniento
(Consctitiida por in aotnnes Aydan. Wal.
3hr Mnrtinez, Voronel RoileA. Apolotol Man-
tistaln y (General VelAzquez. enancehadaii a
50 iietros. Se' extiende dol ie lilo Ma-
po-lho por #I Norte haseta seu itierseceidn
co0n ia Avda. Pedro Atiirre Cera por el
Sur.
AS IRADIA12S I NTpltIMU
NALE8 S
30 itetros
3i) tectrOn (Yte 5 tee. tie .:nrn a n.la I1n)
40) tiiiro (Fntr- ANda. Alaniue.I iodriguiez y Ca-
mittill El Marisal)
40 itietron
ilei Iro4
mietrom
tiet roe
metros
mietros
nctros
tmet ros
tmietros
iti roe
tiet rox
ilet ros
Iet.troe
metros
ieertros
Inetros
mietros
mnetrom
mtetrom
me1t1ro6
(Ver Avdela. Parqie. Pic. N.o 17)
(Entre A vda. Bulstaiante y Plaza
(imtae- 5 nis. de antejardfin) ie Ma mel
lontt. al Oriente
I Entre Aleenueil Mllontt y V. Mackenna.
(al Orie-nte tie Ai-. Ilolanda y 20 ists.
adl'eonientec ii '
(nuixsI iiares die ib unterieur)
(enle alnzula''ntilo,20 mits., auxii-
liar de. Ia anterior)
in reepcifln do traman Mlub de fiolf)
(eotei izt a rea arborizadla del Rio Ma-
jecheie)
C.
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dade Villasana a Iatucana) 35 metros
Banto Domingo ......... 20 metros
Avda. Imperial (Qiuinta Nor-
mal) ... ... ... ... ... . 30 metros
Cinco do Abril (Santiago y
lfaipns) ... ... ... ... .. 40 metros
Camino Pajaritos ........ 40 metros
Las lIejas .. .. . 34 metros
L. Reins y S. Valdovinos . 30 metros
5.-SISTEMA DE DISTRIBUCION
(ENTIRAfj
Sia trazado serau definido, de acuaerdo con
los estudios del nuevo Plano Regulador de
)a couIsana de. Santiago, quo elabora la Di-
recciont de Obras Aluuicipales respectiva.
-000-
Ill.-ZONIFTCACION INTEltCOMUNALU
La Zonificaein del Plano Intercomnuual
comprende las siguientest materias-
INDUSTRIAS
AlMAS VElIDES
YIVIENDA.
INDlUST~IIAS
a) Clasificaci6n:
1.-Industrias Peligrosas.- Son aquellas
que bor Ia indoie -emineiiteniite peligrosa
expslossiva o nociva te sus instalaciones, mna-
terias primass, productos intermedios o pro-
ductos finales 'pueden lilegar a causar da-iaos de cariacter eatastrafico, a la salud o
a la propiedad, en un irea que exeede con-
siderablemento los limites do su propio
predio.
2.- Industrias Molestas.- Suit aquellas
euyo proceso do fabricac;ii6n o almacena-
imienuto do iaterias primas o productos fi-
nales puedten ocasiontalmente estisar daios
a la salud o at Ia propiedadl, y itse normal-
mente quedan circsuseritos al predio de
)a propia industria; o bien asiuellas que
pueden straer moseas o roelores. producir
ruidos o vibraciones, despresier olores, iu-
mos o polvo, proxocar exsivas conceitra-
ciones do tranasito o estacionamiintoe ait is
vias de uso pnblico, causando con ello imo-
lestias quo so prolonguen a cauiesaiisr perio-
do del dia o tie li ntochs'.
3.- Industrias Inofensivas.- Son asgue-
lilas qlue no producen dusios iii mlestias at
resto de la counilad
b) Zonas Industriales:
- I .- Areas Industriales Peligrosas.- 1Is-
taran ubicads fuera dol Lbnite Urbano,
ei aquellas irelts riurales en sluc, previa
autorizacidn tie los organiswos cotpeten-
tel, so insitalen las indttstriass peligrosas.
Las instalaciones de Ia industria debesrna
estar rodeadas por una frasja de 300 le-
tros de terreno libre, miedidos desde el li-
Imite de dichas instalaeiones. Esta faja de-
beri ser de propiedad te lt industria y
en ella queda prolibida Ia eonstrucci6n do
habitaciones, excepto aquellas destinadas a
cuidadores o personal que efecltie trabajos
do emergencia. El aneho de )a faja potlr
ser disminuido o' aumentado cunando las
circunstancias asi lo aco-sejen.
2.- Zonas Industriales Intercomunales-
(A) (Exelusiva). Son aquellas destinadats
a absorber el desarrllo industrial, y en ellas
so ubicarian obligatoriamente Iss industrias
inolestas. Las inofenai'vas y lasr casas-habi-
tacisnl que en estas soeas so construyan lo
haran a su propio riesgo, s'iAn dereelio a pois-
terior reclamo por las molest ias quo expe-
rimenten, lo que so dajari etipulado en
las respectivas incnirpeioness de liienes 'Rai-
ces y en las patentes o autorizaciones otor-
gada. por Ias Municipalidades u otros or-
ganismos. Para Ias nuevas urbanizaciontes
y constrnceiones regirn lats siguientes di4-
posleiones: superficio prelial ainfima do
S.500 m2.; ine inims de'10 1t.
I.
(do Matucana al Poniente)
SCaniiiago, MsIaijHa.
liarranc;as y Quinta Nurmail.
frente a lss vias iitereoiunales y de 5 m.
en las demniis calles, y 5 in. de distancia
muiiiima a las nedianeras.
3.- Zonas Mixtas con Industria Moles.
ta.- (11) (Zona Con.gelada).- Son aqu-
Has en que hay una cierta concentracion
dte industrias molestas, pero (ie no cou-
sulta un lmayor desarrollo industrial. Las
industrias molestas existentes en ellas pue-
den amipliarse o mejorarse, pero no pue.
deu instalarse nuevas industrias de este.
tipo. Podra instalarse en ellas las indus-
trias inofensivas sin liinitaci6n. Las casas-
habitaei6n reninciardn a todo reclamoo por
las niolestias producidas entre las 7 y las
19 horits de los dias habiles.
4.- Zonas Mixtas con Industria Inofen-
siva.- Son aqueilliis zonas r'sideiciales en
que existen industrias inofensivas, cuyos
limites estnin determinados por el Piano
legulador latercoinuial, y eu las cuatles
so permuitiri el estableimiiento de nuevas
industrias iuofensivas tinicamente en Ins
maicrozonas que para tat efecto deber5n
determinar los Planos Reguladores Conu-
nales. Fuera de las microzonas no serfi per-
mitido ning~in tiio de nuevas industrias.
Las microzontas o sectores destinados ex-
clusivamiente a Ia instalavi6n, de industrias
inofensivas so determinarin en coneordan-
cia con lt planificaciin de ciada barrio o
iiidadles vecin iales en que se emplacen.
e) Normas para la aplicac;6n do las Zo-
nas Industriales:
I.- Lass industrias qie aetialmente es-
tant iitstalads fuerit tie ru zona correspon-
diente no podrin aipliarse, ndificarso
ni ciambiar do ubiciei6n desntro de la mis-
1Ma zona; para dichos efectos dteberain tras-
larssIase a la zona correspondiente.
2.- La zoia industrial inte!reomunal ubi-
cada at Norte deo Santiago (correspondiente
a las epimiunsas do Quilieura, Renea y Con-
clasi) estal destinsada esievialneite para la
instalaei6a sie indisstrias Isanjigenas. Las
indstrias clasiliesdas voico tales por et
Servicio Nacional de Salul slo podran
i ivurse en es.ta zona.
3.- Los tatlleres artesanales derinidos
por li Ley do Isllnta Mimiipales (Iey
11,074, cuadro imwxo N.o 2, N.o 321) po-
dria ubiearse -n casilitler ona industrial,
y seran conasiderlnos como una inidustria
juns para todo4 los efettos te Is clasifiea-
ei'sn.o zonificaci6n. Adtnnefa, aquellos Oia.
sifieados comno inofensivos y cun no mis de
10 olperarios se podrisn utbieur sin limita-
eoisn de u(insmero e los stsres comerciales
de cubtiuier tipo sie zona. Se asimilan a
esta disposicion las panaderlias y pastele-
rius con meinois te 21) obreros.
4.- Las bodtgas te elaifican tanbian
en peligrosits, moslestas e inofensivas, y do-
bern enllazarse en Iwoas naias correspon-
dientes.
5.- La lista ie indstrias que se acom-
pasiia es ieramienti informtniva, y las in.
dustrias qlue eni ella figuran couio ioles-
.ts podrii ser i elasifiadas cuso .inofen-
hivas si a juicio del D)cparteento de Iii-
giene IndAstrial del Seivi.in Nacional do
Salud sue procesos . de . fabricacian, de
scuerdo a Is tUeiiet n oderna, no ofrecen
riesgo ni miolestia a la comunidasd.
6.- La aplicavian de Is ronifiacian del
Plaio lhisuhidor es iteria propia de Ia
Direceitlin sdt Olas-M iinieiiales respecl i-
va, La clasificasi de lass inslustrias en si
- Smismas esmei a elsitti Di 1- s'partamiento ds
IHigiene Islustrial sel Servicin Nacional
de Salud; en easu de direrge-ncias entre
ambos organisamos, resolveri la Direceios
de Planeamiento del btitisterio tie Obras
Pablicas.
7.- Es previo a Ia aitorizaiisn nuni-
eilpal para instalar ina intuistria qite esta
sea claificada por el D)epartasa sits dle Ili-
giene l laustri al dt blinisterio te Salud
Pitblica y Previ.,sin S oial.
-000-
NOMINA DEC IN1tSlTI.\S
Industrias peligrosas
FAbrica de explosivos.
Hitinarits y aliaceaiidmiets o Ale lit r.lc'o y
sus de-rivados.
Tostalisa do in erales sulfurshu.
seacttres atmicaos y plasaas piodvu.:toras
de ensrgia nuielar.
Industrias molestas
Acitlos
Aceites vegetales
Aceites y graisas lubricanteb
Alcolholes
Acetilenao
Amtonitaco
Abunos
Alimentos para aves y animal.s
Aliid6n
Astilleros
Anilinas y colorantes
Avena ineltacaada
Articulos de corcho
Articulos elsetricos
Armadurias de autunoviles
Artieulos de marmol
Aserraderos y barraeuss
Aprestos
Articulos netalicos
Articulos do gona y calis
Articulos metalivos para eeritorio
Articulos funerarios
Algolan hidrsfilo
Biitletas y trisom's
Betutie ceras
Baterias.
Bebil As alcohcliis
Debids gaseosas
Cloro
Ceient.a para calza.los
Coaiimensto.% a base de aj J jiW
Crin veg'tat
Catboitn vegetal
Curtiasmbres
Cal
Colelisames
Cemaenito y'o yeso
Corteles
Conservas
Cajonsa..
Cajus do cart6a
Cuatju
Carros y carruaj(es
CarroceriaAs ptra aulomiviles
Califoits
Calzadost
Ceramiuica
Clavos y tornillos
Cecinas
Condmuenlos (inosioa aj) y aji)
CarpinlAria y torneria
Catres tmotalicos.
Cocinasa -
Coservasa aliaaicuias
Cerveza
Celulosa
Destilerias de alquitrin
Depasitos disttribuidores sde sulproductos
tie petrle*
Destilaniua Ade madosia-
Dextriaa
Eter
Estampsl' et tejidos
Entlaipsados do nadera
Envases do hojalata
Estampados y repuajalost de bistles
Euiposnjas ste Scire
Esimeriles y lijas
Emabolinaolsss de hils
EscoAs4 y escobill.a4
. N1 Marta. 17 do Dkk=bre d. 19m
F~4w'.m
1dliva~e.tu de# ae-ru y bierrt
Gl-rIIIrISr.....
I liii it licit)
Jlorrerim%'
J Uam Uvar
talus parnuta
e~oAt 4 ranz
lfa v a,,,leni.t a
PVli ilil s
1. Ilnla rilrot hra -A v' lt' g e tarxd p r,
II ..Ina.. la. i -. I
Poppieaas air arra'ae
lla~g..de lot-h
Il 9e ran,:.s
I 'iii urdm tielt.
lituiiv trto gritio etcma.)
I'laasta Ii-ltajiilim' y breealrme rp'.
tuu j.tu rieo.ina mals
li~r~Itemi-t j.iiedi voiiles u r~r
Pn...liete. *Itautcon rlviles i.pouan
l's. orinaet.
114,nriaa .1. trel
Iteemeraifos al agal
It.'fiailorA dle mutales
HSalapr..,.t mm animmlet
14n1.proatip' ai nicos
Slel~rim i'c memiII&S
Tiian 410. igaprenta
Toviolerijm
iaaees, hformef. y plamtflAim
to4e imperumables
qallerem meektios
T.'ji.1*m on general
Tio.rres ob.. color
'Fajilem tie' alamabre
'Fuioscris*, .. -
Trfilaifim t alambre
lale( ...
Visia y iies e
ta~ray eristales
DLAIIO Co. Fol1A U ~LICA DYR Vfili
indioadair
Qintlinrm................A I
Qunifievr, Hoots, CeatLAK A 0
Warroadil .. ............ A .3
f4.u'1111e. . . ... ..... .A 4
SOmu0ag, Mai.........A 5
hamemg .... . . .. A S
H'antiale, Rwa" Miguel: 1urhea A It
.404 L~4 ;~... A I
Pameinle Alt*......... A I!
Zeialg .. lul Ejtco a dvitr. mail.mta (0...
gimldam).- Sie -*atftok las siliemaea
jr. 4sm
Omama
Pi.4-
- if.. 11
ludIsader
Industrisa inof eusivaa
AtimnentAm parst gualgums
,AnapnIll't11, (CXPIr'ltyndO bIIlbOa)'
Aparatn% det irmdio
Amto at it. Fi i i ti-ciOne
A rt ivi,,tl de' y~4 y evtiiiiiA
Artaeullti;Jo 1(#t.adur (exclate Jmbon)
Art uvula.'i tie grvdg
CietremeIir
EMa"aas de ti
Gumrnieimies' te ueromr
ham..ae Itombres y ecremleii
li sni it-laJ.'ran
Maarmcttrad; ale allbajas
NaletmCa y etersm
Maroes y mt(tlu-rAd;"i p ea sati'e
VI'd. Pia limterag
Pan
l'ASIt c
PlaOm at 1 ie11 iiat
i'ro.Jiie-tfw de pajal
fleparmtvi;.. i- sarattii (Ie ratiha
llepiarniiw 44e lbi(jltus y tricidlom
Telas adlae';ivaq
Tapive rims
Talaseow. eigrarrat ' v cgarri,1s0m
Taller.'.. f..4onrico
Pai u.las
Tallere. ale ealzadit.
Vml..a.aa...Jar smaan.ticem
Zen.. bdastaishla t' F asoim (Zadu.
ImI*SJi.- S~e ftalhlem Ian mUgt tes me-
Sa~llImgO11 3
Sm~lsga11 5
Qt11iuta Norotiil .. .. . it 6
Qumin Nterrnu.l . . . 11 T
Snlting(i 8I.
1V 10
fltfi(,A .... 17)
Cisn',..li* II16
Zonal; Mixtat. con industries inofensivas. -
jImq lim.itrx tie Ins itrea. sei *ittabik'ci-
Pt';tt.' en forMA derimitiva POT el 1"1141111
lid r t 41vi h divilasa Areas. zonat d estina-
da'ti exvltisivevilute pars indaittriii inu
fell'iva.
Areas verde.
do a-us. pili4he dfi-iuwdag ml e..saarv.-
imei44t 44P in 14"i6m 7 at Pamnamien-
to ofevi.ieutsi, ea bs cualci me se pmldrin
ejanudar tamstrueionse de niuguina nmliti-
rml.,m, "w miv..atwlda deiitinsdan a eample-
Uaeolr Ins ruirtoeq de etas lirdras. lAs
etlirinie en;..~. 'tie se' refqticfll (lebm8lm 441
i.wtli. -va,4 %~er af~al ms per I-a M nw ipi)a.
lidAdk "41114ti1 IT pu o fl~rc i.~ le l1t.-
m-sio..ut. 4.4 Muaut~terito de (thrum ftri
e'tiiiesion.iet eurimmervisrurIU ~y lax *~
do resiwvis suburbsaa, pars Ians qvi' at're-
ridm Los di..pldiwialex ris matmaia em #J Title-
1a 4* In. Pretente reoma,.utseia..
Kms el Ilaneo l.teromusm se fromi-ilmni
He%.'rrt... Agri"ela y 'rt-stali 4%lnr-
1hartliwp Fiat erroznmaks.
Areama Empeialfeqt
Avoniolaq .lardines.
Viaq 'hit, iesas..
Iastrvaim Pemm aalw akm.- (D) A"s
riorml..a au..editas a Ia eimilld de~idna-
-de. a plaamlmein do' irbet y matra-
Leas eu genaeral fteift quo se adaptem &
I&*. emu4lir.ag maturalles dtl tetremes.
fog. limitii. file emam it  estim weimlsilem
ena .PI ?oLso -de ZeeWeatiin Iuterommisal Y
wf3 Iam aUguiatem:
I .- iMexerva' iermtal Oriete.- Comn-
prous.le ana f4aja ente fee isobw WO y 19"
IIc to pretrdillera -de s And"., quo almr.
earm domfito IF,* Caiom, per el Nerte, la-
4. tax Cerres de IL ftill de Parque, per
2.- Reraerva Ffiestal Kertoe.- Cemprea.
4#A. eJerr. et qcu y *tree eerres '.o-.
ei.e. wsafiia ent4elan 4e.. do anirtea-
oCi. OW!)
3.- Reamv IFecesta Nulmente.- Com-
pre*de . a Cuse, d44 94 Empoebe, desAd
di el e" Ae lamp. y lf ammldcirm de Use
(ler-em Awmaiol, 1.. Aguhic, Naviderm, I'mi.
.like 4e 104 Y'eToe. COwe Ratsuses, ye*I
4#e i.mecrees. 66, [A Frae Aliajod.
do i4e (erias d& beam. 4Core Negret y C4.
rre lai Caliret en IUm Rai"a de Ieusm, rle.
JIeeuar Agmieean y Fifetalm, Sub-
r OL A
~1
-I_ _n r_ all-_ __ _ _a_ .
araa.- (N) . Omprendem terreao'!
agViolaa y gaaaderos qua senaevaia sa
actual utiLizaci6a y tareas destinadas a ro-
serva forestales.
Dichas Areas estkn delimitadas en el Pla-
a do Zoifieaion Intercemunal, y son las
siguientes:
ZONA
IZONA
ZONA
ZONA
ZONA
ZONA
ZONA
E 1.4Qiera-Resa-Barraaeas.
B 2.-Barraneas-Maipe.
B 3.-San Bernardo
K 4.-La Otaaia.
X 5.-Puento Alto.
3 G.-.-uAo-La Reinas.
B 7.-Apoquindo-Las Condes.
ZEONA I :.rr Lar"d.
ZONAL K 9.-Manquehue-Saa Griat46al.
Parques InterOemanales.- (F) Areas
verdea que cuentan, ademai, con especies
destinados. a reuniones, juegoo, deportes,
eteutera, cuya superlicie es auperior a 30
hectireas.
Sirvea a las poblaeiaus tie aaplies see-
tores do la ciudad, inclusive dos o maus 'o-
munas, y que en ocasidu de exposiciones,
fiestas tradicionales, etc., cuentan con
afluencia de persounas de toda el area mietro-
politana.
-So estableeen las .iguientes aireas:
Comuna Nemabre actual lap. Aprex.
1 CouchaN ... ... ... ... ... ... Sector Arda. Dorsal .. ,. .. 44 IA,
2 Quinta Nrmal ... ... 2l.
3 Santiago ... ........... .. Parque Cousifno . .... 144) lis.
4 Santiago................ Quinta Normal .......... 100 Bas.
5 San Miguel ............... Sector Oehagavia ........ 36 lias.
6 San Miguel .. R............Est. La Castrina ........ 104 lias.
7 Runoa ................. Country Club .. .. .. ... 60 1lis.
a Santiago-Conchali-Las Condes . Cerro San Cristobal ....... ,.252 114s.
9 Las Condes .............. Club de Golf .............. 61 HAS.
Y, ademis:
Cuenca del Rio Mapecho. - Superficie
aproximada 690 His.
Cuenca del Rio Maip.- Frente a Puen-
te Alto, con una superficie aproximada de
30 I1s.
Paqss ossamnales.- (G) Lo coastits-
yes areas verdes que es general tienen ua
exteai6n que- flnetka entre 8 y 1-> His.,
aproximadameate. Sirves especialmewte a
una eemna o a determinado barries le Ia
misnia. Sus caracteristicas sow similares a
leos Parques Intercomunmales, pero s sona
do influencia es mis reducida. Se empka-
san en barrio* populoses com edificaeieses
inialuhrei, comio tambiin en sitios eriazee,
ademias de eonfirmar el desti4e de varies
parques exastentes.
Se estableeen las aguieates areas:
co1 -3..0 Ne indiador Nombre actual sup, apres.
CoaS......... .'Dorsal-El Saito
Santiago.. ... 2........C ... ... ... ...
Conehali.. . i..dependenc.a .2
Coachali ... .... Doi Santa ,. . .. a
Quiiieura ...............
Renca ... ... ... ... ... ... .. 14
Quinta Normal ... ... ... .... 7 Parquc Lo Franco.4
Quinta Noamnl ... ... ... .... 8 Cerro Navia...8
Quinta Normal ... ... ... .... 1 t
Santiago .... ...... . ... 10 Cerro Santa Lucia.. . .
Santiago... .. ....... ... .... 11 Sector San Pablo
Santiago ... ... ... ..... 12 L Palma
Santiago ............... 13 San Joaquin
Santiago ... ... .... 14 Sector Ayda. stia Sur ...
Santiago ... .. ........ ... 1 Sector 10 de Julio.a
Ylarrancas ... ....... ... .... 16 12
La Cistern .. ... ... ... ... 0
La Cisterna.. ... .... ... .... 1 ho Valledor Sur..........
La Cisterna ........ ..... 1S La Blanca ........
La Cisterna.. ... ...... * ... 20 Avda. Progrso.. 2
San Bernardo ... ... ... .... 21 1
San Miguel ... .... ... ... .... 22 LAerin.8
San Miguel.24 Ciudad del ... o . .10
San Miguel ... ... .... ... .... 25 LA Laua................ 12
La Granja ... ... ... . 26
La Florida ... ... ... ... .... 27 10
La Florida.............dea ... ... ... ... .
Puente Alto ... ....... ... .... 29 8
..oa .... .. 30 10Ra.......1 Sata Julia.... . .14.
Runoa... ... ... ... ... .... Eenela Agricola...12
Providencia .. ........... .... 33 Awooni Varas.16
- Las Condes . ......... ... ... 3 L Sales16
2LCipr B...a..n ... ... ... ... 35
AreasingapSanaasMaria ..).Su---ar8a'
Areas Especiales.-Y(R-1) Son Areas
vaela do uso controlado o restritgido:
Arear deportivea
BEtadio Nacional.
Club Hipico.
lp6dromo.
tadio Colo-Colo.
Club do Polo, etc.
verdes existe ntes de propiedad p6blica o pri-
Parques privados
Pargnie Macul.
Lo Htermida.
Ilaineario Apoquindo.
Etc.
Aseas do hter Wg lteo y alturaL
Convento Lo Dominieos, en Apoquinde,
Iglesia y Oruta de Leordes, ete.
Avenidas Parqmes.-Avenidas eop maa o
do calzadas para trasito tleae tetirmas
a una franja do irea verde, coetiiaa * die-
continua, con arboledaa, jardines y juegee
para niios. Estaa avenidas relacionan ge-
neralmnate dos e ma Parques Comunales
o latermonmunkles o eatos larques- een lay
jireai espieciale. Se incluyeu la-siguienute
A venidas:
I .- lerrenos destinados anteriormael a
Carrettra Panameriaeaen a l comsuas de
La Citterna Y Iaa Miguel, y su preissnga-
ia en ]a couuna do Saatiang, em el tra-
mwe emprendido desde el Marque Cemwia.
por el Norte, basta la prelag-acia hawia
el i'itetite do l.a Avenida 1,tl l.a 4-ato.
lica em la esmana de La Cistera. be eon-
aulta un aaebo die 100 nastroa.
2.-Gran Arenida.-Demate el Ferroea.
rril do Cireuxatalacim, por el Norte, hasassa
Ia calle Salesianos, pow el Sur. Se con.
autta an ancho de 60 metror.
3.-Parque Isabel Rique4aasee.- Dede
Vicuia Makeaa per el Orieale, hasta Ia
Avenida l'edro Aguirre Cerla, per fi Po.
niente. Su trazado esta deteriniaado por
el pianto curre"padeute elaborado pee Ia
Ilustre Mliunici-palidad do San ligue (Na.
1:'1.00) y aprobado en atti amuni-ipal.
4.-Avenida qua unrasi el hEasadi Naeio-
nal, Ebtadio Colo-Cow Y el Parqu1 e leatereo-
uuna,. N.o 6 (La Casrina). Se eambsata
un au.ho de 60 metros.
5.-Avenida que wwnes extremiso Oriente.
del Parque Isabel Riquelmte, desdtie ta A ve.
nida Vieufia Mackenas hasta e? Paree de
Ia Viia Macul, por el Oriente. Se epusutaIt
un ancho de 6i metros.
6.-Avenida quo une el elrenae eauaese-
te del Parque Isabel Miquelase. lesde Ia
A venida Pedro Aguirre Cerda hat4a et Ca.
mino Loa Pa'jaritoa. Be -onsulta u1a. ambe
de W4i metros, de acuierdo al anivproyeeto
del Plants Regulador do La coiuma de
Maip.
7.-Avenida Dorsal.-De )a reingmna do
Colhali y su prolongacion ha-ia el P.
nientet a travis de Ia cemouna de lienea leas.
ta la ribera Norte del rio Maptcho. Sc ceon.
sulta un aucho do 60 metros.
8.-Aveuida Tobalaba.-Es el tramo
eempreudido desd *I rio Mapwthio per PI
Norte, hata el Camin. Departamnuital por
el Sur.
9.-A venida Manquebue.-De a etMa..
na die Las Condes. desde el rie 1apeho,per el Norte, hasta .l Parque Iutereoms.
naal N.o 7, por el Bur.
10.-Avenida Franeisco Ililbao.- En el
tramo compremlido desde Ia Aveaida Maaa-
quehue, por el Posiente, hakta el area des-
tinada a eementerios ea la comuna de Las
Coudes, por eI Orienta.
11--Diagonal proyectada en eA Plano
Regulador de Rollo&, desde eA Parque do la
Vinia Macul, por eI Oriente, su proloniga.
cioan hacia el Ponisnte a traves de Ia Ave.
nida Sur y Ia bifureac:6n do estas a traves
de Ia Avenida Matta y el Parqueo Bat.
mante.
12.-Nuevo camuaw a Valparaiso por Lo
Prado en el trame compreadido entra ia
Avenida Ecuador, por eI Oriente, y l erace
del rio Ifapocho, por el Poniente. 84 eon.
sulta, una faja destinada a Area verde y ca.
Ile do trinsito local do 70 metros do an.
Cho, al Norte do Ia faja destisada a'diehe
Carretera.
CAMINOS TURI TKX).- Ba e seeer,
Oriente del Gran -itntiago so establee. go
camine cuyo traza-. .4 adi en of Paa
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de- Zoieini-1-t y que atraviesa las comunas
de l'in.-e.- Alto, l.a Florida, Rtiina; Loas
otonli, ein' '- extienile desde Las Vizen.
erI,. p.,r -lsltr, hai'ta el Cirro Alvarado,
iour eI Nori,.
1-:1 lI'hn, Titnt r.-mnnal enblcee las mi-
geu.ni.- ,''nn,:
ai Z.,ens dh. Iliil'eidn Eenn-ltii.-ai
b) komtnai piric lit A tntoconstruciaiin t Vi.
viendas';
el Zoni~a Mixtans de- Viviendan e Indus-trias;
d ) Z'ina lIaid niules,
mi Zonas de Habitaci6n Econ6mica.- Es.
Gin d.timhniat a In edificacitin de vivien-
dan, "e.-nmien=. la urbanizaeiin y edifi-
criisiiii nt ileichas; i'ireax so hars de annerdo
a un l'l i'. ltR-uindor Scecionil uie todo
el eoiir, aiproloi por a laluniipalidad
respseciva y poor el Ministerio di Obras Pn-
lolia'i, iiiien fijarn las i condic ioine mini-
IA y mnanimn< fie lIns obras de ihania-
hi Zonas pars Ia Antoconstrucci6n do Vi-
viendas:
1.- Livi Arcas de antoconstrui''ian es.
tarift destinniilhe especificameTite a In edi- -
fieneiiiin tie vivie-ndani y aus edifiencicnes
icmpeinenrnin., indiantile el sistema ie an-
tocacnctriiiii, die onerdo a la'c normas quo
se ilinnienne's adeclante.
2.- Ia jcliiliieni'ini'n de dichn<s i'rcas Ia
realirnri la corpwore.ion de In Viviviin. o
aueillainst.aituies o serviins qite des-
arrolleit iriramas de autoconstri' -ion d1e
vivi.-nlbs, 'rmproe ene los plansa; seni apro-
hadft- plor nonellaN I
3.-- La urbnizrii'n de los terreiinn de.
heri revliynr-,e i' mneurdo a Infft normas
noiniainis iltee para ello establezca Ia Cor.
poracian e li' Ia Vivienda,
4.- 1in terre'inos que se inmeran a
ceniinesa ,'n si  poirin des~tinrse a los
fines .setnlail, in el inciso 1.o.
Comuna de San Miguei
Sector 1.- (I.o Valledor). Compr-inle
les l,-rrno', limitadno al Nor te por el Ca-
ninum I )i'n-rten tai; at Sinr, por la Ave-
nnil dettnomniceda 'allejiln de Ion EIvalle;
oil f iri-nt.., ln Iinia del Ferrotent ril lei. i-
ltnelinAl. y Il l'ueiniinte', Ia ija de f Ia ('a-
rreern Paneien proyech'lin en el os.
s"ilie Orinle del Aeropntroiid I,ie's Ce.
srislleo's. Seii'rfrisc aproxiinda: ile h' -u .
Sector 2.- (Deinrtamental). Limitn al
Norle ci el ('Iamino Departnime'ntl: at
Stir, cmiti el ('illjailin de lo (ivalle: l Orien-
te, cmi Ia Nueva Avenida Orienot del Ila-
"io lIie-ldIor, y il Poniente, oi mna pa-
rode-lat iii'-va Avenida Orienite, a 20W noi-
tro, al P.ei'nite ie dichn (-Aeto. Siti'rfi-
Cie aptrioximanecelin '12 IeetAreaq.
Comuna do Maip6
Terreii, liieitanlo at Stnr por lieni Jel
Ferr-warril a Stiln Anitoinii; nI Norel,. poor
ini linen pn'raleit a 200 melrns al Sunr
de Avenielcn ('inc' de Abril. y al I'l-
niisnt.. por In emnle 2 Orietle. Seuperiie
slroxinuin:l:ti 3"1 Iefireas..
Conuna do Barrancas
Seetor 1. - Terren t bilie al PIie ii'n-
: .i.-l t. i tu nd del l'ielno ie r.a, I ia-.
arneoA, y l N)e' de Ia enlie qnn t'a-
Sl.t. y C1om1141 limite Poiniefni eel li ite di e
~le'nin iirbana del Piano untereninuit-
(A. P fik an a ro Im ndIa: 7I heet's-
Lo Prano; at Suir, Ia calle San Pabloi at'
Norte limita coin la l'oblaci6n Franklin
Dilano lloosevelt, iirbanizada por Ia
CORVI, y al Poniente el limite de Exeln-
si6n UrbIin dlei Plann Iitereonminal.
lerficie aproxi bicuk: 50 heeitireas.
Comuna do Quilicura
Bector 1.- Tinie como limite Stir y I'o-
nent e limtite cie Extensi6n Urbana del
1'lanoo Intereomcencnal.
Sector 2.- Al Snr, con la Calle del Ce-
rro; mi Norte con una liica pa'ralela a 400
metros (le dicha calle; al Orienel con ina
linca pnrnela a la ltia del Ferrocarril,
y al 'oniente coin el inite de Extetsien
Urbna del 'lano litiercomfimal. Sunperfi-
cie aproximada: 24 hecitartas.
Comuna de Conchalf
Sector 1.- Limiita l Or'iete con li
Avenida idepenidenen e inn freinte apro-
ximnado do 2.100 nictros, a In nitura ide li
Pobleii'n M1 C'armienn; tiene min profiunidi-
dad de 400 mietros. Scperficie airoxinma.
da: 34 heetareas.
Sector 2.- initaelo it Stir por li Ave-
nida l)or-al: al Nort,. paraIlla, a 1.000
metros de dichia Avenicda; at Oriente por
Ia calle (e4rneral Sndritno, y al Ponicente,
por li enlle Alberto Goizilez larnonita.
Sulerficie aproximadit: 48 heectais.
'omuna de Rulios
eimita l Norte eon el 'anicco dc la E-
eneala Agrieola; at Orienite, con la prolon-
gacinn ie Exeigiiiel Fernaiidez; lal Seer, con
ina lineii jn arnaleit a 800 metros al Sur del
Camino tie ht Eecieln Agricola, y al Po-
niente, una linea parnilela a Exereiiiel For-
nandez, utiinda a 400 metros at Poniente
de dielia ille. Stiperficie aproxiniada: 32
heetircas.
Comuna de La Cisterna
Linita al Norte coni lI calle Alejinnlro
Cmitiinhi; al. Sir, coin el ICamino [Lo Lillo; ant
Poicnite, coin el CaimioO Los Morros, y al
Oriente, in la cIle del LAimite 1ittereomi-
ntl (prolingneiin de calla Cerro Negro).
*Supief'laicie aproxituda: 70 iectirens.
Comuna do San Bernardo
Limit a nal Norte ene In calle Eniaeliptis;
al Sir, eon el Imimite de Exteisiiin Urha-
ns del e 'lainn Intercoiminal (camino pro-
yeitaedo die ?lnlloeo a Ininte Alto, por Via-
lidadI): ait oriente, coi in calle P6-rez, y
at lonicite, coin lat enile Freire. Sueperfi-
cie sproximail: 21 hectirens.
Comuna de Puente Alto
Limita tnl Norle con la prolongaciatnn de
calle Mcar'n P;-rez; atl Senr, coin Ia Costa-
nera Norle; at I'oniente coin e1 limite Orien-
te de Ia htlobllaieini Sindieinto cde la Papele-
rn, y al Orietie con enna linen iranlela al
limite Poiiene. a unn distancia de 200 ine-
tros. Siperficic aproximsla: 8 heetareas.
c) Zonas Mixtas de Viviendas e Indus-
tria.- Ver inq dipweoosieionies relativas a
Zonias nnilndrialee del Tiltlo III del prea-
sente lealamientalo.,
refiere el pirrafo torcero del preentm da,
creto.
Declara, pars ls efects del pago do 1..
puestos, que el presupuesto de las obras as-
ciende a la suma de 1 800. &
Concede definitivamente a don Carlos., Za.
morano GonzAlez. sin perjuiclo do derchas
de terceros legalmente conatitudos, una
merced de 60 litros por segundo durante II
horas diaries pars el regadio do 14,1 HAs.
de su propiedad denominada Parcels Alicia
N.o 2, ubicada en Is comuna do Penaflor,
del departamente de Talagaite, a inerita a
fojas 582 vuelta, N.o 1,121, de 1936. del
Registro de Propiedades -del Oonservador do
Bienes Ralces de San Bernardo, y que fue
concedida provisionalmente por decreto nil-
mero 1,316, de 27 do Junio do 196.
La captscidn del agua 5e hari mediante
elevac16n mecAnica, desde un pozo ubicado
dentro del predio del interesado, 230 me-
tros'al norte del'camino de Malloco a San
Vicente y 90 metras al orientle de I call.
Pedro Corria Ovalle. .
Escrituras Sociales
EXTRACTO
MODIFICACION SOCIEDAD "NEGRETE I
COMPA1RIA LIMITADA"
Rafael L. Barahona Stahr, notarlo pdblco do
Valparaiso, callo Prat N.o W39, certiflcs: por 3-
critura publica otorgada hoy, ante mi.'don Her-
mann Pfingsten Handke, Pamaje Rose N.0 51, es-
ta ciuded, y don Eduardo Negrete Blanchait,
calle Ec evers N.o '161, Vila del Mar, modifI-
caron ancledad "NEORrET Y COMPARIA LI-
MITADA'. constituida por escritura publica
otorgada ante mi con fecha ocho do Octubr
do mil novecientos sesents. Modificacien con-
siste en agregar al- final de Ia clAusula quints
el siguiente p&rrafo: "Ademis. el sefnor Zduardo
Negrete Blanchailt retirarA mensualmente con
cargo a gasto generales del negocio' bast& Is
sums do doscientom cincuenta eacudo pars
atender a gaton de movilisacifn y do represen-
taciea en ef dsempefino do su actividad den-
tro do las provincias de Valparaiso y Acca-
cagua. Queda vigente en todo lo deme 01 con-
trato social. Facultave al portador pars legali-
5ar esta modificacin.- Valperaimo, dos do No-
viembre do mil noveolentom sesents.
EXTRACTO
Luis Az&ar Alvares, notarto de Santiago.
Huerfanos 1044, certifico que por escritura -do
hoy, ante mi, Ia efhores Amadeo Blasosero
Bizsosero. Toesca 23WI. y Juan Cordano Corda-
no. Bunes 67 C., conatituyeron sociedad co-
mercial de responsabilidad limitada, bajo raz6n
social "BIZZOZERO Y CORDANO LIMITADA'.
Objeto de la sociedad seri Ia explotacl6i co-
mercial de - idente de soda. pastelerias, bares.
restaurantes y similares en Santiago u otros
puntos del pals. Uso rasz6n social y adminis-
tracin sociedad corresponderin conjuntamente
ambox socios. Capital -set* 7.000 en dinero
efectivo. aportado por igualea partes y enterado
al contado. Responsabilidad socios limitase al
monto apartes respectivos. Plaso bert cinco afto'.
deade esta feoha, entendiendose tAcits y automi-
ticamente renovada por .periodoo Iguales y sucest-
vas de cinco aaos at ninguno do los socios ma-
nifestare voluntad ponerle teirmino median"o. de-
claracl6n hecha por escritura pilblica anotadi mar-
Son inscripcidn sooledad Registro do Comercio.
eony sets mesos anticipacldn a vencimlento res-
pectivo. En eas do muerp do algdn oseoin. Ia
sociedad segulir con lao herederos del failed-
do. Domicilto sociedad as Ia cuidad do Santa-
go. - Santago, 20 de Diciembre do 1900. -
L. Az6ear Alvares. netaro.
MUERTE PRSUNTA
Por resoluci6n Primer Juzgado Letras Rance-
pua. expedlente i8.23". ordendse citar destapareci-
do HerinAn Espejo Tapia. - Primera eltacido. -
Secretario. .c
MUERTE PRSUNTA
Zn caus
ta de Josmi
" . upr c pNT xrsMa
'"~~ I ~ MINUTA ttsmaamrf..$X.recido, de
Sector 2. - El lrreno tioen n limi. 122 Aprncha men'proydet y las obrae d-acqoela de C CI
0o at liaeite ia roblaci6n Citnadilne ardia &I sprovecbamnlerto do-ls morued a quo as tado.
wiae AilI ;i6L4L
rol N.o 10,4, sabre muerte presun-
Victorino Tliptina, do Jusgado do A-.
llanes, s ha ordenado citar a desapa-
conformidad al articulo g1. Nao 2.*,
vii. - Segunda citacida. - E1 secre
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Declare vacante cargo
Receptor Judicial, Rengo,
per falleimiento, don Al-
berto Riquelme Castro.
Nombra Receptor, Jdo.
Trabajo Antofagasta, a don
Rafaetl Fe. Navarro Alar-
eno.
Kwmbra Of. 29, Tercero
Rancagpa, a don Felix Be-
navides Oonzile . actual
OficIaL 39 mirno Tribunal.
Nombra Oficial 29. Terce-
roMenores Valparaiso, a
dofae Alicia 0. Pinto Soto,
actual Oficial 39 mismo Tri-
bunal.
Deelara vacante cargo,
Of. 3', Primero Rancagua,
per fallecimliento donta Ma-
ria Goneiles Oserrero.
Nossbre Of. 39, Jdo. Ta-
lagante, .a dona Laura U.
Outlerres Oyarsen.
DIARIO OFACIAL- DR, LA ,RPUBLICA, DR CHILE
Viernee s do Nolembre de 1ig
nombra Oficial 39, Segun-
do Jdo. Magallanes, a dos
Maria T. Baltizar Peres.
Nombra Oflcial 49, Corte
Temuco, a don Juan E. Va-lenzuela Leal, actual Oficial
29 Jdo. Angol.
Renunea Oficial de Pre-
supuestos, sede Ls Serena,
a don Douglas Talba Mi-
che.
Nombra Oficial Sala, Cor-
te Trabajo Valparaiso, a
don Luis A. Valensuela Ve-
negas, actual Of. Sala, 29
Jdo. Trabajo misms cludad.
Nombra Oficlal Sala, 19
San Antonio, a donis Rosa
de las M. Vargas Gallegul-
Ie.
Nombra Auxiliar Aseo,
Palaclo Tribunales Santia-
go, a don Abraham A. Urt-
be Caballero.
E N C IV NTRANSE VA-
CANTRS LOS SIGUIENTES
CARGOS PERSONAL SU-
PERIOR:
Jueces: Curic6 (Menores),Illapel, Antofagasta IMe-
nores), Mulchen, Taltal,
Talca (Trabajo). Talca (19),
Vilparat'o (49 Crimen), El-
qui, La Uni6n, Palena, Ma-
gallanes fMenores), Chillin
(39) y San Antonio (19).
Secretaries: Curic6 (Me-
nores), Chafnaral, Puerto
Montt (Trabajo), Antofa-
gasta (,). Parral, Putaen-
do (Sec.-Not.), Elqui-Vieu-
Aa, Puerto Montt (29),
Arauco, Santiago (19 Me-
nones), La I.lgua, Calama
(19) y LAs Andes (19).
Santiago, 29 de Novlem-
bre de 1979.- Oscar Deluc-
chi Marineovich, Oficial de
Partes.
Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
MODIFICA FLAN INTERCOMUNAL DR SANTIAGO Y SU ORDENANZA
Santiago, 31 de Oetubre de 179.- Hoy se decret6 to qua sigue:
Nm. 420.- Vista: Le dispuesto en los articulos 29 y 99 de Is ley
N9 16.391, y 129, letra 1), del DL. NO 1.305, de 1976; los articulos 349 y si-
guentes del DS. N' 458 (V. y U.), de 19715, Ley General de Urbanismo y
Construeciones; eA articulo 5579, de Is Ordenanse General de Construccio-
sa y Urbanlael6n; el oficio ordinario N9 423, de 21 de Septiembre de
1979, de Is Divist6n de Desarrollo Urbano del Ministerlo de Vivienda y Ur-
banismo, y demis antecedentes que s acompafian,
Dee e to
Artieule 19- Modificase eA Plan Intercomunal de Santiago, aprobado
por D. N9 2.387. del Ministerlo de Obras Pbliceas, de 10 de Noviembre de
190, publicado en el Diario Oficial de 27 de Dielembre de 1960, en confor-
midad a to establielde en Is Memorl Explicativa y en los Pianos
RM-0- 0-100 y RM-006-06-100-1, todo de feche Julio de 1919, elabo-
rado por Ia Secretaria Ministerial de Viviends y Urbantsmo, Regi6n Me-
tropolitana, que por el presente decreto se aprueban.
Articule 2*- Modiflesi, asimismo, Is Ordenanza del Plan Intereomu-
mal de Santiago, en Is forms que a continuacion &e indicm,
1. Reemplizase el Titulo Prellminar "Generalidades" por el siguiente
nuevo Titulo Preliminar:
TITULO PRELIMINAR
Generalidades
ARTICULO 19- E1 Area territorial del Plan Intereomunal de Santiago
ceomprende las comunas de Conchall, La Cisterns, Las Condes, La Florida,
La Uranja, La Reins, Malpe, Runoe, Puente Alto, Providencia, San Miguel,
Santiago, San Bernardo, Pudahuel, Quints Normal, Quillcura y Renes.
ARTICULO 29- Pars los efectos de Ia splicacl6n del Plan Intercomu-
nal de Santiago y su respective Ordenana, las comuna comprendidas 6n
el Area territorial de dicho Plan se agruparin pot Sectores Geogrifleos, in
Ia forma quo a continuselen se indies:
Seetees Geogrdfices Comunas
Centro
Nor-Oriente
Oriente
Our-Oriente
Sur
Santiago.
Las Condes, Providencla.
La Reins, Runoe.
La Florida, Puente Alto.
La Cisterna, La Granja, San Bernar-
do, San Miguel.
Bur-Poniente MAtpu.
ponlente .Pudahuel, Quinta Normal.
ner-Ponient. quilicura, Rencea.
Norte Conchall.
La extensidn territorial de los sectores geogrifleos a que so refiere el
presente articulo, ser coincidente eon el territorlo de Is& comunas quo
toe integran, do conformidad a le Divisidn Politices Administrativa vigente.
KEtos sectores geogrdfices, in el Area do Ezpansi6n Urbana definida
en el Titulo I de Ia present. Ordenansa, se subdividirin en subsectores los
que a p a e e aidentificados on los planos RM-W6-00-100 y
RM-0---00oo--1.
ARTICULO 3'- tm eo Area territorial del Plan Intereomunal do San-
Iiago, Ia edifieaelon y urbanisci6n y, en general, el proceso de desarrollo
urbane me regiri por las dispellones de Ia presents Ordenansa.
an todo to no previsto expresamente en Ia present., Ordinansa, regi-
rd. leq disp0elteones 1de l- WM General' do Urbanisanoy Construecones, y
de Is Ordna1s General do Conatrucelones y Urbanisacii,
Minisierlo d .Transpories
y Telecomunlcaciones
SUBSECRETARIA
DE TRANSPORTES
EXTRACTO
DE RKSOLUCION
Por resoluei6n N* 1.920, de
techa 11 de Octubre de 1979,
del Ministero de Transpor-
tes, so autoriz6 a Socliedd
Ferrd y Orau Limitada
"Chile Bus", pare efectuar
el recorrido de transporte
de pasajeros entre "Santia-
go - Raneagua - San Fer-
nando - Curled - Talca -
Chillin - Concepc16n - Tal-
eahuano", per rutas N9*s. 5,
148 y 154, efectuando el mi-
nimo de una frecuencla
diaria.
Rend Antonio
vajal, Jefe del Depte.
porte Terrestre, interin
EXTRACTO
DE RESOLUCION
Por resoluel6n N 1.10,
de fecha 25 de Octubre do
1979, d el JAinisterio -do
Transportes, se autoris6 a
Ia Socedad Perr6 y Ora
Ltda.. 'Chile Bus", pars
efectuar e) recorrido do
transporte do pesajero. .en-
tre "Valparilo - Sentiago-
Rancagua - sen Fernando .
Curled - Tales - ChilliAn -
Concepci6n - Taleahuano-,
por rtu Nft. 6, 5, 148 7
154, efectuando el minimeo
de una frecuencla diaria,
Rent Antonio Reyes Car-
vajal, Jefe del Depto. Trans-
porte Terrestre, interino.
Dentro del Area del Plan Intercomunal de Santiago tendrin plene vi-
gencia, pare la zones urbanas, la disposiclones de lWe Planes Regulade-
res de las comunas comprendidas on dicha Area Intereomunal, come as-
mismo los Planos Secelonales y sus Ordenansas quo toe detallan.
En e Area de expansi6n urbane, definida en el articulo 59 do Ia Or-
denansa, los actuales usos de suelo s considerarin compatibles en las
normas establecidas por este decreto y constitirin, in todo caso, alter-
nativas respecto de los usos regulados por Is presente. Ordenansa.
II. Reemplisase el Titulo I "Extensi6n Urbana y Sub-Urbana" por ml
siguiente nuevo Titulo I:
TITULO I
De las Areas Eapecifleas del Plan Itiereemanal do Santiage
ARTICULO 49- Par& lee efectos de Ia aplicacifn del Plan Interesm*-
na de Santiago y de Ia presente Ordenansa. se distinguirin Ioe sigulentes
Uipos de Areas: Area Urbana, Area de Expansion Urbane y. Aas, di Ree-
trieclen.
ARTICULO 59- a) Se Identifleari come Area Urbana el espacle oem-
prendido dentro del limite urbano del Plan Intercomunal de Santiago, se-
fSalado en e1 Plano RM-00-00-100 de feche Julio 1971, confeecionade pe.
Ia Secretaria Ministerial de Vivienda y Urbanisno, RegTen Metropolltans.
b) Se identificard como Area de Expansidn Urbana ei espaclo potes.-
cialmente urbanisable que se extiende entre el limite urbano senalado en
e1 Inciso a) precedente, el resto del Area intercomunal y loe limites sena-
lados para las Areas de Restriocl6n, donde corresponda. Los limites d. es-
tax iress estAn i n d I e a d o a en le Pianos P)5-40-100-4-
,RM-00-00-100-1 de Julio 1979, confeccionados por la Secretaria Minis-
terial de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Regi6n Metropolitana.
c) Se Identificarin come Areas de Restricci6n squellas in que, por ra.-
sones de preservaci6n del medio ambiente natural, reeguardo de Ia vida
y/o protece6n de importantes obras de infraestructura, entre otras rase-
nes, debe controlarse ei desArrollo urbano incompatible con Ia naturalea
y caracteristicas de las mismas.
Se considerarin tambidn comO tales laS Areas de proteccion do ten-
didos de lineas de aite tensi6n eldetrica; las de resguardo do canales do
regadio; las de protecei6n de cauces naturales de agua; las do restricelda
de huses de telecomunleacionek y lax de protecei6n do ductos subterrines,
cuya delimitacien serk fijada por Ia Secretaria Ministerial do Vlvienda y
Urbanismo, Regi6n Metropolitans, previo Informe de lo organismos sm-
petentes.
ARTICULO 09- Corresponderi a la Secretarie Ministerlat de Vlviena
y Urbanismo, Regi6n Metropolitana, previo informs favorable do las Jos-
tituclones u organismos legaimente competentes. declarar, modiflear e de-
rogar Areas do Restriceltn, ComO asimismo eAtablecer is limites y ssa
permitidos, medlante decretos supremos' del Ministerlo do Vivienda y Ur-
banismo, cad& vex quo corresponda.
ARTICULO 79- Pars ioe ifecto de Ia aplicaeldn del Plan Intereuau-
nal de Santiago y Is presents Ordenansa me establecen, definen y eare-
terisan las siguientes Areas do restricci6n, las cuals spa recen definidas
grifleamente on los pianos que integran el presente instrumento.
a) Areas do Preservaeide del Mede A eabliste Natural.
Son aquellas ires de gran valor ecol6gloo eura destrucel6n ampbes
una perdida irreparable, tanto para el equilibrio natural conmo pare IS
ealidad del medio ambiente. Ls 6nicos usos peramltides en ellag W-
rAn aquellos quo no produscean degradacion do sus valores naltrase I
quo, edemAs, contribuyan a l proteccin y preservaci6n do los miese,
Sn satas Areas me permitirin los siguientes usoe prioritarioe -
1. Cientifico-educativo-reereacional: Se entenderin comprendid6 Bin-
eata eategoria aquelles uos quo eontribuyan a la preservaelfa O
los valores naturales, usanteniendo e inerimentande, evint eft
Ia forestaei6n, at'atoe 'paajistico 7/0 vultal, iA Selbome s
flqra y fauna silvestre I la exploteeidu do toe reepres
evitar
ben c
pobla
mism
por is
tropo
2. Areas
Jas de
yO an
les d
do cc
Mero
3. Arena
Ilas
flerai
locali
rin I
la m
4. Arena
trica:
tendi
Inter
taci6
las r
. om;:
S. Areat
tranj
terro
las I
a la
.s.tidos
taria
orga
6, Area
de te
neos
pedir
regir
.aen 1:
10r Area do
SOn
Nuclear
centrog;
La locall
w eA ian
nismo, F
por los
d) Area de
itAn ec
ntners,
en e1 de
el Diari
Colonsa<
Areas de
aon las
- 4111e 
artanlk
ierinuh
Twists
me as
turian
nimo
3. Reeres
tegorki
deport
menta
En geners
la Secrets
-taha, en c
via consu:
b) Areas de
Son aquel
de asegur
fraestruct
bano imp
Pare lea
de Is pr(
otrua las
1. Areas
DIARIQ OnCIAL DE LA REPUBLUCA DE CBILE
1Vetaods a Novimbro do 1919
4 2. Turistico: Be entenderin comprendidos an esta eategoria los usoa
cuyo objetivo sea el desarrolio del tursmo y del osparcimlento, ce-
mo astrimsmo aquelloas quo tengan pot finalidad el desarrollo del
turismo ocasional y que solamento requieran del equipamiento mi-
nimo e indispensable pqra tales efectos.
3. Recreacional deportivo:. Se entenderin comprendidos en esta ca-
tegoria los uses que tengan pot finalidad el dosarrollo de Areas
deportivas que requieran de equipamiento minimo para su Imple-
mentacl6n.
En general, la normativa que regiri para estas reas se definiri por
Ia- Secretaria Ministerial de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Regl6n Metropoli-
tana, en cada caso, atendiendo a sus caracteristicas especificas y pre-
via consulta a los organismos competentes.
b Areas de resguard. de *bras de Infraestructura.
Son aquelles Areas restrictivas para el desarrollo urbane con el objeto
de asegurar el funcionamiento adecuado de importantes obras de In-fraestructuray, al milsmo tiempo, minimizar los riesgos quo 3u use ur-
bano implica para los asentamientos humanos.
Para los efectos de Ia aplicacl6n del Plan Intercomunal de Santiago yde Ia presente Ordenanza se comprenden en esta categorla, entre
otra , las Areas que a continuacibn so sefalan:
1. Areas de restriccl6n de puertos a6reos: Son aquellas destinadas a
evitar obstAculos fisicos pars Ia navegaci6n adrea y en las que do-ben controlarse ls uses urbanos en beneficlo y seguridad de Ia
poblacidn. La declaraci6n do ostas Areas, Ia delimitaci6n de las
mismas 7 los usos permitidos on oilas so fijaren de omun 'acuerdopor Ia Becretaria Ministerial de Vivionda y Urbanismo, Regi6n Me-
tropolitana y la Direccidn do AeronAutica.
2. Areas do proteccldn do Ia infraestructura vial: Son aquellas fran-jas do terrenos colindantes con los caminoa publicos naclonales, cu-yo ancho es do 25 metros, medidos a cada lado de los cierros actua-les do estos y en las cuales se prohilbe ofectuar construcclones.do conformidad a 1o establecido en al articulo 179 del DFL. ni-
mero 206, do fecha 26 do Mar20 do 1960.
3. Areas do restricei6n de Husos de Telecomunleaciones: Son aque-Ilas quo tienen por objeto evitar los obsticulos fisicos quo inter-fieran el normal funcionamiento do las telecomunlcaclones. Lalocallsacion, delimitaci6n y lao uses pormitidos en ellas so regi-
rin pot las ndrmas especificas do los Servicios competentes onIa materia.
4. Areas de proteccidn de trasados do lineas do alta tensa6n elec-trica: Son aquellas franjas do terronos destinados a proteger lostenddos de las redes eldetricas do alta tensl6n con el objeto doasegurar su normal funcionanilento, impedir obsticulos que losInterfieran y evItar riesgos a ia poblaclon. La ublcacl6n, delimi-
tacidn, ancho y uses permitidos en ellas serin los previstos enlas normas legales y reglamentarlas de los organismos Iecnicos
competentes.
5. Areas do protoecldn de los trasados ferroviarios: Son aquellas
franjas do terrenos situadas a ambos lados do los trazados fe-
ferrovlarios, desUnadas a proteger #I normal funcionamlento do
las vias, Impedir obsticulos quo los interfieran y evitar riesgos
a Ia poblacidn. La ubicacl6n, dellaitacl6n, ancho y usos pernal-
tides son las establecidas en las dLsposiciones legales y reglamen-
tarias .d Ia Empresa de Ferrocarrilos del Estado y do los demAis
organamnos competentes en Is materia. .
6. Area do proteccl6n do ductos subterrineos: Son aquellas franjas
do terreno destinadas a protoger los tendidos do duct". subterrA-
nos son el objeto do asegurar ou normal funelonamlento, im.
pedir obsticulos quo los interfleran y evitar rlesgos a Ia pobia-
el6n. .1a ubicaci6n, delimitaol6n y uso permitido en tlies, se
regirin por las normas eapecificas do los Serviclos compotentes
en la materia.
C) Areas do, Tfseeel6a Atiesa.
Son aquellas Areas circundantes a los Centros do Investigael6n
Nuclear destinadas a asegurar el normal funcionamlento do dichos
contros y proteger Ia vida do la poblacdes.
La Iocalisacl6n. deliiltacl6n y Ia normativa especifica para estas Areas
seri Is quo establsea Ia feeretaria Ministerial do Vivionda y Urba-
nismo, Regl6n Metropolitana. do conformidad con 1o determinado
por los organismos competentes.
b di Areas do froteosda do Vortientos y Cameos Nalrales do Ague.
Estin constituldas pot las riberas dc las cauces do le ties. lagos 0
esteros, cuya dellmitacifn so encuentra sujeta a las normas previstas
en al doeroto supremo No 60, do 31 de Agosto do 1978, publicado en
el DIario Oficial del 24 do Enero de 1979, del Minlsterio do Tierras y
Colonisscldn, y en *I C6digo de Aguas.
0) Areas do Reaguardo do Caaales do Regadi.-
. on las franjas do torrenos que deslin4an con los canales de regado
y quo -constituyen servidumbre der lo misos. La utilisacl6a -y de!i.
aitaciea do esto terronos so oncuentra sujeta a lo quo disponon los
-ri aIr v u0Mp2Yr~ygiguiontos -del , C6digome.Aguas. . . . .
(41191 Pg. s..NO 3408g
f) Areas do Proteeclde do Monumentos Nacilaale,
Quedan comprendidos en esta categaria los Monumentoes Hstdricos y
Arqueol6gicos, las Zonas declaradas Tipicas o Pintorescas y las ftn-
tuarlos do Ia Naturaleza. La localisci6n, dellmitact6n y los uses per-
mitidos en estas Areas se regirin pot las disposiclones de Ia ley n6-
mero 17.28. de 1970, sobre Monumentos Nacionales. y par las do lo
decretos supremos que se dicten pot disposicl6n do ia referida ley.
g) Areas do Alto Riesgo para Asentamiatos aanos,
Son aquellas Areas que pot sus caracteristican geomorfoldglcas-fist--
cas, no son aptas para los asentamientas humanos. En estas Areas,
cuya calificacl6n definitiva corresponder a Ia Secretaria Ministerial
de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Regi6n Metropolitana, 6eo podrin reat-
zarse construcclones calificadas par dicha Secretaria, previo inform*
favorable de los Organismos TeCnicos competentes.
Dentro de esta categoria so comprenden, entre otras, las zones afec-
tadas por fallas geol6gicas, las Areas Inundables, las do alto riesgo
de asentamientos do terrenos a Inestables y las penas do derrumbes
y rodados.
II. Agrdgaso a continuacidn del Titula I el sigulente nuevo Tiulo.
II, pasando los actuales Titulos II "Vialidad" y III 'Zonificaci6n Interco-
munal", a ter Titulos III y IV, respectivamente. y der6gaso el actual TI-
tulo IV "Densidades Urbanas", agregado a la Ordenansa del Plan. In-
trecomunal de Santiago, por decreto supremo N9 378, do Vivienda y Ur-
banismo. de 1972.
TITULO II
Normas generales apieables en el Area do Espansian Urbana
ARTICULO 89- Pata los efectos de planificar el proceso de desarro-
l urbano en et Area do expansi6n urbana, la Secretaria Ministerial do
Vivienda y Urbanismo, Regldn Metropolitana, determinar los usos per-
mitidos y los excluidos de los distintos sub-sectores geogrificos quo so
Identifiquen en ella.
Corresponder tambidn a Ia citada Secretartia a revision perl6Aca
do las normas contenidas en este Titulo con el objetO do mantenedos
permanentemente actualizados.
* ARTICULO 99-- En cumplimilento do to dispuesto en 01 articulo an-
terior, se fijan los usos permitidos y excluidos en @1 Titulo V do ta pre-
sente Ordenanza.
ARTICULO 109- Las subdivisions y lotes quo so originen on el Area
de expansion urbana 610 podrin se aprobado. por Ia Direcci6n de Obras
Munibipales respectiva, prOvio informe favorable do Ia Seeretaria Minis-
terIal do Vivienda y Urbanlsmo, Regl6a Metropolitana, quIOn podri con-
sultar a los organsmos competents cuando lo estime indispensable.
Para estos efectos dicha Secretaria proporcionar a lo interesados
que to soliclten Ia informacl6n previa necesarla a utilizar en ai desarro-lbo do los proyectos.
Los proyectos que so presenten deberin acompaitarse de Los sigulen-
tes antecedentes:
Piano de subdIvision a de loteo, segun corresponds. que consulte los
usos de suelo que se proponen y un cuadro do superficles de los lotes
resultantes, Ia trama vial que lncluya los perfiles do las vias. de con-
formidad a los estindares establecidos en ia legislaci6n vigente, y au vin-
culack6n con Ia red vial existente y/o proyectada para l sector en el
Plan Intercomunal.
Sin embargo, en los casas de proyectos emplaados en terrenos de Ca-
bida igual o superior a 6 His., y que excedan las normas establecidas en
el incise' 29 del articulo 13 do ala Ordenansa, se euiuri Ia presentaciea
do un Piano Seccional, *I quo deberi contener Ia informaeldn estableelda
en e1 inciso anterior p cuyo trAmite do aprobaci6n so somoter a 10 dis-
puesto on la legislaci6n vigente sobre Ia materia.
ARTICULO 119- Para los efectos do emitir el ifnforme a quO so to-
fiere el articulo 109, la Secretaria Ministerial do VivIeada Y Urbanismo,
Regi6n Metropolitana, analisari los proyectos que so presenten a su con-
sideraci6n, entre otros, do acuerdo a los siguientes criterio.:
a) Que el proyecto no afecte Ia estructura do Ia trama vial exLstento *
proyectada para el sector en el Plan Intercomunal o en ot Reguladur
. Comunal correspondlente.
b) Quo el proyecto cumpla con las condiclones de usos, densidades y do-
mis normas tdcnicas definidas para cada uno de los sub-sectores geo-
griflcos que Integran el Area de expansi6n urbana.
No obstante 10 anterior, el propietaro de un predlo equivalente a dos
o mis unidades prodiales minImas do un sub-sector, podri optar a Ia
concentrack6n de densidades con lotes y donsidades puntuales dife-
rentes a los establecidos pars ese sub-sector on Ia presente Ordenansa.
Para tal efecto, e1 interesado deberi presentar sun piano do sonifica-
cien do todo su predlo, en el Cus se defina el proyocto p sus condicio-
nes tMcnicas do densidad, subdivisi6n predial, poreentale mAiImo do
ocupacidn del suelo, coeficiente mAximo do constructibilidad, etc., las
quo en ningfin case podrin sobrepasar ol total correspondlente a Io
permitido para Ia totalidad do las unidades prediales que conlorman
dicho predio.
Asimiamo, en los trmos do densidades contempladas en las Normas
Tcnicas de esta Ordonanza, los proyetos do loeOs quO s" presenten
podzAn .considerqr tamanos prediales. dis3Iapidosnran. 8g% rospeci..
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del lote minimo definido en las normas par ceada sub-aector, slempre
quo etnfimero de lotes acogidos a este dispoalc6n no sobrepase el
20% del numero total de unidades que resulten de ia aplicacl6n ge-
nerica de las normas y no se altere Is densidad establecida para ef
sub-sector respectivo.
c) Que el proyecto contribuya a mejorar Ia calidad amblental, entre otros.
a travis de Is formacl6n de ress verdes o de un incremento de lasAreas verdes y plantaciones existentes. I
di Que el proyecto consulte los terrenos destinados a espaclos de uso pd-
blico, en los tkrminos a que se refiere el Art. 113 del DS. 80 - M.O.P..
de 10 de Mayo do 1963. disposicl6n esta que se encuentra vigente en
Conformldad con lo preceptuado por el articulo 49 transitorio de Ia
actual Ley General de Urbanismo y Construcciones.
El porcentae de terreno que deba destinarse a espaclos piblicos seri
determinado, en cade caso, por Ia Secretaria Ministerial de Vivienda
y Urbanismo, Region Metropolitana.
En tanto Is mencionada Secretaria Ministerial no establezce Ia tabla
de porcentaes correspondlente a esta norma. se entenderi que Ia exi-
gencia aplicable es ia minima prescrita en el citado articulo 113 del
DO. 880, de 1963.
La entrega de terrenos destinados a equipamiento, establecida en-il
Inciso 39 del articulo 113 cltado precedentemente, no seri exigible en
el cas quo el loteador 0 formador ejecute a su costa los equipamientos
correspondientes de acuerdo a Ia envergadura del proyecto I en for-
ma amultinea con Is urbanizael6n.
Pare estos efectos se entenderA como equipamiento correspondiente
aquel necesarlo pare Ia normal atenci6n del vecindario.
ARTICULO 129- La Secretaria Ministerial de Vivienda y Urbanismo,
Regl6n Metropolitans, una vet recibidos los antecedentes completos exigi-
doe en este Ordenana; seg6n corresponda. dispondri de un plazo de 10
dies hibiles par& informar el proyecto sometido a su consideracl6n. Este
plazo empesari a contarse deade Ia feche de Ingreso del expedlento en Ia
OfIcina de Partes de dicha Secretarla.
81 Ia Secretaria, en el plato antes sefialado, no hubiere expedido el in-
forme o este fuere desfavorable. el Interesado podri recurrir a ia Divisl6n
de Desarrollo Urbano del Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo, Ia que re-
solvert en definitiva sin ulterior recurso.
El rechazo por parte de Ia Secretaria deberi ser debidamente fundado
y notificado al Interesado, con copla a Ia Division de Desarrollo Urbano.
La Municpalidad correspondiente aprobari lo proyeetos do loteo y
subdivisidn, como asimismo. lo de edificaci6n y urbanizaci6n a que 6stos
den origen, en los terminos informados por Ia Secretaria Mlnisterial a por
la Divial6n de Desarrollo Urbano, segun corresponds.
ARTICULO 139- Las condiciones de ediflcacion y subdivisi6n predial
expresadas en densidad brute, coeficiente miximo de constructibilidad,
porcentaje mAximo de ocupeci6n del suelo y superficle minima de los pre-
dios, aplicables a los distintos Subsectores Geogrificos del Area de expan-
sion urbana, aparecen definidoe por tramos, en el siguiente cuadro:
CUADRO DE TRAMOS OENERICOS DE
CONDICIONES DE EDIFICACION Y SUBDIVISION
eviembre de 1979
La condiciones tenicas antes senaladas pare log respecivos
podrin alterarse automiticamente, en los casos que le proyectos l '-
placen en terrenos de superficie igual o superior a 5 hs., do acuordo at
siguiente cuadro:
CUADRO DR ALTERACION AUTOMATICA DE LOS TRAMOS QENERICOS
Tramo Alteraecln Autessitles
Generice Mixima de les Trames
A 
. C
D
C E
D P
z tP
se mantiene
Si los interesados requieren desarrollar proyectos en terrenos de 5 o
mis his.. coyas condiclones ticuicas alteren las ya previstas en este ar-
ticulo, podrin solicltarlo a Ia Secretaria Ministerial de Vivienda y Urba-
nismo, Regi6n Metropolitana, mediante Ia presentact6n de in Plano Sec-
clonal cuya aprobacion se cefnri a la legislacl6n vigente.
En todos los predlos del Area de expansidn urbana, cuyas superficles
correspondan a I"o tramos A y B deflnidos en este articulo, podri cons-
truirse, adenis de la vivienda del propletarlo, una vivienda para el colda-
dor siempre que esta cumpla con las caracteristicas definidas para las vi-
viendas sociales en el De. (V. y U.) N' 314, do 1975, pare to coal Is Diree-
cl6n de Obras Municipales respectIva efectuari Ia taxaci6n correspondlente
en conformidad con 10 dispuesto en el DL. N9 2.552. do 1979.
ARTICUID 14*- Las obras de urbanizaci6n quo deban realizarse enlos loteos serin ejecutadas o garantizadas conforme a Ia legislaeldn vi-gente por lo interesados. En tanto no so eumpla eon este exigendea, no
aer licito al propietario, loteador o urbanizador transferir el doninlo aterceros, ni celebrar ningnn acto o contrato que tenga por finslidad
ultima o inmediata Ia transferencla de dominio de los respectivos to-
rrenoe.
El financlamlento total de las obras de infraestructura sanitaria yP
vial, y sus conexiones a las redes existentes seri do cargo del lateresado.
ARTICUsO 151- Las construcclones existentos en el Area do expaM
s6n urbane, que a ia fecha del presente decreto no cuentone al co.
rrespondiente permiso de odfileacl6n, podrin ser regularisadAs on con-
formidad a Ia legislacidn vigente, no obstante que Is superfieo y&
construlda sobrepase haste en on 100% del coeficiente mAimho do Con&
tructibilidad establecido en las Normas Tiencas deftnidas en el TItulo V
de a presente Ordenansa.
8610 podrin acogerse a esta disposicl6n las construcclonoa existentes
destinadas a ia explotac16n agricola del predio. incluldas las viviendas
del propletario y de sus Inquilinos o trabajadores. 7 siempre quo dichas
ionstrucciones eaten emplasadas en terrenos do cabida igual o superior a
2.500 m2.
IV. Reemplisase on eC actual Titulo M "Zoniflesc16 Interom*
nal", pirrafo *Ares Verdes', Incise primoro, Ia Irase *Diroccida do Pi,
neamiento del Unisterlo do Obras Piblicas", por Ia Erase "Secrtaria
Ministerial do Vivienda y Urbanismo, Regida Metropolitana".
Asimismo, der6gase el sub-pirrafo 'Reserves Forestales Rurales".
V. Der6gase on 0l actual Titulo II "Zonificacl6n IntereomunL,
pirrafo "Aras Verdes", eI sub-P afo '1eservas Agricolas y Forestales
Sub-urbana".
VI. Derdgase on el actual Titulo It, "ZonIficacI6n Intercomuna",parrafo "Vivienda", las letras a) "Zonas de Habitacl6n Econ6miea", y
b) "Zones para ia Autoconstruccl6n do Viviendas" y INe acipites quo
regulan estas materlas.
VII.Agregase a continuael6n del nuevo Titulo IV el siguint no .
vo Titulo V.
TITULO V.
Neruas tdeaices aplicables en e Area do Expanuin Urbana
ARTICULO 10- 28 of presewnt italo e incluyen las norms te.
nica aplicables a eda ame do los sub-ectores quo Integran )a sutre
geogrilleos del Jres do expansi6n urbana del Plan Interemunal de 3aa
tage, do conmidad a Ie Cuadros que so lnsrtaa a coatlaneSM .a A
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5 4,9 0,045 4,5% 8.000
9,6 0,08 8,0% 4.000
C 9,6 0,08 6,0% 4.000
19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
D 16,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 00
3 4,9 0,045 '4,S% 8.000
9,s 0,08 6,0% 4.000
3 4,9 0,045 4,5% 6.000
9,8 0,06 0,0% 4.000
19,s 0,04 4,0% 4.000
19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 600
x 49,0 0,30 30,0% 600
81,63 0,40 40,0% 480
a 4,9 0,045 4,5% 6.000
9,8 0,08 8,0% 4.000
D) 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% B00
a 4,9 0,045 4,5% 6.000
9,8 0,06 8,0% 4.000
C 9,6 0,08 6,0% 4.000
19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 600
E 49,0 0, 30 30,0% 600
S 1,63 0,40 40,01 480
a 4,9 0,045 4,5% m.000
9,8 0,06 4,0% 04.000
C 9,8 0,08 9,0% 4.000
,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30.0% 600
- 49,0 0,14 '. 14,0% 60081,63 0,30 30,0% 460
a 4,9 0,045 4,5% 6.000
9,6 0,08 8,0 4.000
C 4,8 0,08 8,0% 4.0010
19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 *30,0% g00
, 49 0,14 14,0% 60
81,63 0,.30 30,01 460
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Art. 70 lete& b.1 do la
presente Ordeaaasa.
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m2
_________________ r i-i
A
2,45
4,9
0,03
0,045
3,0%
4,5%
16.000
.. 8.000.
X 49,0 0,30 30,0% 80081,63 0,40 40,0% 480
r 81,63 0,40 40,0% 480
196O00 0,80 40,0% 200
A 2,45 0,03 3,0% 16.000
4,90 0,045 4,5% 8.000
S . 4,9 0,045 4,5% 8.000
9,8 0,OR 8,0% 4.000
C 9,8 0,08 8,0% 4.000
19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
19,s 0,14 14,0% 2,00
49,0 0,30 30,0% 800
/0,0 0.30' 30,0% 800
81,63 0,o. 40,0% 4!00
8,63 0,40 40,0%
196,0 t-,50 40.0%
A 2,45 0,03 3,0% 26.000
4,9 04045 4,5% 8,000
5 4,9 0,045 4,5% 8.000
9,8 p,08 8,0% 4.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 800
1 81,63 0,40 40,0% 480
196,0 0,80 40,0% 200
g 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
'49,0 0,30 30,0% 800
1 81,63 0,40 40,0% 480
196,0 0,80 40,0% 200
A 4,9. 0,045 4,5% 8.000
9,8 0,08 8,0% 4.000
D 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 800
. 49,0 0,30 30,0% 30081,63 0,40 40,0% 400
7 81,63 0,40 40,0% 480
196,00 0,80 40,0% 200
C 9,8 0t08 8,0% 4.00019,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
V . 19,6 0,14 14,0% 2.000
49,0 0,30 30,0% 000
1 81,63 0,40. 40,0% 800
296,00 0,80 40,0% 200
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az6n y publiquese.- Por orden del Presidento de Is Republica, Jaime Estrada Leigh, General do Brigada, Ministro do
a US. pars su conocimiento.- Dios guarde a US.- Bernardo Garrido Valensuela, ministro de to.
to mi. Humberto Faundes
Rivera, notario pdblico de
Concepcien, O'Higgins 545.
senores Enrique Steffens
Correa. O'iggins 650; Jor-
ge Neumann Appell, O'Hig-
gIns 560, Matlas Poch Poch,
Rengo 1653; JosW Poch
Poch, Avda. P. do Valdivia
1273, JullAn Gonziles De-
rout, Libertad N9 39, Chli-lin, paso 6sta, y Alejandro
Quiero Avendafio, O'Higgins
1160, modificatron Socledad
Agricola y Forestal Los Re-
-bles LulLada, formada por
eacritura publica ante no-
tario pblico Francisco Mo-
llna VAldes. fecha 19 Mar-
so 1968, inscrita a tolas 117
Vta., Ne 72, del Registro do
Comercio del Ao 1968, de
Concepci6n, retirindose de
ella don Jullin Gonales
Derout, cedlendo sus dere-
chos sociles a Alejandro
Quiero Avendano, el cusi
ingress comoe soclo con
iguales facultades que 1e
correspondian al socio co-
dent. en cuanto a la ad-
ministracida y uso raz6n
social. Se deja constancia
quo el poreentale do los
socil on las utilidades, per-
didas y aporte do capital as
e1 sigulente: socio Enrique
Steffens, 22%; socio Jorge
Neumann, 22%; socios Jose
y Matis Poch, 22%, y so-
do Alejandro Quiero, 34%.
Demis antecedentes en es-
oritura extractada.- Con-
Cepeln, 22 do Noviembre
do 1M.-- Humberto Faun-
doe Rivers, Concepcl6n.
EITRACTO
Ra6 Undurraga Las, no-
tarlo pablico est departa-
mento, Huirfanos 1044. en-
trepweo, cortifico: por escri-
turs piblics, sate mi, do
esa feeha. seloros Tomis
Puig Casanova, por s, y don
Pedro Correa Opaso, por
Socioded do InversionesHispana Limitada y Com-
paulo on Comandita por
Acciones, todos do ost do-
micilio, Metias Cousino I2,
oficina 410, constituyen so-
eledad do responsabilidad
Ilmiltada do conformildad a
Is ley, 0nyo objeto sere Is
prestacifn de serviclio do
contabilidad, cuentas co-
--- a Inenpman 3
otros similares, mediante el
uso de computadores y
otras maquinarlas adecus-
das a dichos lines. Su re-
s6n social sen "Oeincla
Chile Computaciba Umita-
da'. pudiendo ussr en to-
das sus actuaciones nom'bre
do fantasia "Ochicom
Ltda.". Administracin y
uso ras6n social, correspon-
deri a don Tomis Puig Ca-
sanova, con todas las fa-
cultades detalladas en es-
eritura social. Capital es do
S 200.000, aportado por so-
clos por Iguales partes en
dinero efectivo y documen-
tos en eate acto. Utilidades
y pirdidas so distribuirin
entre soclos por Iguales
partes, socios lmitan sus
responsabilidades respecti-
vys a monto sus sportes.
Iomicillo social seri eludad
do Santiago, sin perjuicio
do ejercer actividades en
otros pantos del pals o del
extranjero. Plazo duraeidn
sociedad sert do 5 ass, re-
novable automAtica y suce-
sivamente pot periodos do
3 anos cade uno, salvo To-
luntad en contrario de al-
gin soclo manifestada por
erlturas piblica &notada
a margen Inscripel6n social,
con anticipaci6n minima do
6 meses a tirmino respec-
tivo perlodo. Pgcultan a
portador copia autorisada
este extracto pare realisar
trimites legales pertinen-
teLs. Demis estipulaciones
en escritura extractada.-
Santiago, 15 do Noviembro
do 1979.- I. Undurraga L.,
notario.
EXTRACTO
Tito SAnches Gajardo,
notario, Huhrfanas 1100, lo-
cal 22, Santiago, cortilco
que por escritura piblios
fchada boy, ante ml, Os-
ear Octavio Horrors Paves,
Gravity 4515; ChrIstian Re-
nato Oonsiles Pires, Pie-
eope do Gales 71218; Norman
Babarovic Contreras, las
Arallas 3285; Julio Horma-
mAbel Rodriguez. Avenida
Domingo Santa Mara 1713;
Daniel Haroldo Soto PErez,
Principe do Gales 7213, y
Ricardo Patricio Soto Pires,
Principe de Gales 1215, to-
dos Santiago. han modifi-
cado Is socledad ltalpu
socledad Comercial e In-
destrial Umitada', inscrita
ojas 2.997, N9 2.342, Regis-
tro Comercio Santiago, ano
1979. en virtud de cesl6n do-
rechos convenida por escri-
tura 14 Junio 1979, Notaria
GonsAles, como ague: In-
gresa a sociedad Daniel
Haroldo Soto Pdres pot ha-
ber adquirido los derechos
de Norman Babarovic Con-
treras, quien se retira do
sociedad; Ingresa a socle-
dad Ricardo Patriclo Soto
Peres por baber adqulrido
los derechos do Julio Hor-
masibal Rodriguez, quien
so retira do sociedad, y so
retire de socledad Oscar
Octavio Herrera Paves, por
haber cedido sus derechos
a Christian Renato OonrA-
Ie- Pires. Consecuencia mo-
dificacion pcocedente. so-
cledad queda integrada por
siguientes socios con spor-
tea quo se senaalan: Chris-
tian Renato Gonziles Pires,
50% y $ 100.000 capital so-
clal; Ricardo Patricio Soto
Pres, 25% y $ 50.000 capi-
tal social, y Daniel Haroldo
Soto Pires, 235%. 7 $ 50.000
capital social. Modificase
cliusula do admlnistracida
y usc raz6n social a610 en
euanto istas corresponderin
a Christian Renato GonsA-
lea Pires y Daniel Haroldo
Soto Pires. Otras cliusulas
en contrato extractado.-
Santiago, 26 do Octubre do
1979.- T. Sinches G., no-
tarlo.
URTRACTO
Roberto 06mes O6mes,
notarlo publico titular d-
partamento Ultima ZEpe-
ransa, con oticeo Puerto No-
tales, calls 5agallanea 17.
cortifico que por eseritura
ptblica otergads auto ml,
fecha do boy. Hector Mario
Garay Merado, chofer. do-
micillado esta eludsd, ts-
mires 99K, y Sebastien Stela
Arriagada. chofer, domicila-
do esta ciudad MIraflores
484. eonatituyeron soceldad
colectiva comercial respob-
sabilidad limitada, con arrs-
glo leyes 3.918 y 6.156, y en-
yo donMlo seri eats ciu-
dad Puerto Natales, calls
Ramire NO 90, sin perjul-
cio fillales o agencias esta-
blescan otros puntos pais a
extranjero, y objeto Seri
explotaclin del giro trans-
portes on todo aspecto, den-
tro y fuers del pals. Socle-
dad girari balo raz6n so-
cial 'Heter Mario Garay
Mercade y SebastiAn Stela
Arriagada", pudiendo usar
tambien nombro comercial
"Transportes Garay y Stela
Lmitada'. Administracl6n.
representald6n y uso razn
social corresponderi indis-
Unta o coujuntamente am-
boa soclos, quienes podrin
ejecutar actos y contratos
inherentes giro socledad. es-
pecialmente los senalados
cLiusula tercera rs6n so-
cial. Capital social es suma
$ 300.300, aportado socios
Iguales partes, ya ingresado
a areas soclales y que co-
rresponde al pie cancelado
por compra do cami6n Dod-
so. modelo P-900-197, anto
1979, motor TJ 3542B002557F,
serle TO 39973, que se spor-
ta a Ia sociedad totalmen-
to nuevo y sin usN. adqui-
rido a Glldameister S.A.C.,
Aegn facturs N9 000199, do
25 do Octubre de 1979. Res-
ponsabilidad soels queda
limiltada monlo do sum res-
pcetivos aportes. Genanclas
y pdrdidas so distribuirin
ontro socios proporcional-
mente sue aportes, de acuer-
do eon balance e Inventa-
rio qua a* practicari. a lo
mes, ana U ee cada ano
oienArl.. Soclodad durari
dos sao, centados desde es-
a fecha y so entenderi
prorrogada automAticamen-
to por perodos Iguales y su-
cTves do un apo. &I an-
guno do le soelos manUes-
tare su voluntad do ponerle
termino medlante escritura
pibilea quo sn debern anota
Registro Comerelo, margen
inseripel6a etracto social
orn tre mase antlclpeda,
a 1s memos, venelmoento so-
eledad. Deis espedfica-
clones sontan esatua so-
*al.- Puerto Natales, echo
do Novlembre do mu nove-
lento sentanla 7 sueve.
(4125) Pig. treCe
